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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation aims to reveal and explain how the evolving relationship between the 
Johannesburg City Council and the Native Affairs Department affected urban African 
administration during the early stages of Apartheid. It will add detail to a selection of key 
disputes between the levels of Government in the mid 1950s and examine the Department’s 
onslaught against the Council towards the end of the decade. It will trace the emergence of a 
culture of pragmatic cooperation during the early 1960s and analyse internal divisions within 
the United Party group in Council. It will finish by tracing the emergence of the 
Administration Board system and suggesting that the period of pragmatic cooperation played 
a role in delaying the ultimate decision to remove urban African administration from local 
authorities. Throughout this dissertation the influence of key personalities like W.J.P Carr, 
Manager of the Johannesburg Non-European Affairs Department and Patrick Lewis, the 
Chairman of the Non-European Affairs Committee, will be explored.  
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Introduction 
The Johannesburg City Council (JCC) achieved notoriety in Nationalist circles in the mid 
1950s for its high profile skirmishes with the Native Affairs Department (NAD).1 Hendrik 
Verwoerd, then Minister of Native Affairs, took the Council to task for its persistent 
questioning of Government policy and misinterpretation of the flow of authority in the 
country. Towards the end of the decade the NAD launched an all out offensive against the 
Council and its Non-European Affairs Department which culminated in the demand for a 
number of assurances. The threat of a Government takeover of urban African administration 
and the potential destruction of  the Council’s mammoth building machine - churning out a 
house in Soweto every twelve minutes at its height – led a highly divided United Party (UP) 
dominated Council towards its ‘Munich Moment’. 
 
This dissertation aims to reveal and explain how the evolving relationship between the JCC 
and NAD affected urban African administration in Johannesburg during the early stages of 
Apartheid. It will add detail to a selection of key disputes between the levels of Government 
in the mid 1950s and analyse the showdown that led to a shift in the balance of power 
towards the Central State. It will then shed light on a culture of pragmatic cooperation that 
emerged in the aftermath of the Council’s assurance to follow Government Policy as far as it 
was enshrined in law. Throughout this dissertation the role of key individuals such as W.J.P. 
Carr, Manager of the Johannesburg Non European Affairs Department (JNEAD) and Patrick 
Lewis, Chairman of the Johannesburg Non European Affairs Committee (JNEAC) will be 
explored.  
 
In February 2011 I joined a multidisciplinary team investigating the history, people and uses 
of the ‘Old Albert Street Pass Office’ located on the south eastern side of central 
Johannesburg. During conversations with a diverse group of people who had come into 
contact with the building I noticed two frequent generalisations closely tied to each other and 
needing further examination. Firstly, the vast majority of people assumed that 80 Albert 
Street functioned solely as a pass office during the Apartheid era. While this certainly was its 
most notorious function, the building also housed the Administration Branch of the JNEAD 
which was responsible for planning and regulating almost all aspects of urban African life 
from housing, welfare and recreation to beer brewing, employment and research. Secondly, 
                                                             
1 Renamed the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD) in the late 1950s. 
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many people assumed that the work that went on inside the building was uniformly 
oppressive leading to assumptions about the type of person that must have worked there. The 
opportunity to interrogate these assumptions has been a key motivator in taking on this 
research. 
 
W.J.P. Carr’s name is inscribed on the bottom left hand side of the foundation stone of 80 
Albert Street. He served the JNEAD for almost forty years, seventeen of those as Manager, 
and played a significant role in the creation of Soweto. Many sources highlight his paternalist 
style of administration and his desire to improve race relations in Johannesburg. The 
opportunity to explore the ambiguity of the role of Manager of the JNEAD and the 
ideological complexities of Carr, as well as other key individuals like Lewis, has been a 
significant catalyst for this research.   
 
 
 
Picture 2: The JNEAD Foundation Stone. Photograph taken by James Ball April 2011 
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The Relationship between Local and Central Government  
There have been a number of important contributions to the literature concerning the 
relationship between local and central government in South Africa during the early stages of 
Apartheid. In her book, The Making of Apartheid, Deborah Posel describes the shifting 
balance of power between the two levels of government and its influence on policy making. 
She shows how the Native Affairs Department (NAD) was initially dependent on experienced 
municipal administrators for the formulation and implementation of policy. In the early 1950s 
the National Party (NP) was too weak to make a sustained attack on local authorities resulting 
in the reality that the formulation of Apartheid during this time was premised on a high 
degree of municipal autonomy. As the NP improved its electoral performance and expanded 
the NAD bureaucracy in the mid 1950s it was able to chip away at municipal powers. By the 
end of the decade the balance of power had shifted firmly in favour of the state and the then 
renamed Department of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD).2 
 
During the segregation era, the NAD focused largely on the reserves and abandoned many of 
its urban responsibilities to local authorities. Ivan Evans describes how urban administration 
was weakened by an ambiguous chain of command where local authorities and the NAD 
avoided final responsibility for policy and the rising militancy of poorly regulated African 
residential areas.3 As the 1950s unfolded Verwoerd’s authoritarian style galvanised the NAD 
which then mounted an unprecedented assault on the autonomy of local authorities.4 Evans 
emphasises that the clarification of the NAD’s dominant position over local authorities was a 
crucial development in the Apartheid era.5 A large portion of this dissertation will build on 
this key theme. 
 
Posel argues that the relationship between central and local government is critical in 
explaining the discrepancies between the policy and practice of influx control in the 1950s. 
Local authorities had to manage a number of competing interests: on the one hand they were 
answerable to the NAD and on the other they needed to be responsive to the needs of local 
                                                             
2 D. Posel, The Making of Apartheid 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991, p. 
263-264 
3 I. Evans, Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa, University of California Press, Los 
Angeles, 1994, p. 14 
4 P. Bonner, P. Delius and D. Posel, ‘The Shaping of Apartheid: Contradictions, Continuity and Popular 
Struggles’ in P. Bonner, P. Delius and D. Posel (eds) Apartheid’s Genesis, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1993, p. 
28 
5 Ibid, p. 17 
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rate payers, particularly large industrial and commercial concerns. In order to balance these 
commitments municipalities favoured a highly flexible approach to policy implementation.6 
The general picture that emerges is one of a local authority unable or unwilling to maintain 
order by enforcing government policy.7  
 
Bekker and Humphries stress that while there was conflict between municipalities and the 
state prior to 1948 – mainly over finance – disagreement was much more marked in the years 
after the NP came to power.8 Their main contribution to the literature is the argument that the 
divisions in the 1950s occurred predominantly along party-political lines. It appeared that the 
UP controlled municipalities consistently opposed government policies which raised 
questions at a national level about the wisdom of continuing to use municipal agents for the 
implementation of policy.9 For Bekker and Humphries, the establishment of the 
administration boards in the early 1970s came about as a result of the long standing feeling 
within the NAD/BAD that municipalities were not implementing legislation as efficiently as 
the department had intended.10  
 
Nieftagodien rejects the notion that the well publicised tensions between some UP dominated 
councils – especially Johannesburg – and the state can be generalised to include all UP 
dominated local authorities and contends that councils on the East Rand were important role 
players in the implementation of Apartheid.11 His research reveals that the conservative wing 
of the UP which dominated the Springs, Germiston and Benoni municipalities developed 
unusually cooperative relationships with the Nationalist Government. The primary outcome 
of these relationships was that control was easier to achieve and government policies were 
implemented virtually without opposition.12 This dissertation will reveal the tensions between 
the conservative and liberal wings of the UP in Johannesburg and show how the combination 
of conservative influence and Nationalist pressure resulted in the JCC adopting a strategy of 
pragmatic cooperation in the early 1960s. 
                                                             
6 Posel, The Making of Apartheid, p. 263 
7 Ibid, p. 247 
8 S. Bekker and R. Humphries, From Control to Confusion: The Changing Role of Administration Boards in South 
Africa, 1971-1983, Shuter & Shooter, Pietermaritzburg, 1985, p. 3 
9 Ibid, p. 5 
10 Ibid, p. 8 
11 N. Nieftagodien, ‘The Implementation of Urban Apartheid on the East Rand, 1948–1973: The Role of Local 
Government and Local Resistance’, Ph.D. Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2001, p. 5 
12 Ibid, p. 197 
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Evans builds on the theme of cooperation and argues that local authorities were attracted to 
certain key aspects of the department’s urban policy in the 1950s. The areas of mutual 
concern revolved around two principles adopted by the department: commitment to policies 
that gave preferential treatment to urban Africans and the stabilisation of labour. It was 
argued that the establishment of a labour bureau system would protect urban Africans from 
the competitive pressure of migrant workers. Liberal administrators such as Carr accepted the 
principle of the system but objected to the manner in which it was carried out. They 
convinced themselves that had they been in charge, the system would have been far less 
coercive and much more supportive of the settled African population.13  
 
A significant portion of the literature has identified the JCC as a constant voice of opposition 
to Government policies. A central theme throughout Carr’s history of Soweto is the ongoing 
conflict between his department and the NAD.14 He highlights the Western Areas Removal 
Scheme (WARS) and ethnic grouping as major sources of tension and describes the 
appointment of the Departmental Committee for Johannesburg and its demand for assurances 
from the Council. He also stresses key disagreements between the JCC and NAD over 
housing policy and finance.15 
 
Carr believes that his opposition to the concept of housing unproductive Africans in the 
homelands sealed the fate of the JNEAD. With hindsight, however, he argues that the seeds 
for the abolition of municipal African affairs were sown during the conflict surrounding the 
Western Areas Removal Scheme.16 Van Tonder contends that continuities existed between 
pre-Apartheid UP policies and the NP policies of the early to mid 1950s.  He shows how a 
decade before the removals, the UP controlled JCC drafted a similar plan to the one carried 
out by the Nationalists. His research contests the view that the removals were conducted by 
an ‘overzealous NP anxious to impose its ideas of Apartheid’.17 Carr conceded that the JCC 
agreed in principle to remove the residents of the Western Areas and confirms Van Tonder’s 
argument that the delay in implementation was due to the high cost of resettlement at a time 
                                                             
13 Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, p. 106-108 
14 W. J. P. Carr, Soweto - Its creation, life and decline, South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 
1990, p. 183 
15 Ibid, p. 123-134 
16 Ibid, p. 183 
17 Van Tonder, D. “First Win the War then Clear the Slums: The Genesis of the Western Areas Removal Scheme, 
1940-1949”, in P. Bonner, P. Delius and D. Posel (eds), Apartheid’s Genesis, 1935-1962, Ravan Press, 
Johannesburg, 1993, p. 316 
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when the city was experiencing an acute housing shortage. Differences in principle regarding 
the implementation of the removals were a major test for local-central relations. Carr 
maintains that the JCC stood firm on three points which the NP could not accept: the scheme 
would initially be voluntary; the worst-housed should be moved first; and those with freehold 
rights should be given the same rights in Meadowlands.18 The Government ultimately by-
passed the JCC and created the Natives Resettlement Board to carry out the removals. 
 
Evans argues that in demanding the right to either determine how the removal scheme would 
be carried out or to be relieved of all responsibility, the JCC presented itself as the primary 
defender of the historical autonomy of local government.19 He highlights the significance of 
this event as it was the first time since the 1937 Amendment Act made it possible that the 
central government had invoked the Native Urban Areas Act to displace a local authority in 
the realm of Native administration. The JCC ultimately agreed to cooperate with the 
Resettlement Board in some areas (the provision of land and civil engineering services) on 
the grounds that it would alleviate some of the harshness involved in the removals.20 
 
Another important strand in the literature is the centrality of finance in the relationship 
between the different levels of government. Nick Devas, drawing on global case studies, 
demonstrates how the control of the flow of funds can be used as a tool to ensure municipal 
cooperation.21 Maylam has shown that financial issues caused tension between all the major 
stakeholders – capital, labour, local and central government. Each party attempted to shift the 
financial burden of the reproduction of labour onto the other.22 Glaser provides a useful 
description of the historical struggle between the levels of government over the financing of 
African services during the early stages of Apartheid. 23 In the 1950s the NP relinquished all 
responsibility arguing that urban African communities should be self financing. The state 
went a step further in the 1960s and often deliberately prevented municipalities and private 
sources from subsidising Native revenue accounts. By the mid to late 1960s, in line with the 
                                                             
18 Carr, Soweto, p. 86-87 
19 Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, p. 152 
20 Ibid, p. 154 
21 N. Devas, ‘Urban Government: Capacity, Resources and Responsiveness’. In N. Devas (ed.), Governance, 
Voice and Poverty in the Developing World, Earthscan, London, 2004, p. 98 
22 P. Maylam, ‘The rise and decline of urban apartheid in South Africa’, African Affairs, vol. 89, 1990, p. 71 
23 C. Glaser, Bo-Tsotsi: The Youth Gangs of Soweto 1935-1976, David Philip, Cape Town, p. 100-101 
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policy of developing the homelands and attempting to reverse urbanisation, the BAD 
endeavoured to limit housing loans to the JCC and freeze investment in African areas. 24   
 
Parnell, in her description of the establishment of the Dube home-ownership scheme, shows 
how financial pressure was exerted on the JCC. The UP controlled JCC planned to create an 
elite, low density African residential suburb offering full freehold rights. As the title deeds of 
the farm Klipspruit excluded Africans from being registered freehold owners of property, the 
Council offered 99-year leasehold as the next best thing. The vision for Dube was eroded as 
Verwoerd insisted that the scheme be rezoned to achieve greater density and that leasehold be 
reduced to thirty years without the option of renewal. Threatened with the loss of funding the 
JCC reluctantly complied with these stipulations. 25 This pattern of financial coercion 
continued to play out in the 1950s and 1960s and is a significant theme in this dissertation. 
 
A closely related area which produced friction between the levels of government was the 
definition of economic, subeconomic and sub subeconomic housing. Verwoerd’s strategy to 
put native housing on a sound economic footing rested on three principles: the greatest 
number of Africans should be made to pay economic rentals, losses on subeconomic housing 
should be reduced to a minimum and subsidisation should only be available to Africans with 
Section 10 rights.26 Evans argues that the JCC and other large municipalities took a 
sympathetic view and attempted to lower the income levels at which African families would 
become eligible for state subsidisation. Verwoerd predictably dismissed this action arguing 
that it would undermine all the work done by the department to reduce housing costs.27   
 
Beavon provides an overview of the restrictions on trading rights in African townships which 
became another point of divergence between the JCC and BAD. Local Authorities controlled 
the allocation of formal trading rights and had the power to prohibit informal trading. The 
only formal businesses allowed were those that catered for the ‘reasonable or basic 
necessities’ of African people.28 Bonner and Segal demonstrate how disease and death 
became the largest industry in Soweto - herbalism and funeral undertaking were the most 
                                                             
24 Tensions were prevalent pre-1948 as the central government tried to offload the financial burden to the 
municipalities.  
25 S. Parnell, ‘The ideology of African home ownership: the establishment of Dube, Soweto, 1946-1955’, paper 
delivered to the History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand, 1990, p. 6  
26 Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, p. 133-134 
27 Ibid, p. 143 
28 K. Beavon, Johannesburg: The Making and Shaping of the City, Unisa Press, Pretoria, 2004, p. 139 
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profitable business enterprises.29 As the 1960s unfolded stricter controls were applied to both 
formal and informal traders in townships. Under the ‘one man one business’ policy of 1963, 
Africans were limited to only one business and were precluded from forming companies or 
partnerships with a view to expanding their business interests. This meant that the full benefit 
of economies of scale and lower prices could not be achieved. Patrick Lewis found this policy 
particularly objectionable and attempted to lobby the NAD to make amendments. His pleas 
fell on deaf ears.30 
 
Pronouncing judgement on the relationship between the levels of government during the 
1950s and 1960s, Mandy argues that the JCC was a prisoner of the situation. It was 
compelled to acknowledge that it would have to execute government policy but only so far as 
it was enshrined in law. Departmental instructions that lacked statutory authority would not 
be regarded as binding. He concludes that the JNEAD established a proud record of 
achievement under trying circumstances.31 Glaser also argues that Carr managed to provide 
relatively efficient services despite monitoring and limited resources that were ultimately too 
meagre to make a real difference.32 This dissertation will add significant detail to this thread 
of the literature. 
 
Ideologies, Administrative Styles and Internal Divisions 
In his study of the implementation of urban Apartheid on the East Rand, Nieftagodien shows 
that the UP and the NP were not politically homogenous entities. The UP had progressive and 
conservative wings while the NP had purist and practical tendencies.33 Posel argues that 
Afrikanerdom was divided over the substance of Apartheid with opposing factions disputing 
the extent to which white economic prosperity should need and depend on black labour.34 
One division embraced a practical approach where the realities of economic integration and 
African urbanisation were accommodated. The other denied the permanence of Africans in 
the urban areas and believed that urbanisation could be reversed. The practical position was 
evident during Posel’s first phase of Apartheid and resulted in a strategy of stabilisation of 
                                                             
29 P. Bonner and P. Segal, Soweto - A History, Maskew Miller Longman, Cape Town, 1998, p. 34 
30 Archives of the University of the Free State (AUFS), Private Papers of WJP Carr (WJPC), PV423, 1/13/4/1, Vol 
2, Lecture titled ‘A City within a City – the Creation of Soweto’, delivered by Patrick Lewis to the University of 
the Witwatersrand, 1966 
31 N. Mandy, A City Divided, MacMillan, Johannesburg, 1984, p.184 
32 Glaser, Bo-Tsotsi, p. 102 
33 Nieftagodien, ‘The Implementation of Apartheid’, p. 151 
34 Posel, The Making of Apartheid, p. 5 
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the urban African population and strict influx control.35 Concessions - curbs on integration 
and a removals policy to reduce the size of urban African communities in white areas – were 
granted to ‘Purists’ as Apartheid shifted into a second phase from 1959-1961.36 
 
The significant ideological differences within and between the political parties emerged from 
the central contradiction of Apartheid: how to maximise the exploitation of cheap labour 
while minimising the presence of African workers in the white urban areas. As Apartheid 
evolved, the BAD attempted to resolve this contradiction with a number of interventions 
including: the decentralisation of industry to the border areas; tighter influx control; the 
forced removal of Africans to townships and Bantustans; the development of commuter rail 
networks etc. Out of the central contradiction emerged new contradictions, divisions and 
struggles. Maylam argues that given these contradictions it was not surprising that urban 
policy was a contested terrain not only between the dominant and dominated but within the 
dominant class.37 This dissertation will analyze significant divisions within the UP controlled 
JCC.   
 
According to Maylam, the overall trend in native administration from the 1940s was a shift 
from paternalism to professionalism although elements of paternalism survived well into the 
1960s. Evans argues that in the early years of Apartheid, a large portion of native 
administrators were united by a desire to expunge the paternalist ethos inherited from the 
segregation years.38 Verwoerd shifted the NAD’s focus from rural to urban areas and 
abolished all vestiges of decentralised administration. Evans shows how the rise of a new 
style of administration led to regulations being acted on more often than in the segregation 
era and restrictions being placed on courts to restrain judges that might give a liberal 
interpretation of the law.39  
 
Chaskalson recognises that there are significant tensions inside and between different 
departments and different branches of the state. He argues that within the context of these 
tensions there is some space, although limited, for individual actors to have an effect on 
                                                             
351948-1959 (shift to the second phase from 1959-1961) 
36 Posel, The Making of Apartheid, p. 261 
37 Maylam, ‘The rise and decline’, p. 71-72 
38 Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, p. 10 
39 Ibid, p. 17 
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policy.40 A number of studies have investigated the role of individuals acting in this limited 
space. The analysis of Carr and Lewis throughout this dissertation will contribute to this body 
of literature. 
 
Sapire, for example, draws attention to the career of Dr F.J. Language, Manager of the 
Brakpan NEAD. She shows how he had an uncompromising attitude towards African 
urbanisation and urban controls.41 Language was responsible for a few improvements in 
African areas but opinions towards him were ambivalent. His refusal to consult and his 
abrasiveness in dealing with Africans generated intense antagonism. Despite being found 
guilty of assaulting an African leader he went on to hold senior positions in various 
administration bodies and wrote widely on Native administration.42 
 
Nieftagodien describes Language and A.S. Marais, Manager of the Boksburg NEAD, as 
purists. They were determined to limit and reverse urbanisation, placing great emphasis on 
influx control and avoiding the development of African urban areas. The UP sympathising 
NEAD Managers of Benoni, Germiston and Springs, on the other hand, emphasised the 
stabilisation of urban Africans and made solving the housing crisis through the building of 
new townships a priority.43 Nieftagodien also reveals the key role played by J.E Matthewson, 
Manager of the Benoni NEAD in urban African administration. Matthewson was a critic of 
the NP but supported its practical Apartheid policies.44 He became a leading figure and expert 
in urban African affairs and was driven by a ‘paternalistic conviction regarding his role as 
guardian of the Bantu responsible for their upliftment and civilisation’. He believed that 
Africans were not ready to run their own affairs and needed to prove themselves by showing 
integrity, reliability and a strong work ethic.45 
 
Carr features prominently in Evans’ analysis of urban administration during Apartheid. He 
argues that Carr remained pre-eminently an administrator, a liberal who took great pride in 
his dual role of maintaining law and order while promoting the process of ‘civilisation’ of 
Africans. He sought ways to soften the impact of harsh laws and regulations but at the same 
                                                             
40 M. Chaskalson, ‘Apartheid with a human face: Punt Janson and the origins of reform in township 
administration, 1972-1976’, African Studies, 48, 2, 1989, p. 102 
41H. Sapire. ‘Apartheid’s Testing Ground’, The Journal of African History, 35, 1, 1994, p. 100 
42 Ibid, p. 122 
43 Nieftagodien, ‘The Implementation of Apartheid’, p. 152-154 
44 Ibid, p. 6 
45 Ibid, p. 154 
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time ensured the system ran smoothly. It was not the principle of segregation but the severity 
of the laws that disturbed him. Evans goes on to argue that Carr’s paternalist claims were 
undercut by his support - in principle - of the labour bureau system.46 His commitment to the 
well being of the urban African population meant that he was unable to denounce influx 
control.47 By implementing influx control measures to stave off the threat to the white 
population as well as the settled urban African population, liberal administrators including 
Carr become complicit in creating the ‘human fodder’ that farmers began to regard as their 
labour.48  
 
Carr’s own writings reveal divergent ideologies and administrative styles. He describes how 
he came into almost immediate conflict with Verwoerd whose opinions were ‘almost 
diametrically opposed to his own on almost every aspect of native administration’. Apart 
from a few exceptions he found no evidence of compassion for African people in central 
government during his tenure as Manager of the JNEAD. He gives the example of the 
instruction given to his department in the mid 1960s that nothing should be done to create 
conditions of ‘luxury’ in Soweto which would act as a counter-pull to the policy of trying to 
repatriate as many Africans as possible to the homelands.49 Glaser supports this view to a 
certain extent and asserts that while the JCC and JNEAD tried to improve the conditions for 
Africans, the BAD neglected and obstructed services and tried to make urban life 
insufferable.50 One of the exceptions identified by Carr was Mr M.C. De Wet Nel whose 
tenure as Minister of the BAD was marked by a degree of compassion. Although he remained 
committed to Apartheid principles, he acted with a degree of sensitivity to the practical 
hardships experienced by ordinary Africans.51  
 
Mandy provides a brief overview of the administrative style of Patrick Lewis. He describes 
how Lewis received an honorary doctorate from the University of the Witwatersrand for his 
massive contribution to the development of black housing in Johannesburg during a period 
when the JCC accepted the responsibility for the ‘creation of a civilised mode of living for 
the Black population of the city’. The citation for the award stated that a splendid team of 
                                                             
46 He includes other liberal administrators in this line of argument 
47 Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, p. 102 
48 Ibid, p. 113 
49 Carr, Soweto, p. 55-60 
50 Glaser, Bo-Tsotsi, p. 100 
51 Carr, Soweto, p. 59-60 
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municipal officers had been inspired by Lewis’s ‘single-minded devotion to the upliftment of 
the Urban Bantu’. This research project will add considerable detail to the role of Patrick 
Lewis in improving the relationship between the JCC and BAD during the second phase of 
Apartheid. 
 
Glaser demonstrates how crime reveals the different approaches of the levels of government 
to the Advisory Board system in Johannesburg. For township residents, crime became a 
major grievance in the 1950s and almost certainly deteriorated in the 1960s. They were able 
to articulate their grievances through Advisory Boards calling for better policing, schooling 
and recreational facilities. The boards received a sympathetic hearing from the JNEAD which 
saw the solution in terms of improving urban social conditions. The BAD took little notice of 
the Boards and other township groups and believed the solution hinged on stricter control of 
African mobility.52  
 
The following excerpt from Carr’s memoir neatly summarises the difficult intermediary 
position in which paternalist local administrators operated: 
 
 The administration of a large and complex multiracial department was both 
frustrating and rewarding: frequently frustrating because of the difficulty of 
trying to steer a middle course between the opposing views of the council and 
its master, the government; and rewarding because of the satisfaction which 
came from the few successful attempts to improve the lot of the hard pressed 
African community.53 
 
*      *      * 
 
It is well known that all sources have strengths and weaknesses and that it is the job of the 
historian to contextualise, assess and balance them in order to construct a coherent analytical 
narrative. Throughout this research process I have remained acutely aware that every source 
has its own problems of accuracy and subjectivity. The documentary record surrounding the 
activities of the JCC and JNEAD and their relationship with each other and the NAD/BAD is 
particularly rich while the search for surviving protagonists from the period under 
                                                             
52 Glaser, Bo-Tsotsi, p. 100-101 
53 Carr, Soweto, p. 178 
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investigation has been fruitless. It is for these reasons that this research report is based 
exclusively on archival sources. The following substantial collections have provided the 
foundation for this dissertation: the private papers of W.J.P. Carr and Patrick Lewis; the 
annual reports of the JNEAD; Johannesburg City Council Minutes; internal records of the 
NAD; conference papers and speeches from the Institute of Administrators of Non-European 
Affairs (IANEA); and the Report of the Dube Riots Commission. 
 
The variety of speeches, reports and correspondence contained in the private papers of Carr 
and Lewis combined with the annual reports of the JNEAD and relevant passages from 
Council Minutes have assisted my effort to build a picture of the anatomy of the JNEAD and 
the flow of authority between the NAD/BAD, JCC and JNEAD. The instructive speeches – 
many delivered to audiences with little concept of the work of these bodies – have been 
extremely helpful in distinguishing departmental and committee structures and functions. The 
Council minutes and JNEAD annual reports have breathed life into these descriptions by 
providing a sense of change over time. 
 
Carr’s personal writings as well as reports, correspondence and minutes of crucial meetings 
from his personal papers have been incredibly useful in shaping the ‘Power Struggle’ chapter. 
The documents surrounding the conflict between the JCC and NAD over ethnic grouping and 
the ‘Locations in the Sky’ legislation are particularly powerful and clearly expose the 
arguments and intrigue on both sides. The detailed record of the Western Areas Removals 
Scheme including crucial correspondence and minutes of key meetings has allowed me to 
add detail to this significant dispute between the levels of Government. The report of the 
Dube Riots Commission adds another layer to the ethnic grouping debate and itself becomes 
a key catalyst in the chapter describing the ‘Showdown’ between the Council and the NAD. 
The Lewis Collection contains explosive correspondence between the Secretary of Native 
Affairs and the Town Clerk regarding Carr’s conduct during this time. The flow of letters not 
only highlights significant tensions between local and central government but reveals the 
emergence of a strong friendship between Carr and Lewis. 
 
The Lewis Papers contain a large and diverse collection of newspaper clippings covering a 
wide range of events and issues from the late 1950s to the mid 1960s. These clippings have 
been particularly valuable for developing a sense of historical process during the period of 
‘pragmatic cooperation’ between the JCC and NAD. They are also sensitive to waves of 
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public concern over particular issues and reveal significant internal tensions within the 
political parties of the time. I have taken into consideration the divisions between the English 
and Afrikaner press and have been acutely aware of potential political motivations and 
propaganda campaigns. 
 
Chapter Outline 
This dissertation will have five chapters excluding this introduction. Chapter one will set the 
scene for this study and provide a benchmark for the analysis of how the evolving 
relationship between the JCC and NAD affected urban African administration in 
Johannesburg. It will do this by highlighting the trends shaping the rise of urban African 
administration in South Africa, outlining the statutory flow of authority in the country and 
describing the core functions of the JNEAD. Chapter two will track the power struggle 
between the Council and the NAD during the 1950s through an analysis of three high profile 
disputes while chapter three will describe the extraordinary showdown which led to the 
Council’s eventual acknowledgement of the statutory authority of the Central Government in 
the realm of African affairs. Chapter Four will examine the aftermath of the power struggle 
and reveal the emergence of a culture of pragmatic cooperation. It will also evaluate 
significant divisions within the United Party as a result of the improving relationship with the 
Nationalist State. The final chapter will briefly discuss renewed tensions between the levels 
of government over housing policy and influx control before describing the winding down of 
municipal administration in Johannesburg as the Central Government introduced the 
Administration Board system.  
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Chapter One:  The Rise of Urban African Administration 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first describes the rise of Urban African 
Administration in South Africa while the second explores the anatomy of the JNEAD.  I will 
begin the first section by providing a brief account of the regional trends towards segregation 
and control before 1923 emphasising the high levels of municipal autonomy and the low 
levels of state intervention in the lives of urban Africans.54 I will then highlight the dramatic 
growth in the size of the urban African population in the interwar period before examining 
the intense ideological debate amongst intellectuals and policy makers on how to approach 
the issue of African urbanisation. I will finish the section by exploring the growth of state 
intervention in Native affairs and describing the evolution of the state apparatus created to 
regulate and control the lives of urban Africans. In the second section I will outline the flow 
of authority between Central and Local Government and emphasise the ambiguous position 
of the Manager of the JNEAD. I will then provide an overview of the many divisions and 
functions of this Department before finishing with a brief description of the Council’s 
Housing Division.  
 
An awareness of the broad trends and patterns shaping Urban African Administration as well 
an understanding of the role of the JNEAD is important not only to set the scene for this 
dissertation but to provide a benchmark for analysing the evolving relationship between the 
JCC and NAD and its impact on the administration of Native affairs in the City. 
 
Regional Trends in Segregation and Control before 1923 
The early decades of the twentieth century were characterised by a low level of African 
urbanisation, a relatively undeveloped state apparatus for regulating and controlling urban 
African life and a high degree of provincial and municipal autonomy. Maylam emphasises 
that while there was little centralised state control over African urbanisation during this time, 
there were important regional trends towards segregation and control.55 
 
One of the earliest forms of labour control in South Africa emerged in the diamond mining 
town of Kimberley in the 1880s. In the context of declining diamond prices and stubbornly 
high production costs, mine owners searched desperately for ways to prevent desertion and 
                                                             
54 Maylam divides the development of urban policies and practices in South Africa into four overlapping and 
imprecisely bounded phases: 1) Pre 1923; 2) 1923-1950/52; 3) 1950/52-1979; and 4) Post 1979. The 
periodisation of this section is loosely based on the first two phases. 
55 P. Maylam, ‘The rise and decline of urban apartheid in South Africa’, African Affairs, vol. 89, 1990, p. 58 
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diamond theft. The result was the design and creation of closed compounds to accommodate 
migrant African workers. The compound system enabled tighter discipline to be exerted over 
the workforce ensuring a more reliable supply of experienced labour while preventing 
working class mobilisation. While Kimberley did not represent an early model of segregation 
- about half of all Africans lived outside of the mining compounds in the town or locations – 
it did provide a mechanism for labour control which was replicated on mines and in mining 
towns across South Africa.56 
 
Johannesburg was one of those towns that borrowed from the Kimberley model to create its 
own compound system. The period that followed the South African War was marked by a 
severe labour shortage on the mines which led to calls for greater discipline to curb 
absenteeism and desertion. The white compound manager played a key role in ensuring these 
goals were achieved. In addition to mineworkers, a considerable number of municipal and 
factory workers were also housed in compounds. A fundamental feature of Johannesburg 
during this early period was that there was no strict racial segregation outside of 
compounds.57 Suburbs like Sophiatown, Martindale, Vrededorp and Doornfontein all 
contained multiracial communities.58  
 
Cape Town evolved differently to the mining towns of the interior. The city was 
predominantly a commercial and administrative centre with highly casual and seasonal labour 
requirements. Rigid segregation was not historically entrenched in the city with the central 
area in particular having a long history of racial integration. While the beginnings of racial 
segregation coincided with the influx of large numbers Africans, a stronger motivation 
emerged from white middle class concerns about disease and sanitation.59 In 1901, Bubonic 
Plague hit the city and was immediately associated with the presence of Africans. The Cape 
Town Council, responding to calls from white residents, decided that a location should be 
built to house Africans under sanitary conditions. The result was the construction of Ndabeni, 
a product of social pressure camouflaged by the rhetoric of disease and sanitation.60 
 
                                                             
56 Maylam, ‘The rise and decline’, p. 58-59 
57 The one exception was Johannesburg’s first municipal location established on the farm Klipspruit in 1904. 
After the outbreak of bubonic plague near present day Newtown, the JCC resolved to move the African people 
in the area to the farm twelve miles south west of the town. 
58 Maylam, ‘The rise and decline’, p. 58-59 
59 In 1890, the Dock Native Location was opened providing compound-type accommodation for dockworkers. 
60 Maylam, ‘The rise and decline’, p. 59-61 
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The port city of Durban had much in common with Cape Town. Both economies were 
underpinned by the docks and required casual and seasonal labour. The most significant 
difference was that Durban’s labour force was made up of a large portion of migrants drawn 
from African reserves in close proximity to the city.  The Durban Council was more 
concerned about controlling than segregating its urban African population and developed a 
bureaucratic structure to achieve this. The revenue derived from a monopoly on the 
production and sale of African beer enabled the municipality to finance the creation of its 
own Native Administration Department in 1916. Many of the practices that evolved in 
Durban during this time were borrowed by other local authorities and incorporated into 
subsequent parliamentary legislation. Maylam argues that the practices and structures that 
emerged in Durban reflect the relatively high degree of municipal autonomy that existed 
during this period.61 
 
In all four cities, apart from compounds, there was no developed housing policy for urban 
Africans (there were very few segregated townships). The vast majority of Africans lived in 
private or leasehold townships or rented backyard quarters close to the centre of town. The 
degree of control over their lives was tiny compared to the tight regulations that were to 
follow in the coming decades.62 
 
The Dramatic Rise in the Urban African Population 
The three decades following World War I were characterised by a remarkable increase in the 
size of the urban African population. This was driven by the coalescence of two key factors: 
the dramatic growth of the manufacturing sector and the deterioration of the rural economy. 
Between 1921 and 1951, South Africa’s urban African population grew from just under six 
hundred thousand people to close to three million people63 and the percentage of urbanised 
Africans rose from fourteen to twenty-eight percent.64  
 
The combination of protectionist policies, the diversification of mining capital, the influx of 
foreign capital and the stimulus of two World Wars resulted in the manufacturing sector 
                                                             
61 Maylam, ‘The rise and decline’, p. 62-63 
62 Ibid, p. 63 
63 Maylam uses the exact figures of 587 000 to 2.8 million people 
64 Maylam, ‘The rise and decline’, p. 63 
25 
 
overtaking the mining sector in terms of contribution to Gross National Product in 1943.65 
This expansion drew increasing numbers of Africans into the urban industrial workforce and 
led to calls from employers for the creation of a settled urban workforce which would 
increase productivity. At the same time a number of government commissions documented 
the appalling conditions in the reserves including malnutrition and extreme poverty.66 
Hindson has shown that by the early 1920s the reserves were producing less than fifty percent 
of subsistence requirements.67 For the landless there were very few employment opportunities 
and small farmers struggled to produce enough to sustain their families. Apart from a small 
prosperous peasantry, the vast majority of people depended on remittances from family 
members who had become migrant workers.68 Between 1936 and 1946 the proportion of 
Africans living in the reserves declined dramatically.69 Maylam highlights how the character 
of the urban African population was also changing during this time. The proportion of 
Africans living under family circumstances increased substantially reflecting the existence of 
settled urban communities.70 
 
The rapid growth in the urban African population triggered increased state intervention in the 
regulation and control of the urban African population. Maylam emphasises that there was 
considerable uncertainty and debate amongst policy-makers and opinion-formers as to what 
form this intervention should take.71  
   
Ideological Uncertainty and Debate 
There were three key ideological positions in the debate over urban African policy in the first 
half of the twentieth century. The first supported the principle of stabilisation of the urban 
African population while the second denied the permanence of Africans in urban areas. The 
vast majority of commissions in the 1930s and 1940s endorsed a third position which 
recommended a pragmatic approach recognising the reality of stabilisation but stopping short 
                                                             
65 D. Posel, The Making of Apartheid 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991, p. 
25  
66 Ibid, p. 27 
67 D. Hindson, Pass Controls and the Urban African Proletariat, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 
1987, p. 33 
68 Posel, The Making of Apartheid, p. 28-29 
69 Posel states that the proportion of the African population living in the reserves fell from 44.91% in 1936 to 
37.91% in 1946. Maylam states that there is considerable evidence of outmigration during this period with the 
overall annual increase in the population hovering around 0.9%  
70 Maylam, ‘The rise and decline’, p. 64 
71 Ibid, p. 65 
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of encouraging urbanisation. This approach acknowledged the realities of the urbanisation 
process as well as the labour needs of different capitalist sectors. The manufacturing industry 
demanded a permanent and skilled workforce while the mining sector remained reliant on 
migrant labour. The agricultural sector hoped that a strategy of stabilisation combined with 
strict influx control would ameliorate the farm labour shortage.72 
 
Social upheavals following the First World War and the devastating flu epidemic led to the 
government appointing a committee chaired by Colonel G.A. Godley to investigate the 
question of controls on movement and settlement by Africans.73 The committee did not take 
up the question of African urbanisation directly but it clearly viewed urbanisation and the 
gradual stabilisation of the African population as necessary and economically viable. 
Committee members did not want labour supplies in urban areas to be restricted but at the 
same time they wanted the level of unemployment to be controlled. A key principle endorsed 
by the Godley Committee was the promotion of class differentiation through stabilisation. 
Africans who resided in urban areas would be treated as ‘insiders’ and not have to carry 
passes while newcomers in the towns would be treated as ‘outsiders’ and be subject to strict 
control.74 The kind of future imagined by Godley was expunged by the Central Government’s 
eventual acceptance of the Transvaal Provincial Government Commission’s (Stallard) view 
that all Africans should be regarded a temporary residents of urban areas.75 
  
The Stallard Commission was formed in 1921 to examine local government structures and 
finances. In investigating the rationalisation of local government, the commission took up the 
issue of African urbanisation rejecting the permanence of Africans in the urban areas.  It 
recommended that the urban African population be kept to the bare minimum needed to meet 
labour requirements and asserted that all Africans without employment should be removed to 
the reserves. The Stallard report referred to the need to establish segregated locations in 
which family housing would be provided by local authorities, employers or Africans 
themselves. The commission wanted to reduce to the absolute minimum the number of 
Africans to be provided with accommodation and ensure that those who were housed were in 
a position to pay for rent and services. Housing and employment controls were to be tightly 
                                                             
72 Maylam, ‘The rise and decline’, p. 66 
73 A. Mabin and D. Smit, ‘Reconstructing South Africa’s cities? The making of urban planning 1900-2000’, 
Planning Studies, 12, 2, 1997, p. 199 
74 Hindson, Pass Controls, p. 35-36 
75 Mabin and Smit, ‘Reconstructing South African Cities?’, p. 199 
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linked to the point that no African would be provided with housing if he was not in registered 
employment. Another central principle that emerged from the Stallard Commission was that 
locations should be self financing with employers covering any excess of expenditure over 
income. The overall objective was to shift the financial burden away from white 
municipalities.76 
 
Unlike Godley, which did not want to limit labour supplies to the town, Stallard 
recommended that the labour market be subjected to rigid controls as a means of restricting 
the flow of African labour to the towns and called for wide powers of removal. Municipal 
Departments of Native Affairs (DNAs) rather than courts would be the mechanism for the 
removals which would be conducted against all unemployed and economically inactive 
sections of the population.77 The two reports agreed on the need to regulate the inflow of 
African labour to the urban areas and to exclude the unemployed. Where they differed was 
over the intensity of the measures needed to achieve these ends and the scope of removals. 
Both supported the principle of residential segregation but whereas Godley saw this as a 
means of promoting the gradual assimilation of Africans into urban areas, Stallard would give 
no recognition to an African middle class other than that of a group who could provide basic 
services to the African population.78 
 
Both Godley and Stallard proved influential in the formation of urban African policy. They 
offered different strategies for regulating African urbanisation and for securing the conditions 
of urban reproduction. Hindson has shown that recommendations from both committees79 
found their way into the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 which set out a national policy 
towards African employment and housing in urban areas.80 This Act will be analysed in detail 
in a later section. 
 
In 1935 the Young-Barrett committee was appointed to investigate the methods by which 
Stallard principles could be applied. To the surprise of a number of commentators, the 
committee rejected Stallardism arguing that Africans could not be expelled from urban areas 
if economically redundant. Agreeing with Godley, the committee called on the state to 
                                                             
76 Mabin and Smit, ‘Reconstructing South African Cities?’, p. 35-38 
77 Ibid, p. 38 
78 Ibid, p. 39 
79 A number of sources do not mention the contribution of the Godley Committee  
80 Mabin & Smit, ‘Reconstructing South African Cities?’, p. 39 
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encourage the growth of a stabilised urban African population to serve industrial employers. 
Posel shows how this did not go down well with a powerful faction within the state that was 
more concerned with finding ways to solve the problem of acute farm labour shortages.81  
  
In 1946 the Native Laws Commission, more commonly known as the Fagan Commission was 
appointed to enquire into the question of the laws then in force that had a bearing on Africans 
in or near urban areas, the pass system and the employment of migrant labour in the mines 
and industries.82 The UP based its strategy for the urban areas on the recommendations of the 
commission. Many of the findings reiterated the view of several anti-Stallard commissions 
and committees. Some of the well known conclusions reported by the Fagan Commission 
were: 1) the differentiation of the urban African population into settled and migrant 
communities should be accepted as a fact; 2) total segregation is not a feasible strategy; 3) 
integration of Africans into the urban areas need not lead to the granting of political rights; 4) 
rural Africans taking up jobs in the urban areas should be allowed to settle permanently in the 
cities along with their families (numbers would be limited to industrial requirements)83 and 5) 
the state should rationalise urban administration structures through the establishment of a 
centralised system of labour bureaus (but this should be on a voluntary basis).84 
 
Posel argues convincingly that Afrikanerdom was divided over the meaning and 
interpretation of apartheid. She demonstrates that Afrikaner capital broadly supported a 
practical conception of Apartheid premised on continuing white access to African labour 
while other segments including a considerable number of Afrikaner workers, professionals, 
civil servants and intellectuals endorsed a purist policy of total segregation. The Sauer report 
emerged as a contradictory combination of these competing conceptions of Apartheid.85  
 
In the first half of the twentieth century, the NAD did not speak with one voice on Native 
affairs. It chopped and changed between the major positions creating an inconsistent and 
ambiguous policy towards the urban African population.86 
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Growing Intervention and the creation of Legislative Framework 
Maylam demonstrates how the state’s growing intervention in the decades after 1923 laid the 
foundation for the era of ‘high apartheid’ and the rigid labour controls that were to follow 
from the 1950s. He describes how a legislative framework evolved and argues that although 
fragments of municipal autonomy survived, the overall trend was towards greater 
centralisation.87 
 
Parnell has shown that much early town planning legislation, including the Public Health Act 
of 1919 and the Housing Act of 1920, played a role in securing the racial division of urban 
space. This was largely due to the reality that regulations on urban African settlement were 
incomplete or ineffective.88 The need for a law to regulate and control the urban African 
population was recognised as early as 1912 but disputes over its content led to considerable 
delays.89 Eventually in 1923 the Native (Urban Areas) Act was passed representing the first 
major state intervention in the field of urban African administration.90  
 
The Act made it clear that the NAD would not interfere with the strong pattern of municipal 
autonomy inherited from the colonial era. The NAD would concern itself with policy while 
administrative functions would be delegated to local authorities.91 This created a basic 
tension where local authorities had the power to carry out policies with national implications 
raising the possibility that not only might responses differ but the narrower focus of local 
authorities might conflict with the wider demands of the NAD.92  
 
The Act empowered municipalities to create segregated locations, implement a basic influx 
control system, set up Advisory Boards93 and establish a Department of Native Affairs 
(DNA) – later renamed an NEAD- under the control of a Manager, responsible for the urban 
African population.94 The desired role of an NEAD was to promote expertise in urban Native 
administration, establish contact between urban Africans and the City Council and act as a 
                                                             
87 Maylam, ‘The rise and decline’, p. 66 
88 S. Parnell, ‘Creating Racial Privilege: The Origins of South African Public Health and Town Planning 
Legislation’, The Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 19, no. 3, 1993, p. 473 
89 Posel, The Making of Apartheid, p. 39 
90 Maylam, ‘The rise and decline’, p. 66 
91 Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, p. 31 
92Ibid, p. 26  
93 Bodies which would contain a number of elected African officials able to discuss local issues with the City 
Council. They were often denied a serious hearing and had no power over policy. 
94 In order to avoid unnecessary confusion I will use NEAD (general) and JNEAD (Johannesburg) for the 
remainder of this dissertation. 
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link between local authorities and the NAD.95 The Act also required municipalities to 
establish Native revenue accounts into which income from rents, fees, fines and beer hall 
sales would be paid.96 Expenditure to the Native revenue account could only be charged with 
the approval of the Minister.97 This system emerged from the principle that African 
communities should be self financing although some municipalities including Johannesburg 
subsidised the account from the general rates fund for a number of years.98  
  
According to Maylam, the short term significance of the 1923 Act was limited. This was 
mainly due to the fact that most of its provisions were discretionary.99 Many local authorities 
did not establish NEADs or Advisory Boards (or at least did so belatedly) and influx control 
measures were not widely initiated – only eleven towns had utilised the power of the Act in 
this regard by 1937.100 Under the Act, once a Council had obtained a proclamation from the 
central government applying to the whole or part of the municipal area it could compel all 
Natives found within the proclaimed area to reside in locations, municipal villages or hostels 
provided by the council or on their employers’ premises.101 The vast majority of local 
authorities did not request proclamations102 as they lacked the resources for implementation 
or opposed the Act on ideological grounds.103 The NAD hesitantly reached the conclusion 
that effective control over the lives of urban Africans could only be achieved if local 
authorities utilised the powers of the 1923 Act. For the first time talk of compelling local 
authorities to take action began to emerge.104 
 
In addition to the underutilisation of the Act, the legislation contained a number of loopholes 
in its influx control provisions. As there was no prohibition on entry to an urban area, it was 
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only after a workseeker failed to find employment within fourteen days that his presence 
became illegal. The task of enforcing the system became incredibly difficult and 
expensive.105 The Act also only concentrated on males, leaving women and children free to 
enter an urban area. This compromised the principle that ‘surplus’ Africans should not be 
permitted into urban areas.106 Subsequent amendments to the Act attempted to close these 
loopholes. 
 
The 1937 Amendment to the Urban Areas Act took a far more aggressive Stallardist line, 
significantly strengthening influx control provisions and eroding municipal autonomy.107 
Workseekers were refused entry into a town if there was a surplus of labour while at the same 
time the control over labour leaving rural areas was strengthened. Labour tenants now had to 
provide proof that they had been released by a landowner before a contract could be 
registered and women had to obtain certificates from Native Commissioners in their home 
districts before being allowed to enter a proclaimed area. Stricter penalties would also be 
placed on employers who introduced workers to an area illegally.108 
 
The Act reemphasised the NAD’s control over policy and its statutory dominance over local 
authorities. The Minister was given the power to compel a recalcitrant municipality to 
implement any section of the Act or have the section executed by his Department at the 
municipality’s cost.109 Evans maintains that the Act brought a new discourse to Native affairs 
built around technical information, centralisation and bureaucratic hierarchy.110 Officials 
within the NAD were divided over the merits of the Act and therefore failed to oversee its 
implementation in a consistent way.111 Many liberal officials, opposing the Stallardist 
influence, resisted the implementation of the Act.112 
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Maylam emphasises that the real significance of the Native (Urban Areas) Act lay in its 
broader long term affects. It provided the framework on which subsequent legislation and 
policy was built and contained the nascent principles of urban apartheid practice including 
segregation (and the subsequent practice of forced relocations), influx control mechanisms, a 
self financing system and an institution for the potential cooptation of potential collaborators. 
In 1944, the Housing Amendment Act set up the National Housing and Planning 
Commission. Maylam shows how this body was empowered to directly intervene in housing 
policy, further eroding municipal autonomy. The following year all legislation governing 
urban Africans was consolidated in a new Act which strengthened the power of central 
government and tightened influx control measures.113 As briefly shown above, legal 
mechanisms were intensified and refined so that by the time the NP came to power the 
machinery for regulating and controlling the movement and daily lives of urban Africans was 
in place.114  
 
The Anatomy of the Johannesburg Non-European Affairs Department 
From a relatively straightforward administrative task confronting the JNEAD in the pre-war 
years, one of the most complex situations confronting any local authority in the world 
developed.115  The huge industrial growth of Johannesburg and the rapid increase in the size 
of the urban African population meant that already stretched resources became completely 
swamped. Immense housing and other socio-economic problems emerged in the late 1940s 
and it was estimated that over fifty thousand African families were living in appalling 
conditions. In order to bring the urban African population under state control, a vast array of 
legislation was placed on the statute books during the early years of Nationalist rule.116 It is in 
this context that JNEAD’s phenomenal growth in size and complexity must be seen.117 
 
At its inception in 1927 the Department consisted of a Manager, four clerks and a typist as 
well as a handful of superintendents in the field. By the early 1970s, shortly before the West 
Rand Administration Board (WRAB) took over from the JCC, the JNEAD was an enormous 
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organisation employing approximately three and half thousand people118 and overseeing 
almost every aspect of urban African life.119 Department officials were involved with the 
employment, registration, residence, welfare and recreation of urban Africans presenting a 
daily situation of complexity and difficulty.120  
 
The Manager of the Department operated in a highly ambiguous and potentially volatile 
space. On the one hand he was licensed by the Minister of Native Affairs and expected to 
implement government policy while on the other he was employed by the JCC and required 
to operate through the channel of the Johannesburg Non-European Affairs Committee 
(JNEAC). In situations where there was agreement between central government and the JCC 
the process could be expected to run relatively smoothly but if there was friction, the job of 
JNEAD Manager could be one of the most difficult in the country.121 If the Minister felt that 
government policy in the field of Native affairs was not being followed he had the power to 
take the dramatic step of withdrawing an official’s license and depriving him of his 
livelihood.122 
 
Adding another layer of complexity to the situation was the JNEAD’s responsibility for day-
to-day liaison with the Advisory Boards and after 1968 the Urban Bantu Councils (UBCs). 
Once a month the Manager also chaired the Joint Advisory Board where policy measures, 
legislation, regulations and any issues that affected the African population were discussed. 123 
While taking Advisory Board complaints and suggestions seriously he also had to 
communicate and enforce highly unpopular government policies and regulations. If there was 
disagreement over a particular issue, the Manager faced the unenviable prospect of being 
pressured by up to four sources: the NAD, the JCC, the Advisory Boards and independent 
African organisations (see diagram below). 
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‘Non-European’ employees. 
119 AUFS, WJPC, PV423, 1/13/4/1, Vol 2, Lecture titled ‘A City within a City – the Creation of Soweto’, delivered 
by Patrick Lewis to the University of the Witwatersrand, 1966 
120 AUFS, WJPC, PV423, 1/13/1/1, Vol 9, A draft review of the growth of the JNEAD compiled by Patrick Lewis, 
Unknown date (approximately June 1959) 
121 The Manager also had certain statutory duties to fulfil. He was able to use his own discretion and was not 
subject to instructions from anybody.  
122 Misinterpretations of the flow of authority will be a central theme throughout this dissertation. See 
Chapters 2-4 in particular. 
123 A committee where all Advisory Boards were represented.  
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Figure 1: The Flow of Authority, Communication and Pressure 
 
The department was to a large extent a self-contained organisation although other 
departments such as the Treasury, City Engineer and Health Department established divisions 
concerned with urban African affairs. Officials at the JNEAD were in daily contact with their 
counterparts at the NAD/BAD as well as other government departments regarding a 
multitude of administrative, financial and legal issues. The Manager of the JNEAD and the 
Chairman of the NEAC were also in daily contact. It was essential for these two men to 
cultivate a healthy working relationship in order to maintain high standards of service 
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delivery. The JNEAD at all times remained the coordinating body for policy implementation 
and planning.124  
 
While the structure of the JNEAD changed over time it is possible to make a few general 
observations regarding its core duties and functions. The section below will consider the 
following: Head Office administration; public relations and the provision of information; 
research; township administration; registration, employment and inspection; the production 
and sale of African beer and ‘European’ liquor; and the provision of welfare, recreation and 
community services. It will also include a brief description of the City Council’s Housing 
Division - established in 1954 to tackle the housing crisis.125  
 
On the 1 June 1954, the JNEAD took occupation of its new administrative headquarters 
located at 80 Albert Street on the south eastern side of the Johannesburg Central Business 
District. The building became the nerve centre of Native administration in the city for over 
three decades as well as a symbol of the authorities’ response to rapid African 
urbanisation.126 From this command centre, highly qualified and experienced Head Office 
administrators engaged in strategic, financial and infrastructural planning. They also 
performed human resource and office management functions and aspired to play a guiding 
and coordinating role for all other divisions.127 
 
The Head Office administration was responsible for maintaining relationships with other 
Council and Government departments. The City Treasurer stationed an accountant at the 
Albert Street offices to control all financial matters relating to the department while the Clerk 
of the Council assigned a legal assistant and a committee clerk to deal with all concerns 
pertaining to the JNEAC. The City Engineer and the Manager worked closely together to 
plan townships and develop services, and effective collaboration with the Medical Officer 
was vital for the provision of staff and clinics throughout the African areas. Close 
cooperation with the council’s specially formed Housing Division was also a high priority as 
the city made a determined attempt to tackle the huge housing backlog in the mid to late 
                                                             
124 AUFS, WJPC, PV423, 1/13/1/1, Vol 9, A draft review of the growth of the JNEAD compiled by Patrick Lewis, 
Unknown date (approximately June 1959) 
125 With the formation of this division the JNEAC became the Johannesburg Non-European Affairs and Housing 
Committee. 
126 The Head Office of the West Rand Administration Board replaced the JNEAD in the early 1970s. 
127 80 Albert Street also provided facilities for the registration, employment and inspection functions which will 
be discussed shortly. 
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1950s.128 Contact was also maintained with important outside organisations such as the 
Institute of Administrators of Non-European Affairs (IANEA)129, the South African Bureau 
of Racial Affairs (SABRA), the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), the 
railways administration and a number of Universities.130  
 
The demand for tours of the African areas and the need to publicise the activities of the 
JNEAD necessitated the appointment of a full-time information officer in March 1959.131 By 
the early 1970s the number of European visitors to Soweto had exceeded a thousand per 
month and almost every conference of any importance included requests for most if not all 
delegates to be taken on a tour. Through the powerful network of relationships maintained by 
the JNEAD, many influential people from around the world visited Soweto and were exposed 
to the ‘achievements’ of the JNEAD.132 The information officer initiated contact with the 
press - all daily and Native newspapers and periodicals in Johannesburg - and disseminated 
regular updates in an effort to reduce what officials in the department perceived as ill-
informed criticism. In addition to this a significant portion of all news bulletins broadcast on 
Radio Bantu in the 1960s dealt with the activities of the JNEAD.133 
 
The information section was also responsible for the printing of brochures dealing with a 
wide range of subjects from housing and welfare to employer-employee relations. The 
brochure ‘Thousands for Houses’ which documented the positive aspects of the JCC’s 
massive housing programme in the 1950s required a number of print runs to keep up with 
demand from the Central Government. It appears as if it was used for propaganda purposes 
with the Department of Information ordering a thousand copies for its offices in the United 
States and another thousand for its offices around the world. Another successful publication 
was the advice booklet ‘Your Bantu Servant and You’ which was handed out to employers at 
the European counter of the Registration Branch at 80 Albert Street. It contained 
recommendations on how to treat employees compassionately and sensitively in an effort to 
                                                             
128 See brief section towards the end of this chapter. 
129 The Head Office Manager was always a member of the executive committee. 
130 Carr, Soweto, p. 170-171 
131 University of the Witwatersrand Historical Papers (UWHP), Private Papers of PRB Lewis (PRBL), A1132, 
Ea26, A pamphlet compiled by WJP Carr describing the activities of the Non-European Affairs Department, 
February 1964  
132 AUFS, WJPC, PV423, Notes compiled by WJP Carr on the activities of the JNEAD for the Chairman of the 
Management Committee, 24 January 1962 
133 Ibid 
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improve race relations. It also provided an easy to understand explanation of the correct 
processes to be followed when dealing with the Labour Bureau.134  
 
The Research section of the Department was closely integrated into the Head Office 
administration and conducted a wide range of surveys and investigations into the lives of 
urban Africans and trends in urban African administration. At various times this section 
provided key information regarding family size, occupations, wages, social condition etc. It 
also attempted to forecast population growth patterns and housing requirements. This 
information was invaluable to the Manager of the JNEAD as well as other council 
departments for planning and policy purposes.135 
 
The frontline administration of urban African life was the responsibility of township 
superintendents. They had jurisdiction over an area of approximately two to three thousand 
households and, as with all JNEAD officials, were expected to implement government policy 
and regulations. Superintendents were responsible for maintaining law and order, collecting 
rents, allocating welfare services, providing information and advice, and settling disputes 
within the community. They also had the power to allocate trading sites and demolish illegal 
structures. The township superintendent was the chairman of the local Advisory Board and 
was required to keep ‘Head Office’ informed of progress regarding service delivery as well as 
any significant issues that could affect the stability of the community. As the JNEAD 
expanded rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s so did the superintendent’s staff of African clerks. 
These clerks acted as the eyes and ears of the Department and played a key role in ensuring 
that the local office ran smoothly.136 At times, superintendents were placed in difficult and 
frustrating positions when communicating government policy to communities on the 
ground.137 
 
Local authorities were compelled to consult with Advisory Boards before any regulation 
affecting the township could be made, amended or withdrawn. Lewis argues that the JNEAD 
always took the boards and the principle of consultation very seriously. He believed that the 
relative success that Johannesburg achieved was a result of the degree or recognition afforded 
                                                             
134 AUFS, WJPC, PV423, Notes compiled by WJP Carr on the activities of the JNEAD for the Chairman of the 
Management Committee, 24 January 1962 
135 Carr, Soweto, p. 170 
136 Superintendents’ offices were placed physically in their area of jurisdiction. 
137 Carr, Soweto, p. 173 
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to the boards and the sincerity with which its deliberations and recommendations were 
treated. Advisory Board members in Johannesburg received a generous stipend, were given 
recognition and provided with training in the art of local government particularly financial 
management. Once a month all the boards would meet as a single Joint Advisory Board under 
the chairmanship of the Manager. A whole range of issues were discussed including policy 
measures, legislation and regulations. Officials from other Council and Government 
departments attended these sessions when issues affecting their departments were 
discussed.138 Despite the best efforts of officials like Carr and Lewis the Advisory Board 
system was often perceived as nothing more than a grievance committee with no real 
powers.139   
 
The Registration Branch of the Department was responsible for influx control and the 
employment of Africans through the operation of a number of labour bureaus. The Branch 
worked closely with the Inspectorate which was responsible for monitoring the behaviour of 
employers and employees and encouraging them to comply with the relevant regulations laid 
down by the state.140 The legislative foundations for the work of the Registration Branch in 
the first phase of apartheid were laid between 1948 and 1953. The 1952 Native Laws 
Amendment Act was a key piece of legislation in this regard and while Section 10 was 
notoriously restrictive it did allow for the continuous growth of the urban African population 
by protecting Africans from removal if unemployed.141 The Act nevertheless considerably 
tightened influx controls and sparked the creation of this large and complicated branch of the 
JNEAD.142 
                                                             
138 AUFS, WJPC, PV423, 1/13/4/1, Vol 2, Lecture titled ‘A City within a City – the Creation of Soweto’, delivered 
by Patrick Lewis to the University of the Witwatersrand, 1966 
139 It is important to note that a number of credible African leaders, including prominent ANC officials, served 
on Advisory Boards in the 1950s. They considered the Boards useful platforms for the articulation of 
grievances and for legal and political mobilisation. 
140 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ea26, A pamphlet compiled by WJP Carr describing the activities of the Non-European 
Affairs Department, February 1964 
141 Posel shows how parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition forced Verwoerd to make a number of 
concessions which introduced loopholes and contradictions into the Act. Faced with strong pressure to ease 
conditions for residential rights and eager to get the Act approved as soon as possible with minimal debate, 
Verwoerd agreed to revise Section 10. The final version prevented an African from staying in an urban area for 
more than seventy-two hours unless: a) he had been born and permanently resided in the area; b) he had 
worked continuously for one employer for ten years or more or had proof of having lived in the area 
continuously for more than fifteen years; or c) was the wife, unmarried son or daughter of an African 
qualifying in terms of section a or b above. Africans who did not fall into any of these categories had to register 
as workseekers with the local labour bureau. 
142 AUFS, WJPC, PV423, 1/13/1/1, Vol 9, A draft review of the growth of the JNEAD compiled by Patrick Lewis, 
Unknown date (approximately June 1959) 
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The Registration Branch was inaugurated on 1 July 1953 when the Council took over control 
of the registration of service contracts and the operation of a male labour bureau from Central 
Government despite heated debate within the council (mainly over financial issues).143 
Between August and December 1953 around two hundred and eighty thousand reference 
books were issued to African Males from temporary rented premises while the JNEAD’s new 
Head Office was being constructed. The huge workload experienced in these early months 
led to the JCC approving extensions to 80 Albert Street while it was still under 
construction.144 
 
The law required all workseekers and employers to refer their requirements to the local 
labour bureau. If there was a shortage of labour in any area, permission could be granted by 
the government for ‘outsiders’ to enter under a permit system.145 The Registration Branch 
provided information regarding the labour position of the city as well as key details of wages 
paid in different industries. This information was vital for planning housing schemes in the 
city and it was therefore important for the Branch and the council’s housing division to work 
closely together.146 
 
No African could be certified for work unless declared medically fit which required a medical 
examination consisting of a general physical inspection and a chest X-ray to test for 
Tuberculosis. Vaccinations against smallpox were carried out and in some case blood tests 
for typhoid and venereal disease were conducted.147 The JNEAD offered one free medical 
examination per worker per year and the information section of the Department actively 
encouraged employers to make use of this service. In 1960 almost one hundred thousand 
examinations were carried out.148  
 
On 9 January 1959 labour regulations were made applicable to women. The legislation had 
been in place since 1952 but had not been enforced for political and administrative reasons. 
Temporary arrangements were made for operations to be carried out at 80 Albert Street while 
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JNEAC, 30 March 1954  
145 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ea26, A pamphlet compiled by WJP Carr describing the activities of the JNEAD, 
February 1964 
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facilities at 1 Polly Street around the corner were prepared. The female labour bureau was 
officially opened on 1 March 1959 and a medical examination and X-ray unit came into 
operation in 1961.149 The Registration Branch also opened a juvenile employment bureau as 
the main labour bureau had found it difficult on the one hand to persuade employers to 
employ youths willing to work and on the other to persuade youths to accept employment. 
The opportunity to reduce crime and vagrancy in the city was another motivation for the 
introduction of this section.150 By the end of 1961 the juvenile employment bureau had 
placed over six thousand young men151 and around three hundred young women.152 
 
The administration and legislation affecting the presence of Africans in Johannesburg was 
complex and seldom understood by employers and employees. Reference books were often 
deliberately lost or damaged by Africans while employers regularly disregarded what they 
perceived as an irritating and frustrating bureaucracy. One of the strategies to improve 
compliance was the establishment of the Inspectorate Division. Inspectors were sent to flat 
premises to scrutinise African living quarters to prevent overcrowding and checked on 
employers who had defaulted on their services levy or services contract payments.153 The 
general practice, however was to warn and assist employers rather than issue summonses. At 
the height of its activities the Branch conducted over eight thousand routine inspections of 
employers’ premises per year and around ninety special evening and night inspections 
planned in conjunction with the South African Police.154 Despite these efforts the 
Inspectorate was plagued by capacity issues and many transgressions were overlooked, 
ignored or missed altogether.155 
 
The fraudulent alteration of registration documents became a major problem in the 1950s and 
1960s. The use of official rubber stamps stolen from Albert Street resulted in thousands of 
Africans obtaining forged documents. Many enterprising individuals made a tidy profit from 
                                                             
149 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ed7, Statement made by the Chairman of the JNEAC on the reorganisation necessary 
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150 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ea26, A pamphlet compiled by WJP Carr describing the activities of the Non-European 
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152 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ea62, Fact Sheets regarding the structure and operations of the JNEAD, 12 October 
1972 
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154 The Inspectorate played a key role in the implementation of the ‘Locations in the Sky’ Legislation 
155 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Eb8, Inquiry into the extension of Johannesburg’s Municipal Borders, statement of 
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this black market activity.  In order to combat the illegal practice the South African Police 
strengthened a special unit based in Auckland Park and asked for experienced inspectors 
from the JNEAD to be made available. W. J. P. Carr obliged immediately and even applied 
for further positions to be created.156 Two inspectors were also permanently based at John 
Vorster Square157 to assist in the ongoing battle against the illegal trade.158       
 
In December 1937 the JCC decided to exercise its powers under the 1923 Native (Urban 
Areas) Act to brew and sell African beer. The delay was largely due to a number of financial 
and moral concerns within the council. The JNEAD established a separate branch to control 
the entire enterprise from the construction and operation of breweries to the distribution and 
sale of product in beer halls and beer gardens around the city and African areas. From the late 
1930s until the mid 1960s the municipal monopoly on African beer generated profits of over 
eighteen million rand. Two thirds of the profits could be used to off-set losses from housing 
schemes while the remaining third could be spent on any service to improve the social or 
recreational amenities in an African area.159 While the beer monopoly was certainly 
controversial, it is very difficult to see how housing and community services could have been 
provided without this valuable source of income.  In 1962 the JCC received an additional 
boost in income when it was granted the monopoly over the sale of ‘European’ liquor to 
Africans.160  Twenty percent of the profits which amounted to over two hundred thousand 
rand in 1965 were retained by the council and the remaining eighty percent was paid over to 
the BAD.161 Lewis highlights how this move made the much hated raids to detect illegal 
liquor obsolete and improved the relationship between Africans and the police 
considerably.162  
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In 1938, with the profits from beer sales flowing into the Native Revenue Account, the 
JNEAD was able to establish a welfare section which endeavoured to assist families in need 
by providing food, clothing and in some cases cash grants. Over the decades the number and 
diversity of services provided to African communities increased spectacularly driven by the 
council’s belief that without the social development of the community modern housing could 
deteriorate into slums. This required a simultaneous increase in the organisational capacity of 
the Recreation and Community Services Branch. By the mid 1960s this branch had over 
seven hundred employees and an annual budget in excess of a million rand.163  
 
The recreation sub-section of the Branch provided a wide range of sporting and entertainment 
facilities including football fields, tennis courts, swimming pools, golf courses, playgrounds 
and venues for film screenings and general entertainment. Department officials helped to 
organise school sporting leagues, adult football leagues and evening clubs for men to partake 
in boxing, weightlifting and bodybuilding. They even managed to arrange a few trips to the 
beach for small groups of children. Lewis believes that these facilities and services played a 
significant role in reducing community tensions by providing a ‘healthy outlet for their 
energies’.164 The JNEAD’s ability to maintain the quality and extent of these services was 
severely constrained during the 1960s as Government approval and loans were hard to come 
by. The horticultural sub-section of the Branch aimed to beautify the townships by planting 
trees along the main streets. At the height of its activities over ten thousand trees were 
planted per year.165 Officials also encouraged residents to establish private gardens by 
running competitions and vegetable shows.166 The Branch actively encouraged the pursuit of 
the arts. Music, dancing, ballet and painting were taught amongst others. The renowned artist 
Cecil Skotnes was in charge of the art centre located on Polly Street for many years.167 
 
A final community service worth mentioning was the operation of the Vocational Training 
Centre (VTC). It was registered with the Department of Education but managed by the Head 
Office Administration of the JNEAD. The Centre was one of the measures devised to combat 
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164 Ibid, p. 41 
165 The motive in this regard may have been questionable. The more attractive the townships looked the easier 
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juvenile delinquency during and after the Second World War and in its first year admitted 
forty students.168 By the mid 1960s over one hundred and eighty young men were enrolled 
and on average fifty-eight students qualified each year as artisans in terms of the Bantu 
Building Workers Act.169 The courses offered at the centre, at various times, included 
carpentry, plumbing, electrical wiring, motor mechanics and tailoring. After successfully 
completing a course many artisans were absorbed into various Council Departments 
including the Housing Division.170 
 
As mentioned above, Johannesburg experienced a severe housing crisis in the aftermath of 
the Second World War as local authorities, the NAD and employers attempted to avoid the 
financial burden of providing African housing. Losses borne by the Council and the Central 
Government reached nearly six hundred thousand rand a year by 1952 resulting in the 
Council’s building programme coming to a virtual standstill. As conditions within and 
surrounding Johannesburg deteriorated an urgent solution was needed.  C.S. Goodman, 
Johannesburg’s Chief Housing Engineer in the late 1960s, identified three key breakthroughs 
that allowed the JCC to tackle the housing backlog. Firstly, the passing of the 1951 Native 
Building Workers Act which allowed the Council to train and employ African artisans 
lowering the cost of housing significantly. Secondly, the introduction of the Native Services 
Levy Act in 1952 which required all employers of African labour to pay a weekly sum for 
each employee they did not house. This money was placed in a fund earmarked for the 
provision of bulk services in the townships again reducing housing costs dramatically.171 The 
last breakthrough was the introduction of Site and Service schemes from 1953 which required 
municipalities to provide forty by seventy foot sites supplied with basic services on which 
African families could build temporary shelters.172 These shelters had to be built at the back 
of the site leaving the front available for the construction of a permanent home.173 Verwoerd 
encountered considerable resistance to the idea and had to use his Ministerial powers and in 
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some cases threats and ultimatums to push the policy through.174 The following comments 
from Dr Ellen Hellmann of the SAIRR reveal the ultimate success of the site and service 
scheme: 
 
Many of us at the time viewed the scheme with misgivings fearing the 
emergence of new slums with the temporary shacks becoming permanent. It 
is a pleasure to record that these fears proved unfounded.175  
 
These measures allowed the JCC to create a formidable building machine that, at its height, 
completed over nine thousand houses in a year (1958-1959).176 From the early 1960s, 
however, activities in the Housing Division were curtailed due to limited government funding 
and the slow approval of housing schemes. This was in line with the Central Government’s 
push to realise the Stallardist goal of reducing the urban African population to an absolute 
minimum. Instead of houses being built in Soweto the JCC was encouraged to finance houses 
in suitably placed homelands.177 
 
                                                                   *    *    * 
 
As the 1950s unfolded the increasing power and reach of the Nationalist State triggered a 
number of disputes between the NAD and the UP dominated JCC. Chapter Two will explore 
three of these high profile struggles. 
 
 
 
                                                             
174 The JCC had to be pressured into implementing site and service schemes. Although the Council and BAD 
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Chapter Two: Power Struggle 
During the 1950s a dramatic power struggle developed between the JCC and the NAD over 
the formulation and implementation of Apartheid policy. The rising tensions between the two 
levels of government became evident in a number of high profile and overlapping skirmishes 
which had a profound effect on the administration of African affairs in the City.  As the 
National Party expanded its capacity to govern and improved its electoral position, the NAD 
was able to step up the pressure on the recalcitrant JCC and ultimately bring it to heel in an 
intense showdown towards the end of the decade.  
 
In this chapter I will trace the evolution of three key disputes between the Council and the 
State during the 1950s: firstly, the battle over freehold rights during the negotiations over the 
Western Areas Removal Scheme; secondly, the conflict over the NAD’s policy of ethnic 
grouping in Johannesburg’s African townships and lastly, the clash over the drafting and 
carrying out of the ‘Locations in the Sky’ legislation.178 Throughout the chapter the following 
key themes shaping the relationship between the JCC and NAD will be emphasised: 1) the 
Council’s frequent refusal to acknowledge its statutory duty to implement government policy 
in the field of African affairs; 2) the Council’s persistent emphasis that the unique situation in 
Johannesburg demanded a flexible policy approach taking into consideration local conditions; 
3) the NAD’s use of threats and ultimatums – funding withdrawal and the appointment of 
alternative bodies to carry out Council obligations -  to compel the JCC to cooperate; 4) the 
role of party politics in driving disagreements; 5) the defectiveness of existing 
communication channels creating an atmosphere of mutual mistrust and 6) the general 
disregard of African opinion by the NAD and to a lesser extent the JCC.   
 
Freehold Rights and the Western Areas Removal Scheme 
The conditions in the freehold areas of Sophiatown179, Martindale and Newclare – commonly 
referred to as the Western Areas – deteriorated sharply during and after the Second World 
War as a result of the rapid influx of Africans to Johannesburg. Despite this, the Western 
                                                             
178 There were a number of additional disputes that occurred during this period including the clash over the 
principle that African Institutions should be self financing and the quarrel over the planning and 
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sufficient white buyers. Many African owners struggled to keep up with the monthly payments and decided to 
build rooms at the back of their property to rent out and raise much needed cash. Sometimes as many as five 
or ten rooms would be squeezed onto one property without additional services.    
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Areas remained highly attractive for newcomers largely because they fell outside of 
municipal control and were in close proximity to town. By the mid to late 1940s, the demand 
for accommodation exceeded supply and approximately forty-six percent of Johannesburg’s 
non-compound African population called the Western Areas home including a small section 
of relatively prosperous residents with freehold tenure.180 
In the late 1930s the sanitary and political threat posed by overcrowding in the Western Areas 
led to calls from politicians and white residents in the surrounding suburbs for the removal of 
the black freehold suburbs.181 The JCC supported the removals in principle and drafted a 
number of plans182 but these never reached the implementation stage largely due to the huge 
financial cost of resettling tens of thousands of people.183 A number of alternative solutions 
including upgrading the area to improve conditions and reducing overcrowding by removing 
some residents were raised but it appears as though pressure from white ratepayers and a 
political desire not to give the impression of being weak on segregation issues led the Council 
to favour complete removal. 
 
The issue was revived in late 1949 when the Minister of Native Affairs, Dr E.G. Jansen, 
acting in response to vociferous representations made by a white deputation, enquired as to 
what action the Council intended to take in the immediate future.184 The Council responded 
by forming a special sub-committee to investigate the matter and engage with NAD officials. 
Carr provides the following description of these early discussions: 
 
A number of joint meetings were held and broad agreement was reached. 
The council would conduct a detailed survey and would then carry out the 
actual removal, as well as build the necessary houses at Meadowlands – the 
area found to be most suitable – while the government would smooth out 
                                                             
180 S. Parnell, ‘The ideology of African home ownership: the establishment of Dube, Soweto, 1946-1955’, paper 
delivered to the History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand, 1990, p. 6 
181 W. J. P. Carr, Soweto - Its creation, life and decline, South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 
1990, p. 85-86 
182 Johannesburg Public Library Archives (JPLA), Collection of Johannesburg City Council Minutes (JCCM), 9 
December 1952, Excerpt from a letter from the African Anti-Expropriation Ratepayers and Proper Housing 
Movement to the Town Clerk, 1 April 1952 
183 Carr, Soweto, p. 85 
184 JPLA, JCCM, 9 December 1952. Excerpt from a letter from the African Anti-Expropriation Ratepayers and 
Proper Housing Movement to the Town Clerk, 1 April 1952 
47 
 
difficulties in acquiring the land, and would grant loans for the work of 
resettlement.185 
 
The Council secured the cooperation of African interests and carried out the survey with 
financial assistance from the Government.186  The results of the survey enabled the 
negotiating parties to refine their positions and at a highly significant meeting on 7 May 
1952, they reaffirmed their agreement on the vast majority of issues. The Council continued 
to endorse the removals in principle while the Government committed to finance the 
scheme.187 The NAD would now be responsible for the transfer of natives to the new area – a 
shift from the earlier broad agreement – while the Council through the JNEAD would be 
responsible for the planning of the new townships and eventually for their administration and 
control. Both parties agreed that adequate health, transport, welfare and recreational facilities 
would be provided in the new areas. Despite the broad consensus, one significant point of 
difference emerged and endured for the duration of the negotiations: the question of full 
freehold title compensation for those owners who legally enjoyed freehold title in the areas 
concerned.188 Council officials made robust representations on this point but the most 
Hendrik Verwoerd, who had replaced Jansen as Minister of Native Affairs in 1950, was 
prepared to offer was ownership on a thirty year leasehold basis. In an attempt to compel the 
Council to comply with his version of the scheme the Minister issued a powerful warning 
reflected in the following excerpt from a summary of the meeting: 
 
...it will be observed that the only major point of difference between the 
Council and the Government arises from the Government’s refusal to allow 
freehold title and in lieu thereof it has offered a thirty year lease basis in the 
new township. The Minister is adamant on this point, and states that if the 
Council is not prepared to proceed with the scheme as outlined by him, the 
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Government intends to carry out the scheme itself and to debit the Council 
with any costs involved.189 
 
This was a shrewd approach as the ultimatum played on two of the Council’s biggest fears: 
facing a compulsory financial burden and losing jurisdiction over of an aspect of its 
administration. The pressure from Verwoerd had the desired result and the United Party 
dominated JCC agreed to proceed with the scheme but with one important proviso: 
 
...the Council will however continue to press the Government to grant 
freehold rights in the township which is the declared policy of the United 
Party with this Scheme.190 
 
It is understandable that the National Party Government was immovable on the issue of 
freehold compensation as it ran contrary to the national policy of Separate Development. The 
underlying principle of Separate Development was that whites could enjoy all their rights and 
privileges in white areas of the country while Africans could similarly enjoy their rights and 
privileges in African Areas. As African townships were officially part of the white areas it 
followed that no freehold rights would be granted. According to Verwoerd the offer to allow 
thirty year leases in the new areas as compensation was in line with national policy as this 
form of possession did not have any characteristics of permanency.191 The United Party, by 
contrast, recognised the permanent nature of a considerable portion of the African population 
and pushed for greater citizenship rights to be granted.  
 
A key part of the 7 May agreement was that the JCC would appoint an Ad-Hoc Committee 
made up of Council and Government officials to work out the details of the scheme.192 The 
full report of this Committee was considered by the Council at a watershed meeting on the 9 
December 1952. The Council abandoned its earlier commitments and insisted that the report 
be referred back to the Committee for further consideration on a number of issues in line with 
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Council policy193 including the insistence that every African owner of freehold title be 
offered compensating freehold title elsewhere.194 The following extracts from an open 
letter195 written by a City Councillor and published by The Star a few weeks after the meeting 
emphasise the significance of this shift in position: 
 
On paper it may sound like all that needs to be done is to amend one or two 
aspects of the scheme for it to be approved and put into action. In reality the 
referral back sounds the death knell of the scheme as it was put forward by 
the Ad Hoc Committee. 
 
The terms of reference back have therefore only expressed in the polite 
language of diplomacy the Council’s disapproval of the method advocated 
by the Ad-Hoc Committee and it is to the credit of the Council that this 
disapproval was so expressed.196 
 
Various reports of the Council’s change of heart filtered through to Verwoerd who felt that 
the Council’s attitude and opposition on points of principle had now made cooperation 
impossible. In a letter to the Town Clerk, the Secretary of Native Affairs issued another 
explicit warning that unless the Council was prepared to proceed with the scheme in 
accordance with the plan submitted by the Ad-Hoc Committee the Minister would be forced 
to proceed with alternate arrangements for carrying it out in accordance with Government’s 
intentions.197 
. 
While this letter was making its way to Johannesburg, the Ad-Hoc Committee, intimately 
familiar the principles stipulated by the Minister, resubmitted all its original 
recommendations to the Council. On the contentious issue of freehold rights it reported as 
follows: 
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We feel that if the scheme is to be implemented at all it is not possible to 
insist on freehold title being given in compensation for freehold title and 
that the 30-year lease we have suggested as compensation is the utmost 
possible in the circumstances.198 
 
After considering the Committee’s full response to the points referred back in December, the 
Council shifted course once again and resolved to implement the scheme along the lines of 
the 7 May 1952 agreement. A signal that this would not be the end of the Council’s political 
manoeuvring was the familiar resolution that while it understood that the Government was 
opposed to the granting of freehold rights it would continue to press for such rights when ‘the 
time was opportune’.199  
 
Verwoerd responded with caution and pointed out that the attitude of the Council to the initial 
report had compelled him to reconsider the manner in which the scheme should be 
implemented. He informed the Council that he had set in motion the process of drafting a bill 
‘to meet the new situation’ and instructed the Lands Department to begin acquiring the 
necessary land as contemplated by the Ad Hoc Committee. He voiced his suspicions that the 
general attitude within the Council remained the same and that the recent change of heart 
appeared to have more to do with political expediency than a genuine commitment to 
cooperate. Verwoerd was concerned that time and energy would be wasted on all sides by the 
Council’s continued requests for concessions he had repeatedly stated would not be 
granted.200 
 
Although Verwoerd emphasised that he had made no final choice on the matter it appears as 
though he was favouring the formation of a legally constituted body to carry out the scheme. 
The following extract, in a letter from the Secretary of Native Affairs to the Town Clerk, 
reveals the Minister’s reservations about the Council’s ability to push through with the 
scheme:   
 
This body [a legally constituted body] may achieve a greater measure of 
success in bringing the scheme to rapid fruition and might ensure that 
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cooperation is less influenced by factors of political expediency than one 
that to a large extent of necessity [has] continually to refer to the Council 
for decisions on both principles and details and which might also feel 
compelled to react to the expressions of opinion of certain members of the 
public and the press.201 
 
As the months passed the NAD refused to commit openly to a particular method of 
implementation but continued to pursue the acquisition of the necessary land for the scheme. 
Towards the end of July, the Department informed the JCC that the Minister had decided to 
appoint an Advisory Committee to move the scheme forward and had invited a number of 
Councillors to serve on the Committee in their individual capacities. On the 19 November 
1953 the Council agreed to reaffirm its resolutions of the 27 January 1953 and appealed to the 
Minister to allow it to implement the scheme.202 This was communicated to the Secretary of 
Native Affairs in early December and on Christmas Eve a reply was sent to the Council 
firmly rejecting the request. The Minister decided not to revert to the previous agreement for 
two key reasons: firstly, he would not be pushed on the question of freehold title and 
secondly, he believed that as the Council had shifted its position time and again there would 
be no acceptable guarantee that it would in fact implement the scheme.203 
 
Despite this unambiguous reply, the Council persevered and in early to mid 1954, even as the 
Resettlement Bill was making its way through Parliament, Verwoerd assured Leslie Hurd, the 
Chairman of the Non European Affairs Committee, that the door was not closed to further 
negotiations in connection with the Council carrying out the Western Areas Scheme.204 On 
the 14th May a deputation from the Council that included Hurd and Carr met with Verwoerd 
to make further representations. In a familiar pattern the Council urged the government to 
reconsider its position on the issue of granting freehold compensation.205 It also added two 
further demands: 1) that the removal and rehousing should be on a basis of priorities 
determined by the JCC with those living under the worse conditions moved first and 2) that 
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the scheme would initially be voluntary.206 In addition to this the Council representatives 
urged the Government not to proceed with the Natives Resettlement Bill which they felt was 
unnecessary and interfered with the prerogatives of the Council. Again they appealed for the 
Council to be entrusted with the scheme and for it to be given the space to secure the 
cooperation of affected communities in a way that ‘promoted good race relations and 
prevented injustice and hardship’.207  
 
Not surprisingly these representations were rebuffed and on 1 August 1954 the Natives 
Resettlement Bill came into force providing for the formation of the Natives Resettlement 
Board to implement the scheme. The Board immediately approached the Council to request 
the assistance of a few of its Departments including the JNEAD. In response, the Council 
repeated the offer made to the Minister on the 14 May 1954 and advised that if it was not 
accepted then the JCC would play no part in the planning, organisation and execution of the 
removals. It did, however, commit to take responsibility for the administration of the new 
areas when all families had been settled in their new houses and to give whatever support was 
necessary to ensure that when it took over, the conditions necessary for effective 
administration would be present.208 
 
The debate over the response to the Resettlement Board’s request for assistance took on a 
party political dimension when the National Party representatives in the Council proposed a 
motion that the Council should accept the principle of the official Resettlement Scheme and 
undertake to give the Board its full support. The United Party used its dominance in the 
Council to crush the motion. Adding an additional dimension of controversy to the meeting 
was the delay in considering a petition against the action of the Council submitted by 
Nationalist Councillors. Councillor P.Z.J. Van Vuuren addressed the Council and protested 
that the petition, submitted nine days before the meeting, should be considered immediately. 
The Mayor ruled against Van Vuuren and when the petition was eventually presented - after 
the report of the General Purposes Committee (GPC) - Nationalist Councillors left the 
chamber in protest.209 
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A few months earlier resistance to the Natives Resettlement Bill had also taken on a party 
political dimension. The United Party fought the Bill on a National level and resorted to 
drastic measures to ensure that none of its members cooperated with the Resettlement 
Board.210 This is reflected in the following passage from a letter from Prime Minister 
Strijdom’s office to the Town Clerk: 
 
The City Council in accordance with the declared policy of the United Party 
vehemently opposed the Natives Resettlement Bill and the ruling party [in 
Council] carried this opposition so far even after the Act was passed that it 
prevented – under threat of expulsion from the party – those of its members 
from serving on the Board who wished to do so in a personal capacity.211  
 
Throughout the negotiation process there was general indifference towards African opinion. 
The Ad Hoc Committee agreed to consult with affected communities on the practical aspects 
of implementing the scheme but unsurprisingly there would be no debate on the underlying 
principles of the scheme to which there was much resistance. The following poignant 
telegram sent by the African Anti Expropriation and Proper Housing Movement to Minister 
Verwoerd embodies African sentiment towards the scheme: 
 
Africans strongly oppose and protest against the Western Areas Removal 
Scheme. The scheme aggravates homelessness among Africans. It 
contributes to crime and other social evils. It disregards more urgent needs 
for the proper housing of Africans. It is retrogressive and detrimental to 
African interests, progress and security. It is a denial of elementary rights. It 
is contrary to Christianity, democracy and human decency. It engenders 
race hatred and colour conflicts. Africans will never thank the Minister for 
it.212 
 
Dr A.B. Xuma, Chairman of the Movement, ex President of the African National Congress 
and a leading Sophiatown personality, added:   
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We shall never thank the Council of Johannesburg for it either.213 
 
Looking back at the preliminary negotiations between the JCC and NAD in the first half of 
1950, Xuma believed that he and other African representatives had been misled regarding the 
true purpose of the Western Areas Survey by JCC officials. They were repeatedly told that 
the survey would help to relieve overcrowding and improve slum conditions. Articles in The 
Star and The Rand Daily Mail connecting the survey to a Western Areas Scheme and 
reporting on negotiations between the Council and the Minister were dismissed by Carr as 
sensationalist articles misrepresenting the true facts. Carr actively disassociated the JNEAD 
from the reports and urged the African representatives to accept statements made in their 
presence rather than newspaper reports.214  
 
Councillor Atwell, chairman of the JNEAC at the time and mayor of Johannesburg during the 
eventual removals, gave the representatives the following assurances in order to gain their 
cooperation: 
  
The Western Areas Scheme can be forgotten at present. The survey is being 
conducted at the request of the government in order to give a clear picture 
of what has to be done for the African people. Until we have given the 
African people decent homes we cannot expect happier and safer conditions 
and the lessening of crime. I hope we will have your cooperation in this 
survey. The better the information the better the idea the Council will have 
to plan for the future needs of the people... 
 
...the Council had a meeting with the Minister of Native Affairs but they did 
not plan the removal of natives from the Western Areas. There are still 
sufficient men in the City Council sympathetic to the Africans to give them 
a square deal. The City Council did not tie itself down to the government in 
the meeting.215 
                                                             
213 JPLA, JCCM, 9 December 1952, Excerpt from a letter from the African Anti-Expropriation Ratepayers and 
Proper Housing Movement to the Town Clerk, 1 April 1952 
214 JPLA, JCCM, 9 December 1952, Excerpt from a letter from the African Anti-Expropriation Ratepayers and 
Proper Housing Movement to the Town Clerk, 1 April 1952 quoting statements made in a meeting between 
Council officials and African representatives on the 2 June 1950 
215 Ibid 
55 
 
 
The following passage from a letter written by the Secretary of Native Affairs to the Town 
Clerk reveals a level of Council opposition to the scheme at the time: 
 
After the conference called by Dr Jansen a survey of the areas concerned 
was agreed to and carried out with financial help from the Government. 
When the survey was completed considerable pressure by the Minister was 
required before the Council agreed to implement the removal.216 
 
A full interrogation of the issue falls beyond the scope of this dissertation. It is sufficient to 
say that in the minds of the various African representatives the consultation process followed 
by the Council and the NAD was flawed, inadequate and unjust. 
 
The dispute between the Council and NAD over the Western Areas Removal Scheme had a 
considerable impact on the work of the JNEAD throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The JCC 
through the JNEAD had always assumed that it would take over administrative responsibility 
for Meadowlands and Diepkloof as soon as the resettlement was complete. It is highly 
doubtful that any official considered the possibility that the Resettlement Board would remain 
in control for close to two decades. Carr argues that although it was not realised at the time, 
the breakdown in negotiations over the scheme sealed the fate of municipal African 
administration in South Africa and led to the creation of the Administration Boards in the 
early 1970s.217  
 
The Council made frequent calls for the new areas to be transferred to the Council and argued 
that the existence of two organisations controlling an area, which for all practical purposes 
was within the confines of the Council’s own African areas, caused considerable 
difficulties.218 According to Carr, the Resettlement Board built houses to the lowest possible 
standards and provided inadequate social, health, welfare and recreational facilities. The 
people from Meadowlands made full use of the services in the neighbouring Council 
controlled areas adding considerably to the costs of the JCC and increasing the administrative 
burden on JNEAD officials. Residents in the Resettlement Board Areas were also required to 
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pay economic rents whereas subsidies were available to qualifying households in the Council 
areas.219 
 
Ethnic Grouping 
The intense debate over the application of ethnic grouping in Johannesburg’s African areas 
began in early April 1954 and was closely tied with the dispute over the Western Areas 
Removal Scheme. Carr and his Deputy were invited to a meeting where Government officials 
argued that accommodating Africans according to ethnic groups would improve community 
spirit and allow children to be educated in their mother tongue without having to walk long 
distances to school. Carr responded candidly that he believed none of these factors could 
justify such a serious step, one that, in his Department’s experience, would quickly lead to 
bloodshed. He recalled the following events to support this position: 
 
This aspect was clearly demonstrated many years ago at the Wemmer 
Native Hostel when a particular employer insisted on engaging only 
Natives from one particular tribe and asked for all his employees to be 
housed together. This group very rapidly developed a spirit of racial 
arrogance and frightened and intimidated Natives from other tribal groups 
living in the same hostel. These banded themselves into their own racial 
groups for self defence and before long we had fighting in the hostel almost 
every weekend; invariably between rival racial groups.220 
 
In addition to this Carr emphasised that the size and complexity of Johannesburg’s African 
population221 as well as the widespread occurrence of intermarriage would make the 
application of the policy in Johannesburg far more difficult than in any town or city in the 
country.222 
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Nevertheless, the Secretary for the Advisory Committee for the Western Areas Clearance and 
Resettlement Scheme sent a letter to the Council stating that the Minister wished that the 
settlement of the Meadowlands-Diepkloof area should take place with due attention to ethnic 
grouping. On 27 July 1954 the Council considered a report compiled by Carr - outlining his 
strong arguments against ethnic grouping - and resolved to inform the Advisory Committee 
that the Council could not support the policy in the areas concerned.223 Once again the 
Council openly opposed Government policy and placed itself in the firing line of the 
Minister.    
 
Verwoerd received the news of the Council’s defiance through the press and felt it necessary 
to issue a strongly worded statement sharply reprimanding the JCC and warning it of the 
consequences of non-compliance.224 He affirmed that the lay-out of Meadowlands and 
Diepkloof would be on an ethnic basis, and that the JCC had no say in the matter. He also 
made the following statement which dramatically changed the nature of the ethnic grouping 
debate: 
 
It is not practical to consider each racial group separately with regard to 
accommodation in urban locations, but settlement according to the most 
important language groups is essential.225 
 
There appears to have been a significant misunderstanding between the Council and the NAD 
regarding the meaning of ethnic grouping as indicated in the following statement made by 
Carr to the 1954 IANEA Conference: 
 
It was considered at the outset, Mr President, that what was meant by ethnic 
grouping was a rigid demarcation as between tribe and tribe, differentiation 
as between all the varying racial groups in our heterogeneous community. 
That principle or concept was very strongly resisted by my Council. But if, 
as is now apparently the case, the Department of Native Affairs is prepared 
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to accept something which is not a division on a racial basis, but which 
amounts to something on a linguistic basis, then I suggest the whole 
procedure is entirely different, and the objections earlier raised to a very 
large extent fall away.  
 
Carr voiced his frustration that there was no adequate consultation process which 
could have easily cleared up the confusion: 
 
...on an issue such as this which is purely a theoretical one, an issue which 
has never been tried in the Union anywhere as far as I know, that rather 
than the local authorities being confronted with a clear dictum “accept this 
policy or else”, that it would have been possibly more advantageous for all 
concerned had there been a measure of discussion and consolidation as I 
mentioned last night in my talk to this Institute; because events have shown 
that had we in Johannesburg been aware of the standpoint now enunciated 
by the Department in a recent Circular or directive received from the 
Minister, some of the misunderstanding and objections which were first 
raised would not have been raised at all.226 
 
Carr compiled an updated report for the Council discussing the government circular 
mentioned above and, while he questioned some of the advantages of ethnic grouping as well 
as the argument that various local authorities’ concerns that the policy may lead to violence 
were misplaced, he nevertheless recommended that ethnic grouping now be accepted by the 
Council. This change in direction can partly be explained by the shift in the content of the 
debate from ‘tribal’ to linguistic grouping. The various warnings from the Government 
threatening the Council’s Housing programme, however, appear to have played a more 
prominent role. The following passages from Verwoerd’s attack on the JCC on the 29 July 
1956 are worth quoting at length in this regard: 
 
I find it necessary to make this public statement as I do not wish the public 
to be under the impression that the Johannesburg City Council is able to 
thwart the Government’s policy in regard to Meadowlands and Diepkloof in 
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this respect, and this impression to influence politically hostile City 
Councils elsewhere to depart from housing on an ethnic basis. 
 
The Government who provides the funds must impose conditions in 
accordance with its policy with regard to the spending of the money, and no 
local authority can expect to receive money from the Government if such 
money is to be used in a manner which would undermine the Government’s 
policy. The City Council of Johannesburg will then have to explain to the 
citizens of Johannesburg why other cities were solving their native housing 
problems by utilising the available money whilst Johannesburg could do 
nothing at all because it obstinately refuses to cooperate within the national 
policy. Unfortunately it is necessary to give this warning to the 
Johannesburg City Council as it has become a habit of that Council to 
oppose the principle laid down by the Government in respect of the serious 
native housing question in connection with which the Government is 
prepared to render all reasonable assistance. Not only does the Council 
oppose all proposals while doing very little itself but it also poses as the 
only competent body that is prepared to do everything, but is unable to 
obtain the necessary assistance from the Government. 
 
The City Council is gaining nothing for Johannesburg by defying the 
Government’s policy and making its own conditions and by refusing its 
cooperation. On the other hand, those cities which are not controlled by 
Government supporters, who are prepared to cooperate under the 
conditions, derive all the benefit. As the plan progresses from year to year, 
the benefits derived by them will become more and more apparent whilst 
Johannesburg, where vigorous action is needed most, will remain 
neglected.227 
 
Despite ultimately endorsing Ethnic Grouping, Carr rigorously voiced a number of his 
reservations. Below are a few relevant examples: 
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Only time will show whether this new principle is a good one or whether it 
is going to result in unrest and fomenting of disorder between the two 
groups.228 
 
I have said previously that from the experience gained by my Department 
over the past 25 years segregation of the various tribes on a racial or tribal 
basis is conducive to racial strife and one cannot say to what extent racial 
antagonism will be reduced or allayed if Natives are grouped not on a tribal 
basis but according to their language groups.229 
 
While accepting the principle of ethnic grouping on a language basis, for 
the three main groups of South African Bantu, as demanded by the 
Secretary for Native Affairs, I wish to make it clear that in my opinion the 
step is an ill-advised one and the possibility of inter-racial animosities and 
antagonisms will be accentuated so that the responsibility for any disorders 
which my eventuate in the future must be borne by the Government. 230 
 
These statements were particularly prophetic for the events that unfolded at Dube on the 14-
15 September 1957 – described in chapter three. 
 
The Council’s shift in position over ethnic grouping placed increasing pressure on its 
relationship with the Advisory Boards that resisted grouping on any basis. At a special 
meeting between the JNEAC and the Joint Advisory Board on 20th November 1954 the 
following resolution was adopted by the Board: 
 
The Joint Board reaffirms its previous resolution rejecting in toto the 
creation of Ethnic Grouping of Africans, as such a policy is [ostensibly] 
intended by its authors to divert the Africans from the acquisition and 
adoption of the western way of life, which is the ultimate cultural goal 
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which the less advanced countries are striving for in order to make their 
contribution for the good of mankind.231 
 
The NAD dismissed the objections of the Boards and moved forward with its ethnic grouping 
policy. No amount of resistance from below could halt the NAD’s social engineering during 
this period.    
 
Locations in the Sky 
Another key dispute that took place between the JCC and NAD in the 1950s was over the 
principle and implementation of the ‘Locations in the Sky’ legislation. The Native (Urban 
Areas) Act had exempted domestic servants from requiring a license to live in the ‘European’ 
areas of Johannesburg allowing tens of thousands of Africans to reside on the rooftops of flat 
buildings and offices throughout Johannesburg effectively outside of municipal control.232 In 
reaction to several murders which took place in and around Hillbrow in the early 1950s, 
Verwoerd demanded action to limit the number of Africans residing in these areas. The 
Council took no firm action as many Councillors were reluctant to upset voters who were 
highly dependent on their servants. Verwoerd made an unsuccessful attempt to introduce 
appropriate legislation during the 1954 Parliamentary session but after many hostile 
Parliamentary debates and continuous opposition from the public and the press he eventually 
succeeded the following year when the Native (Urban Areas) Amendment Bill was 
promulgated with the express aim of reducing the number of Africans living in the 
‘European’ areas of cities and towns.233  
 
Clause Four of the Bill amended Section Nine of the original Act to prevent any person from 
housing more than five Africans on his premises, without the special consent of the Minister 
or an officer acting under his authority.234 This clause became known as the ‘Locations in the 
Sky’ clause and was vociferously opposed by the JCC. In addition to concerns over the 
shortage of alternate accommodation, inadequate transport facilities and the unknown affects 
on the wage structure of domestic servants, Councillors felt that limiting the number of 
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Africans permitted in a building could have detrimental effects on the overall planning and 
development of an area.235 Most significantly the Council objected to the lack of consultation 
in drafting the bill and the growing powers of the NAD at the expense of local authorities: 
 
...Local Authorities should have some voice in determining the residence 
within their area of native employees. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act has 
hitherto recognised the position that in these matters the Minister should act 
only after consultation with and in many instances with the concurrence of 
the local authority. It seems that this principle is now being departed from 
and that without even consultation with the local authority, an official in the 
Union Department of Native Affairs can, without the safeguard of a right to 
appeal to a higher authority, change at will the nature of city areas and the 
composition of their inhabitants.236 
  
The Council also argued that the Government needed to take the unique position of 
Johannesburg into consideration: 
 
In order to emphasise the objections brought forward to some of these 
amendments it is desired to point to the special position of Johannesburg 
which is equalled nowhere else in the Union. Some of the amendments will 
affect Johannesburg in particular and their affect in smaller communities 
will probably hardly be noticeable. The commercial, residential and 
transport position in Johannesburg requires, it is submitted, special attention 
when legislation affecting the residence and work of its inhabitants is 
contemplated and it is felt that the present proposals cannot receive proper 
consideration unless these special factors are taken into consideration.237 
 
In the mid 1950s there was no effective platform for the JCC to present this kind of an 
argument and to discuss the unique practical challenges it experienced in implementing 
government policy. This would change by the turn of the decade.  
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Following the promulgation of the Act, the Council needed to decide whether or not it would 
apply for delegated powers to carry out the legislation. A deputation was sent to discuss the 
matter with NAD officials on the 23 November 1955 and the following day the Secretary for 
Native Affairs informed the Council that delegated powers would be granted subject to 
certain conditions including: 
 
1) That the delegated powers are exercised in accordance with policy 
directives issued by the Honourable the Minister to the local authority 
from time to time; 
2) That the delegation will, in the first instance, be for a test period ending 
31 December 1956 so as to enable the Department, in the light of 
experienced gained, to evolve satisfactory formulae for general 
application in urban areas. 
3) That the local authority undertakes to restrict approvals to the barest 
minimum number of natives, who must, of necessity reside on the 
premises where they are employed, and such numbers will, in any case, 
not exceed the numbers which, as at 6th May 1955 were lawfully 
accommodated on the premises where they are employed.238 
   
Despite widespread criticism, the Council accepted these conditions and the powers under the 
Act were officially granted by the NAD in January 1956. A few years later the Commission 
appointed to inquire into the Dube Riots found that the Council was justified in taking this 
course as it was able to mitigate the severity of the measure in the interests of owners and 
employees. The Commissioners argued that because the Council had its entire administration 
on the spot and understood local conditions it was in a better position to carry out the transfer 
than a Government Department would have been.239  
 
On the 27 March 1956 the Non-European Affairs and Housing Committee produced a report 
setting out the general basis for the removal of Africans in terms of the ‘Locations in the Sky’ 
legislation.240 About half of the accommodation at the Dube Hostel which was then under 
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construction would be allocated for this purpose.241 The resolutions taken by the Council 
were approved by the Minister and everything appeared to be progressing smoothly. It soon 
became apparent, however, that the Dube Hostel would not be ready to receive residents 
before the one year grace period set out in the Act expired. The JCC acting under delegated 
powers took steps to legalise the position of all persons who had previously been licensed to 
be reviewed on 30 June 1956. On 21 June the JNEAD notified these parties that 
accommodation would be available at Dube from 1 July and called upon employers to begin 
the transfer of workers to the Hostel.242 The Council was soon hit by a flood of complaints 
from building owners and, more specifically, by the owners of residential hotels and flats that 
the reduction in the number of servants would detrimentally affect their businesses. 
Numerous representations were made to the Council by owners and business associations and 
on 31 July 1956 the JCC resolved not to reduce the numbers of Africans lawfully 
accommodated until all Africans illegally accommodated had been rehoused.243  
 
This resolution infuriated Verwoerd and was interpreted as the direct disregard of 
Government policy. He immediately arranged for a strong letter to be sent to the council:      
 
The proposal to concentrate only on illegal lodgers is considered to be in 
conflict with your Council’s responsibility to implement the ‘Locations in 
the Sky’ legislation and is a departure from the understanding under which 
approval was given for the Dube Hostel Scheme.244 
 
In view of the changed circumstances, Verwoerd issued a two part directive on the 7 August 
1956 to bring the Council back into line: 
 
a) As and when hostel accommodation becomes available such 
accommodation should primarily be earmarked for the reduction of the 
excess licensed natives, as visualised by section 9(3) of the Act and as 
explained in my letter of the 24th November 1955. 
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b) Natives employed in Johannesburg but at present living illegally in the 
European area are to be dealt with as an independent issue, and not in 
stultification of the scheme devised to implement the ‘Locations in the 
Sky’ legislation. 
 
The Council quickly realised that its attempt to make concessions to building owners and 
Verwoerd’s reaction to the decision could lead to a rapid deterioration in relations. The 
seriousness of the situation was reflected in the following internal Council memorandum: 
 
The complete reversal of our 27th March resolution on the 31st July when 
we decided to ignore all licensed Natives and concentrate only on 
unlicensed ones is now being regarded by the Minister as a complete “volte 
face” and it is necessary to take stock of the position. 
 
 On 30 August 1956 a meeting between the JCC and NAD was arranged to try and remove 
any misunderstandings and to find a basis for a new arrangement acceptable to both sides. 
Council officials attempted to argue that they considered the problem of housing illegally 
accommodated Africans as the more urgent issue and this was the reason why the Council 
had favoured the policy in terms of its resolutions. NAD officials, nevertheless, demanded an 
assurance that the removal of legally accommodated Africans from buildings in the City 
would continue on an equal footing with the removal of illegally accommodated Africans. 
They emphasised that these were two separate issues which had to be targeted 
simultaneously.245 While the motive of Council officials can certainly be understood, it 
appears as if they had still not grasped the fundamental principle that it was the Government 
and not the Council that formulated urban African policy. 
 
A week later the Under Secretary for Native Affairs (Urban Areas), Mr Heald emphasised the 
importance of the Council and the Department arriving at an amicable settlement and in a 
veiled threat stressed the serious consequences for all concerned if the Council’s inability or 
refusal to implement the legislation were to lead to a breach between the two levels of 
government. The Council was asked to work out the basis of an agreement acceptable to all 
sides and on the 14 September 1956 it submitted the following assurances: 1) that the Council 
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accepts that the removal of the two groups of Africans are two separate problems and 2) that 
while regarding the removal of illegally accommodated natives as the more urgent problem 
of the two, every endeavour will be made to implement the ‘Locations in the Sky 
Legislation’. This was not good enough for the NAD and a letter was sent to the Town Clerk 
demanding an unqualified assurance that an acceptable quota of Africans legally resident in 
licensed accommodation would be moved to the Dube Hostel without further delay.246  In the 
same letter the NAD issued two strong warnings on the consequences of non-compliance: 
 
Further, I am directed to point out that the question of the Department’s 
continued support of the other building activities of the Council is one that 
hinges on your Council’s preparedness to deal energetically with ‘Locations 
in the Sky Legislation’ and allied problems, in accordance with a 
programme acceptable to the Honourable the Minister.  
 
Finally, I am also directed to state that it is considered a matter of great 
urgency that finality in regard to the present issue be reached as, firstly, the 
Dube Hostel cannot remain partly occupied whilst there is this delay and, 
secondly, other schemes – e.g. the three million pounds housing scheme247 
– cannot be proceeded with if the Council is not prepared to fulfil its 
obligations under the powers delegated by the Honourable the Minister and 
in accordance with his directive, as in such an eventuality the degree to 
which the Department will be prepared to co-operate with the Council in 
the implementation of such other schemes will have to be reconsidered.248  
 
The pressure exerted by the NAD was sufficient to bring the Council back into line and the 
Government’s directive of the 7 August 1956 was accepted. The Secretary of Native Affairs 
expressed the Department’s regret that the Council had only taken this decision after repeated 
instructions from the Minister and emphasised that much unpleasantness could have been 
                                                             
246 AUFS, WJPC, PV423, 1/13/1/1, Vol 9, Letter from the Secretary of Native Affairs to the Town Clerk, 3 
October 1956 
247 In 1956 the Mining Houses of Johannesburg, led by Sir Ernest Oppenheimer of the Anglo American 
Corporation agreed to loan the City Council three million pounds to tackle the housing shortage. The activities 
carried out as a result of the loan had to be approved by the Minister.  
248 AUFS, WJPC, PV423, 1/13/1/1, Vol 9, Letter from the Secretary of Native Affairs to the Town Clerk, 3 
October 1956 
67 
 
avoided.249 At the end of the saga the Council had to make a decision similar to the one it 
faced during the dispute over the Western Areas Removal Scheme: accept the delegated 
powers for another year and adhere to the principles and policy laid down by the government 
or allow the Minister to appoint an alternative body to do the work. After much deliberation 
and consultation the JCC decided that it could not allow another body to take over aspects of 
its administration and it agreed to cooperate.250 
 
Throughout the conflict described above the Council attempted to emphasise the special 
position of Johannesburg and argued that a one policy fits all approach was flawed. Although 
the NAD accepted a number of Council deputations there was still no effective platform 
where both parties could air their issues, find common ground and attempt to prevent an 
escalation of tensions. The Council’s relationship with the Advisory Boards became 
increasingly strained as officials often resorted to the ‘it is not our decision’ defence when 
explaining government policy to members. 
  
It is important to emphasise that the disputes described in this chapter formed part of broad 
pattern of JCC opposition to Government policy often driven by party political motivations. 
The NAD was able to bring the Council back into line by resorting to threats and ultimatums 
but only after a great deal of time, energy and goodwill had been wasted. The NAD did not 
yet have the power to break the trend of resistance but this would change as the end of the 
decade approached. 
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Chapter Three: Showdown 
During the mid to late 1950s NAD officials grew increasingly frustrated by the recalcitrant 
behaviour of the JCC. Driven by the infuriating struggles described in the previous chapter 
and triggered by evidence given by Council officials at the Dube Riots Commission, the 
NAD launched an intense offensive with the aim of permanently subduing the JCC. In this 
chapter I will briefly describe four key elements of this offensive: 1) the severe warnings 
directed at the conduct of the Manager of the JNEAD; 2) the creation of the Departmental 
Committee for Johannesburg to ensure that the Council adhered to government policy; 3) the 
stationing of Government officials at the Head Office of the JNEAD to keep an eye out for 
non-compliant behaviour and 4) the NAD’s demand for crucial assurances before 
Government assistance – predominantly housing related - would be forthcoming. I will 
conclude by arguing that the Council’s acquiescence to the Government’s demands towards 
the end of the decade represented a key shift in the balance of power between the two levels 
of government.  
 
The Dube Riots Commission 
As briefly described in the previous Chapter, the Dube Hostel was built partly in order to 
accommodate Africans employed in flats and other buildings in the ‘European’ areas who 
had to be resettled according to the ‘Locations in the Sky’ legislation. The vast majority of 
the men transferred to the Hostel were Zulu migrants whose quality of life deteriorated 
sharply as a result of the move.251 From a relatively secure environment with access to 
adequate wages, convenient cooking facilities and opportunities to earn additional income the 
men now had to endure long commutes where they were harassed by gangs of tsotsis. In 
addition to this they had to pay for their own cooking fuel and adapt to life under close 
Municipal supervision. The harsh living conditions promoted a general attitude of bitterness, 
anger and resentment amongst new hostel residents.252 
 
Largely as a result of the attacks they suffered at the hands of young gangsters, many of 
whom adopted a ‘Basuto’ style of dress, the Zulu residents of Dube began to group together 
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for protection and in some cases reprisals against their attackers.253 On the 8 September 1957 
the first known clash resulting in a loss of life occurred in Meadowlands where two Zulu men 
and a Basuto leader lost their lives. After this incident the South African Police reported 
finding mutilated African corpses almost every day. On the weekend of the 14-15th 
September large scale fighting broke out with the most intensive skirmishes occurring during 
the funeral procession of the Basuto leader killed the previous week. As the cortege made its 
way to the burial ground a standoff occurred between approximately two thousand Zulus and 
a police escort that had been brought in to protect the mourners. Witnesses reported that as 
the crowd rushed towards the procession the Police Captain on duty gave the order for his 
men to open fire. The crowd dispersed but six Zulus were left dead. Later in the day, for 
some unknown reason, the returning cortege was led passed the Dube Hostel where another 
clash took place and three more Zulu men were killed.  All in all the death toll from the 
rioting that occurred during the second week of September was estimated to have reached 
fifty. The JNEAD had to call on leading Basuto and Zulu chiefs to address the rival factions 
and urge all involved to refrain from further violence.254  
 
The scale of these events prompted the JCC to call for the Government to appoint a Judicial 
Commission of Inquiry.255 The Government turned this request down stating that: 
 
...in view of the previous inquiries which were instituted when similar 
occurrences took place and the known facts of the present events, the 
appointment of such a Judicial Commission is unnecessary.256 
 
The Council disagreed with this decision and appointed its own Commission comprising of 
three retired judges including a former Chief Justice.257 In the official report the 
Commissioners severely criticised the Government’s reasoning and attitude in not appointing 
a Judicial Commission: 
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Judicial Commissions of inquiry into riots in Native locations have from 
time to time been appointed but as far as the present Commission is aware 
no such Commission has been appointed to inquire into riots which took 
place after the coming into operation of recent legislation and of directives 
issued by the Government which have profoundly affected the lives of 
Natives and one or more of which, according to a number of witnesses who 
have given evidence before us, were a serious contributory cause of the 
riots. Moreover it is not the case that (as seems to be assumed in the reasons 
under discussion) that the causes of all riots in Native Locations are the 
same. 
 
The negative attitude adopted by the Honourable the Minister of Justice is 
surprising in view of the fact that the riots extended over two days and 
resulted in a great loss of life.258 
 
The Council sent letters to the Commissioner of Police and the Secretary for Native affairs 
requesting the cooperation of their departments and emphasising the importance of an 
‘unbiased and worthwhile’ inquiry. Both departments rejected the call and refused to allow 
any of their officials to submit evidence. The Commissioners commented on this decision as 
follows: 
 
Our task in arriving at the truth has obviously been hampered by the attitude 
adopted by the Government and its Departments of State. In view of the 
fact that the subject-matter of this inquiry is of great interest and importance 
not only to the City Council of Johannesburg, other public bodies and the 
general body of citizens of South Africa, but also, one would have thought, 
to the Government of the Union, the reasons for this attitude are difficult to 
understand.259 
 
The retired judges interrogated the Government’s decision not to participate in the 
Commission and put forward two potential reasons: firstly, it did not have sufficient 
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confidence in the personnel and secondly, it felt it would lose face after not appointing a 
Judicial Commission. In addition to this the Commissioners speculated on a third alternative: 
 
...that the Departments concerned, and more especially the Native Affairs 
Department, might have felt that they would not emerge unscathed from an 
interrogation in regard to their part in the proceedings in relation to the 
townships that culminated in the riots.260 
 
 In any event one of the key findings of the Commission was that the Government’s policy of 
ethnic grouping played a major role in the violence as reflected in the following extract from 
the official report: 
 
There can to our mind be no doubt that the implementation of the policy of 
ethnic grouping was one of the causes which led to and facilitated the 
rioting. The fact that the Basutos were concentrated in a portion of 
Meadowlands and the Zulus were concentrated in Zondi and the Dube 
Hostel in the immediate vicinity enabled both sections to gather in force in 
order to attack one another. It is significant that the rioting did not extend to 
the Orlando Township where ethnic grouping had not yet been 
implemented.261 
 
The Commission criticised the NAD severely on a number of key issues. In a Circular sent to 
all local authorities on 26th August 1954 the Secretary for Native Affairs stated the following: 
 
A certain measure of anxiety still exists within some local authorities that 
clashes will occur when the system of Ethnic grouping is applied. The 
Department is, however, not aware of a single instance where faction fights 
originated solely because members of the two sides belonged to different 
Ethnic groups or even tribes. Thorough analysis of the few instances where 
unrest occurred in the past in certain urban areas showed that the cause 
                                                             
260 UWHP, DRCR, AD1758, Commission Report, p. 6 
261 Ibid, p. 73 
72 
 
could not be attributed to tribal enmity but rather to a lack of discipline 
which would have been in place had Ethnic grouping been in operation.262 
 
The Commission found this line of argument flawed in respect of the African townships 
under the control of the JCC: 
 
When that letter was written the policy of ethnic grouping had not been 
applied by the City Council and, as in our view ethnic grouping will have 
the inevitable effect of maintaining and encouraging antagonisms, it is idle 
to rely on causes of past disturbances in support of the contention that 
ethnic grouping is not likely to result in clashes between ethnic groups. 
There is nothing to substantiate the suggestion that disturbances would not 
have occurred in the past had ethnic grouping been in operation.263 
 
Similarly the Commission contested the NAD’s argument that because the policy of ethnic 
grouping worked satisfactorily on the mines it would be equally successful in Johannesburg’s 
African areas: 
 
Before such a contention can have validity one must be satisfied that the 
conditions on the mines are the same as the conditions in the Native 
Townships. The Manager of the Non-European Affairs Department of the 
City Council correctly pointed out that “one must not lose sight of the fact 
that the mine authorities are able to exercise far greater disciplinary control 
over their ‘single compounded’ employees than a local authority can over 
its thousands of tenants living under family conditions.”264 
 
The Commission also agreed with a view held by many Council officials that Johannesburg 
was a unique case requiring context specific attention: 
 
Having regard to the enormous size of the Native population under the 
control of the Johannesburg City Council, the diversity of racial origins, the 
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degrees of westernisation and urbanisation attained by a large proportion of 
the permanent residents and the number of well-educated persons to be 
found amongst them, the position of that Council is, we think, unique and 
its problems different from those which other municipal councils may be 
called upon to face in the administration of their Native Townships.265 
  
The commission concluded that it was possible but highly unlikely that the Government 
could have presented evidence that would weaken their conclusions on ethnic grouping. In 
order to do so would have required proof of additional advantages so great that these would 
outweigh the dangers of the policy.266 The appointment of the Commission of Inquiry, the 
testimony of various Council officials and the ultimate condemnation of the Government’s 
policy of Ethnic Grouping - and therefore the vindication of the Council’s original stance - 
further weakened the relationship between the two levels of government and acted as a 
catalyst for the NAD’s offensive against the JCC and its officials. 
 
The Castigation of Carr 
The Dube Riots Commission relied heavily on the testimony of the Manager of the JNEAD. 
The Commissioners were highly impressed by Carr’s conduct as reflected in the following 
statement from the official report: 
 
In conclusion we wish to place on record our high appreciation of the 
services rendered to us by Mr Carr in placing before us the information we 
asked him to furnish. The City Council is fortunate in having, as its 
Manager of the Non-European Affairs Department, a man who has devoted 
the best part of his life to matters relating to the administration of Natives in 
the City and a man who, through his patience and tact, has won the 
goodwill of the natives.267 
 
Verwoerd vociferously disagreed with this conclusion. He firmly believed that many of the 
problems experienced in Johannesburg were caused by the JCC’s defective implementation 
of Government policy. In a speech to Parliament in January 1958 he even went as far as to 
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say that if the United Party ever came to power ‘it would create the misery for South Africa 
that existed in Johannesburg’.268 As it was Carr’s responsibility to carry out policy and 
inform the Council of its statutory duties, Verwoerd directed a large portion of blame and 
anger towards him. Between May and August 1958 Carr’s future hung in the balance as the 
NAD accused him of dereliction of duty.269 On the 5 May 1958 the Department issued a 
severe warning to the Council regarding Carr’s conduct: 
  
...I must inform you that the Honourable the Minister of Native Affairs has 
noted with grave concern the attitude of Mr W.J.P. Carr, your Council’s 
Manager of Non-European Affairs, towards government policy in respect of 
native administration. 
 
Mr Carr is an officer licensed by the Minister in terms of Act No. 25 of 
1945 and as such he is bound to implement government policy or show 
good reason for any deviation therefrom. He should therefore be informed 
that his indifferent and in some respect biased attitude towards government 
policy and its implementation cannot be condoned. Conduct on such lines is 
a source of embarrassment both to the government and the City Council and 
will inevitably lead to serious consequences for the officer concerned.270 
 
A key source of Verwoerd’s anger was Carr’s testimony on ethnic grouping at the Dube Riots 
Commission which he felt was aimed at exonerating the JNEAD and placing the blame 
firmly on Government policy. He argued that Carr was biased in his presentation of evidence 
and had not set out the many advantages of ethnic grouping. The Council defended Carr 
emphatically and demonstrated that he had submitted a number of documents to the 
Commission which outlined the advantages of the policy including the NAD’s 1954 directive 
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to all local authorities and various newspaper articles.271 The Town Clerk went on to argue 
that it was not Carr’s duty to present the Government’s case in this matter and that if there 
were additional advantages not mentioned in the documents then the Government could only 
blame itself for refusing to be part of the proceedings.272 In reply the Secretary of Native 
Affairs argued that as a licensed official Carr should not have offered evidence on matters of 
policy which were beyond his jurisdiction.273 He should merely have informed the 
Commission of the flow of authority and the respective functions of the Government and a 
local council in the field of Native Affairs.274  
 
Verwoerd also accused Carr of failing to report that the conditions attached to a £3 million 
loan granted by the mining companies were not being met. In order to understand this 
accusation it is necessary to provide some background to the mining loan agreement. In 1956 
Councillor Boris Wilson invited Sir Ernest Oppenheimer of the Anglo American Corporation 
to accompany him on a tour of the South Western Areas in the hope that Sir Ernest would 
provide financial assistance to break the housing backlog.275 At this time very few houses 
were being built and attaining finance from Government sources was proving exceptionally 
difficult due to the poor relationship between the JCC and NAD.276 Sir Ernest witnessed the 
wretched conditions under which thousands of families lived and was stirred into action. He 
approached fellow mining bosses and within a short period of time organised a substantial 
loan to assist the Council with its housing programme. The Council hoped to use this money 
exclusively for rehousing the residents of Moroka and Shantytown, whereas Verwoerd 
wanted it to be used to resettle Africans removed from the ‘European’ areas under the 
‘Locations in the Sky’ legislation. Carr provides a stinging critique of Verwoerd’s behaviour 
during these negotiations: 
 
A deputation of leading councillors asked Dr Verwoerd for an interview 
and at this meeting on 13 August 1956, in his office in Pretoria, he showed 
himself at his petulant worse. Instead of welcoming the loan and the public 
display of generosity shown by Sir Ernest and his colleagues in the mining 
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industry he was sulky and unfriendly. At one stage of the meeting he said, 
‘I’m not just going to agree to this loan...without attaching certain 
conditions.’277 
 
Ultimately Verwoerd approved the loan as well as the use of serviced land for the scheme on 
condition that a certain percentage of new houses built as a result of the loan would be used 
for his purposes (resettling Africans from the ‘Locations in the Sky’).278 
 
Again the Council firmly defended Carr by arguing that the ‘working difficulties’ being 
experience  by the Manager did not warrant an official report to the NAD: 
 
...the Manager has at all times since houses became available under the 
slum clearance scheme for occupation kept his committee fully informed of 
progress as well as practical difficulties experienced in immediately filling 
houses set aside for occupation by native families removed from the 
European areas. 
 
...the committee [JNEAC] contemplated asking the Minister to receive a 
deputation but eventually after further consideration at the April meeting it 
was decided to instead take intensive action in terms of night raids in an 
effort to fill the 2000 houses. As a result of this Mr Carr prepared a 
memorandum and instruction to his staff dated 24th April, a copy of which 
is attached and which, it is suggested, shows that every effort was being 
made to comply with the Minister’s conditions. 
 
... the section [of the Act] has been interpreted as requiring the Manager to 
report any irregularity in his department or any occurrence which he may 
consider advisable to bring to the notice of his Council for transmission to 
yourself. It was not thought that working difficulties being experienced in 
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this matter required a formal report of the kind contemplated in this 
section.279 
 
The response from the Secretary of Native Affairs to this reasoning was unequivocal: 
 
It cannot be conceded that the departure from the agreement reached in 
connection with the £3,000,000 scheme was based on “working 
difficulties”. In this case there was a definite unilateral breach of a 
fundamental condition of the agreement, and a licensed official of Mr 
Carr’s standing should have known he was in duty bound to invoke the 
requirements of section 22(6) of Act No. 25 of 1945.280        
 
The correspondence between the Secretary of Native Affairs and the Council overlapped with 
two key events that will be described in a section below: the formation of the Mentz 
Committee and the demand for assurances. As a result of these events the NAD resolved to 
take no further action against Carr as long as two principles were accepted. These are 
reflected in the concluding passage of the NAD’s 14 August letter: 
 
There can be no real co-operation with either the City Council or Mr Carr if 
the fundamental legal obligation resting firstly upon the Council to restrict 
itself to executive duties and not to try to create separate local policy and 
secondly on Mr Carr, to carry out the purpose of his license is not 
accepted.281 
 
A key theme reflected in this passage and one considered in detail below is the Council’s 
misinterpretation of the flow of authority in the realm of African affairs.282 The Town Clerk’s 
defence of Carr on 30 May 1958 reveals the Council’s misunderstanding of the statutory 
duties of the Manager of the JNEAD and local authorities in general:  
 
...it does seem that the Manager may be placed in an extremely difficult 
position where the majority party in the council may have a different view 
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from those of your department. While it is appreciated that such an official 
is licensed by the Minister in terms of Act 25 of 1945, he is directly 
employed by the City Council of Johannesburg and that body pays his 
salary. 
 
...bearing in mind that your department and this Council have on occasions 
seen matters from a different standpoint, it is hoped that you will accept that 
the Manager has only performed his duty to the best of his ability in 
carrying out the policy and instructions of his Committee and the Council 
and should not be accused of having shown an indifferent or biased attitude 
towards Government policy and its implementation.283 
 
In response the Secretary of Native Affairs bluntly corrected this misinterpretation: 
 
...it cannot be accepted that Mr Carr has not erred because, as you put it, he 
was merely performing his duty to the best of his ability in carrying out the 
policy and instructions of his committee. He must know that the Committee 
has no authority to create basic policy or give instructions which conflict 
with the policy laid down by the Government. He is, in terms of his licence, 
guilty of dereliction of duty to the Government where he connives or gives 
effect to such unauthorised actions on the part of the Committee.284 
 
It appears highly unlikely that a well qualified and experienced administrator like Carr was 
unaware of the terms of his license and the statutory duties of the Government and Council. 
Verwoerd’s powerful and highly publicised speech at the 1956 IANEA conference left no 
doubt as to the roles and responsibilities of licensed officials and the levels of Government: 
 
Their [Municipal ‘Native’ Administrators] primary function is to ensure 
that their Councils - the members of which change from time to time – 
know precisely what the policy of the State is and how it is to be applied to 
their towns’ administration. 
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The facts are that there is only one policy source in the country in regard to 
Native Affairs and that is the government itself. All local authorities are 
concerned only with executive functions. The task of the local authorities is 
to put the country’s policy into effect, not to create any basic policy for 
themselves or for the country. This is a very clear principle which has been 
laid down in our legislation from its commencement and only confusion 
and chaos would result throughout the country if Native Affairs were 
subjected to a diversity of policies. It simply cannot be permitted that 
differing policies be applied to the management of Native Affairs in 
different towns, or that policy is implemented piecemeal as a result of the 
variety of methods of approach which arise. 
 
It is necessary to obviate misunderstanding in this respect because of late 
when there has been the occasion to call a local authority to book or reprove 
or admonish it for not carrying out the government‘s policy, the accusation 
has more than once been levelled at us that the Central Government is 
usurping the functions of the municipality. 
 
I wish to make this very clear to those of you whose responsibility it is to 
interpret the Government’s policy to your Councils – the Government is the 
body responsible for formulating Native policy and it does not usurp but 
merely fulfils its own obligations when it issues its directives and when it 
exercises its supervisory functions over local authorities which neglect to 
carry out their duty in regard to Native Affairs.285 
 
It appears that Carr’s decades of experience in the JNEAD and his high standing in the field 
of urban African administration gave him the confidence to voice his concerns that various 
Government policies would have detrimental consequences for Africans living in 
Johannesburg. Throughout the 1950s he was unwilling to implement policies without 
questioning their potential effects. He consistently emphasised the unique position of 
Johannesburg and appealed to the NAD to consult those with practical experience before 
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passing legislation. The question of whether or not Carr was guilty of dereliction of duty 
hinges on how one defines ‘duty’. In a pure legal sense as argued by the NAD he is more than 
likely guilty. In a wider moral sense strong arguments can be made that in resisting 
Government policy he did not believe in he was fulfilling paternalist responsibilities he felt 
he had towards the African people under his supervision.  
    
The flow of correspondence between the Council and the NAD in the middle of 1958 also 
reveals the close relationship between Patrick Lewis, the newly appointed Chairman of the 
JNEAC and Carr. The men jointly prepared the key arguments that appeared in the Town 
Clerk’s 30 May defence.286 The following passage confirms that Carr had the full support of 
Lewis and the JNEAC:  
 
In the first place I would like to make it clear that Mr Carr has always acted 
in close consultation with his committee and in particular his Chairman and 
the Council through that committee must be regarded as taking full 
responsibility for the actions of the Manager.287 
 
A handwritten thank you letter from Carr to Lewis at the height of the episode also reveals 
the extent of the growing relationship between the two most important men in the 
administration of African affairs in Johannesburg: 
  
I would like you to know that I appreciate your support and encouragement 
over the criticism from Verwoerd very much indeed. My job is very 
difficult at the moment and without the full backing from my Chairman and 
Committee would be quite impossible.288 
 
The strong rapport between these two men and in particular the pragmatic influence of Lewis 
would play a major role in the relationship between the JCC and NAD during the 1960s.289 
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The Mentz Committee and the Assurances Saga 
On 13th June 1958 Verwoerd appointed a Departmental Committee for Johannesburg to 
ensure that Government policy was carried out in the city. This body was more commonly 
known as the Mentz Committee – after its Chairman, the Deputy Minister of Native Affairs 
Mr F.E. Mentz - although the English Press quickly nicknamed it the Watchdog 
Committee.290 It was appointed to keep an eye on all spheres where the NAD had an interest 
including housing, influx control, labour, removals and the implementation of the ‘Locations 
in the Sky’ legislation.291 The Government stated that this measure had been taken in reaction 
to the Council’s ‘maladministration of Native Affairs’ and repeated opposition to 
Government policy.292  
 
City Councillors were not surprised by the creation of the Committee and some argued that 
such a body had always been needed in light of the numerous practical difficulties in 
implementing Government policy. The Rand Daily Mail reported that many United Party 
Councillors were, however, frustrated that despite forming the majority party in the Council 
their decisions could be changed by outside bodies.293 Their annoyance at having policy 
decisions relating to African affairs overruled once again revealed an ignorance of the 
Council’s statutory duties. Nationalist Councillors welcomed the move with Councillor Van 
Vuuren enthusiastically declaring that the Committee was there to ensure that the Council 
toed the line.294 
 
A few weeks later the NAD implemented another element of its offensive against the JCC by 
informing it that two government officials, Mr PA Franken and Mr BT Steyn, would be 
stationed at the JNEAD Head Office to ensure the ‘full and proper implementation of 
Government Policy’.295 Carr provides an amusing description of this unprecedented event: 
                                                             
290 Bob Connolly, the cartoonist for the Rand Daily Mail produced many memorable cartoons portraying the 
Watchdog Committee. 
291 The official line was that the Committee would be a medium through which interested and affected parties 
could get clarity on Government policy in the field of African affairs. Journalists from the Rand Daily Mail 
speculated that the move was designed as a way for Verwoerd to keep an eye on Johannesburg and ensure 
that everything continued to run according to plan once he left the Department (at the time it was reported 
that he was seeking another Cabinet position - he would go on to become Prime Minister later in the year). 
292 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail, 14 June 1958 
293 The Local Transportation Board had jurisdiction over transportation in Johannesburg while the Wage 
Determination Board set the wage level for African Municipal workers. Both were set up in a way to ensure 
Government control despite the UP holding a large majority in Council. 
294 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail, 27 June 1958 
295 The officials were specifically keeping an eye out for breaches in influx control and labour regulations. 
82 
 
 
The outcome was not what the government department expected. In fact the 
situation became ludicrous. The two officials were immediately christened 
‘Frankenstein’ by a wag in the department and after a relatively short period 
of trying to find non-compliance with government policy in the department 
failed to do so and quietly disappeared from the scene without even saying 
goodbye.296 
 
 
 
Picture 3:  Carr, Soweto, p. 99, A Bob Connolly cartoon depicting the stationing of government officials at 80 Albert 
Street 
 
While many experienced Councillors were cynical of the action being taken by the NAD, 
Patrick Lewis argued that the Mentz Committee could be an effective consultation platform 
where Government officials could come face to face with the unique situation in 
Johannesburg and achieve significant results for the African people living within the areas 
administered by the Council: 
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Johannesburg because of its size and huge congregation of people on its 
boundaries has problems which are unique. By regular contact with the 
Mentz Committee it should be possible for these problems to be discussed 
with the object of finding a solution rather than developing antagonisms 
which help no one in the long run. I am hopeful that when the Mentz 
Committee comes face to face with some of the problems it will realise and 
appreciate the difficulties which face the Johannesburg City Council in its 
administration of a Bantu population larger than that of any other city in 
South Africa.297 
 
He planned to approach the Committee to request assistance on a number of housing matters 
including the approval of new housing loans and tweaking the formula for filling houses built 
as a result of the £3 000 000 mining loan.298  
 
On 7 August 1958 an historic meeting took place between Council officials, including Lewis 
and Carr, and the Mentz committee. In a dramatic move Chairman Mentz ruthlessly 
demanded nine assurances from the Council before he would allow any discussion on 
Johannesburg’s housing problems. Carr provides a sense of what this meeting was like: 
 
Councillor Lewis had just been elected chairman of the council’s 
committee; this was his first meeting of this kind. The meeting was held in 
a large committee room in the BAD headquarters in Pretoria, and many 
senior government officials from several departments were present. At the 
outset the deputy minister of Bantu Affairs, Mr F Mentz, said in a very 
offensive manner that before he was prepared to discuss the agenda, certain 
assurances were demanded from the council. The council representatives 
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had been given no prior warning of this, which was essentially a matter 
which could have been dealt with in a confidential letter to the council. The 
manner in which Mr Mentz raised the issue was so provocative, and indeed 
insulting, that we from Johannesburg felt that it had been done publicly in 
this way with malice and with the intention of humiliating us before all the 
other government officials present. It was particularly embarrassing for 
Councillor Lewis because he was new and had no background information 
about the issues on which Mr Mentz demanded public assurances there and 
then. All we could do was undertake to raise the matter with the council on 
our return.299 
 
Mentz emphatically stated that the Government could no longer tolerate the attitude adopted 
by the JCC and he was not ashamed by the steps taken by his committee to prevent this in the 
future. He also commented that ‘the objections made to the actions of the NAD were that a 
small country like South Africa had the audacity to poke its nose into the affairs of the big 
city Johannesburg’.300 The nine assurances demanded were as follows: 1) that the Council 
will carry out government policy and not form a basic policy of its own; 2) that Council-
appointed licensed officers will not attempt to introduce different policies301; 3) that the 
Council will apply the Government policy of ethnic grouping; 4) that the Council will 
develop its site and service schemes by building on alternate sites; 5) that the Council will 
continue to administer the Influx Control and Labour Bureau systems; 6) that the Council will 
replace the Beer Halls in the European areas with similar facilities in the African areas302; 7) 
that the Council will give preference to essential workers in dairies, bakeries, butcheries etc. 
in the Denver Hostel and the new Eastern Native Township Hostel; 8) that African 
deputations will not be given the impression by officials and councillors that its laws and 
regulations are considered by them to be unreasonable; and 9) that the Council will continue 
to carry out the ‘Locations in the Sky’ legislation in terms of its delegated powers.303 
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The demand for assurances by the Mentz Committee combined with the stationing of 
Government officials in the JNEAD and the threats against Carr left the Council in no doubt 
that the situation had escalated dramatically. The NAD offensive placed the Council in an 
impossible position as reflected in the following passage from The Rand Daily Mail 
describing the Council’s core dilemma: 
 
To refuse to conform to policies coming from central government would be 
to invite the Government to take direct action in the city’s affairs. To 
cooperate is to risk the displeasure of many of the citizens who elected it 
and perhaps worse still to share the responsibility for putting into practice 
policies which it regards as wrong and even dangerous. Both choices 
involve grave disadvantages.304  
 
A leading City Councillor reflected the dilemma in a similar way:  
 
Our choice is to carry out legislation or face the possibility that the 
government will appoint a body which will do so which will not be in the 
interests of the citizens of Johannesburg or the Non-Europeans.305 
 
Adding another layer of intensity to the dilemma was the fact that unless the assurances were 
given the huge housing division the Council had created would be scaled back dramatically 
due to a lack of orders placing thousands out of work, having a knock on effect on related 
industries and adding to the hardships of thousands of African families living in slum 
conditions.306  
 
There appears to have been deep division within the United Party group in Council on the 
issue. The press reported that two factions had emerged: a ‘Business Group’ advocating 
cooperation in the interests of the City and a ‘Political Group’ opposed to any form of 
appeasement.307 After intense debate the Council, influenced by the arguments of the 
‘Business Group’, voted in favour of cooperation, arguing that it had chosen the lesser of two 
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evils.308 On the central issue of implementing government policy the Council responded as 
follows: 
 
While emphasising that it is a democratically elected body responsible to its 
electorate, the council accepts that according to the act of Union there can 
only be one source, namely the state, of policy based on laws dealing with 
the Native administration in South Africa, and the council will restrict itself 
to executive duties in this regard as agents of the state. It is quite obvious to 
everybody that it is the duty of the council to carry out the laws of the 
land.309 
 
On the issue of the manner in which officials communicated policy to African deputations the 
Council found it difficult to give an unqualified assurance but promised that it would make it 
clear that it was an agent of the Government and that when explaining a specific matter it 
would do so without suggesting that the policy was unreasonable. The Council also conceded 
‘on reflection’ that it should have been the function of Councillors and not officials 
(specifically Carr) to offer evidence at the Dube Riots Commission.310 
 
The Council assured the citizens of Johannesburg that it would continue to make robust 
representations emphasising the unique situation in Johannesburg and attempt to influence 
Government policy wherever possible. Lewis emphasised that all the Council had done was 
agree to carry out the law of the land and would not implement any policies that were not 
enshrined in law.311 He also argued that by cooperating the Council had prevented an outside 
body from taking over a large aspect of the City’s administration. Many councillors 
contended that the JCC was the only body that could apply the law to the best advantage of 
the people affected.312  
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Shortly after the assurances were given, the conservative ‘Business Group’ attempted to take 
control of the City Council by securing a number of powerful committee positions.313 Its plan 
was to retain the United Party ‘ticket for election purposes but move away from the Party’s 
policy of fighting the Nationalists. It aimed to promote greater compromise and cooperation 
with the Central State arguing that conflict between the two levels of Government had taken 
the Council’s focus away from running an efficient City. It appears as though this group had 
much in common with conservative UP Councils on the East Rand highlighted by 
Nieftagodien.314  Supporters of the existing Leadership argued that firm opposition to the 
Nationalists was fully justified as it was on this basis that the UP had retained its position and 
captured two seats from the Nationalists in the previous election. Ultimately the coup did not 
succeed but the Council remained highly divided influencing its relationship with the NAD 
for the rest of the decade and into the 1960s.315 
      
The JCC also experienced considerable pressure from external sources in the aftermath of the 
assurances saga. A group of ‘fourteen leading citizens’ including a former MP and three 
former City Councillors challenged the United Party members of the Council on their 
‘humiliating surrender’ to Verwoerd.  They organised a petition signed by over a hundred 
citizens and presented it to the mayor calling on him to convene a meeting on the steps of the 
City Hall to explain to the people of Johannesburg why the Council had agreed to 
collaborate.316 They demanded answers as to why the Council had agreed to implement 
ethnic grouping despite the findings of the Riots Commission and why the decision was taken 
without consulting the Advisory Boards. 317 
 
A United Party Councillor wrote an open letter published in the Rand Daily Mail defending 
the Council’s decision to cooperate: 
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Recent verbal assaults on city councillors in Johannesburg make odd 
reading. Very recently we had the Nationalist Press castigating a large 
section of UP city councillors (by name) as liberals masquerading as UP 
followers and now we are accused by another source of acting as NP 
executives. 
  
I am completely opposed to most of Dr Verwoerd’s non-European 
legislation but it is stupid to defy it or attempt to evade it when by doing so 
the squalor and misery of tens of thousands of Africans are perpetuated.   
 
The 14 leading Johannesburg citizens must surely have been following 
events and thus must know that Dr Verwoerd has said in effect that if the 
City Council does not carry out policy the State will not advance any 
further money for Native Housing in the South Western areas. 
 
It is one thing to make high principled gestures of defiance from the luxury 
of Dunkeld, Melrose and Houghton and another to do so from the hovels 
and shanties of Moroka. It does not need the opinion of any advisory board 
to know what the people of Moroka and other cess pools want.318 
 
In a powerful response to this letter the ‘fourteen leading citizens’ accused the City Council 
of allowing itself to be politically blackmailed and failing to realise the significance of its 
surrender: 
 
We have a typical Munich situation. Even you concede that the laws we are 
asked to administer are bad laws. A policy of expediency (in this case 
houses are more important than principles) has been the cause of disasters 
throughout history.319 
 
Despite a detailed open letter from Councillor Patmore outlining the statutory duties of the 
Council and the reasons for cooperation, the ‘fourteen leading citizens’ continued to argue 
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that the Council was not legally obliged to execute policy and should have refused to 
cooperate: 
 
If [housing] can only be provided on Dr Verwoerd’s terms then let him bear 
the responsibility for his own bad policy. The council should not soil its 
hands.320 
 
The Rand Daily Mail reported that the Nationalist group in Council under the leadership of 
Eben Cuyler was clearly happy about the whole situation. This is understandable as not only 
was the balance of power shifting noticeably in favour of the central government but the 
NAD offensive had created significant divisions within the dominant UP group. He gleefully 
told United Party Councillors that if what they had done was a genuine effort in the ‘interests 
of the State and the Natives’ he would do all he could to assist. He added that he hoped that 
this would be the last time that the JCC made a public issue out of such matters.321 
 
A former member of the UP who had joined the Liberal Party added to the pressure on the 
Council by publicly stating that approximately seventy five percent of the members of the 
Liberal Party had left the UP because ‘their conscience would no longer allow them to remain 
in it’.  He went on to say that every time the UP ‘surrenders to the Nationalists or betrays a 
progressive principle more members leave to join the Liberal Party’.322 
 
Councillor Patmore quickly reminded UP opponents that the Council had not relinquished its 
right to criticise. What the agreement in reality entailed was a separation of functions: the 
NEAC, council departments and officials would administer the laws to the best of their 
ability while criticism of those laws would be confined to the Council Chamber, public 
meetings and political platforms.323 
 
The first major success of the Mentz committee and the Council’s agreement to give 
assurances was that the NAD recognised the limitations of the formula for filling houses 
under the £3 000 000 loan agreement. Council officials were able to use the platform 
provided by the Committee to demonstrate that there were not enough families living in 
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backyards or on licensed premises in Johannesburg’s white areas to make it possible for the 
Council to meet its commitment of allocating two thousand out of every five thousand houses 
to Africans from the ‘Locations in the Sky’. The Mentz committee agreed that what 
Johannesburg needed was more Hostel accommodation for the many single men awaiting 
resettlement. The unspent balance from the mining loan would be used for this purpose.324 
The result of this decision was that thousands of families living in slum conditions in Moroka 
and Shantytown could be housed immediately.325  
 
The most significant outcome of the whole saga was that a government loan of £1 150 000 
was approved allowing the Council’s mammoth building machine to continue operations. 
This saved jobs, assisted the building sector of the local economy and ultimately allowed 
over thirty thousand people to be housed.326  
 
After almost a decade of conflict between the two levels of government the NAD’s offensive 
from May to September 1958 succeeded in bringing the Council to heel. It forced through the 
realisation of the limited powers of local government. Councillors and officials who had been 
punching above their weight for many years would now have to adapt to the reality of life at 
the lowest level of government. While the Council would continue to make representations 
throughout the 1960s it would no longer attempt to formulate an African policy of its own. 
This realisation represented a key shift in the balance of power towards the central state.  
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Chapter Four: Pragmatic Cooperation 
In the aftermath of the showdown between the City Council and Verwoerd a gradual process 
of relationship rebuilding took place. Initially the old habits of both sides were difficult to 
break but through the leadership of key individuals - Minister Nel and Councillor Lewis in 
particular - a new culture of pragmatic cooperation emerged. In this chapter I will trace the 
emergence, growth and consolidation of this culture through a number of incidents and events 
from the late 1950s to the mid 1960s. I will begin by describing the rebuilding process 
through the following key episodes: 1) the mixed meetings saga which resembled the power 
struggles of earlier in the decade but ended on an optimistic note; 2) the beerhalls crisis where 
robust representations from the Council achieved what some thought were impossible 
concessions from the Minister; 3) the preservation of Pimville where the BAD agreed to 
include the historic location and surrounding areas within the South Western Native 
Township; 4) the agreement on a revised formula for the continued implementation of the 
‘Locations in the Sky Legislation’ and 5) the development of the Oriental Plaza to ameliorate 
the harsh removal of Indian Traders from Pageview. I will then explore the internal divisions 
within the UP, triggered by cooperation with the BAD, as well as attacks by the newly 
formed Progressive Party on the UP dominated JCC.327 I will finish by emphasising that 
despite granting practical concessions to the JCC, the BAD continued to strengthen its 
machinery of control and accelerated the attack on the permanency of urban Africans. 
 
Throughout the chapter the following key themes will be emphasised: 1) the importance of 
consultation and negotiation at the highest level; 2) the growing appreciation of local 
circumstances amongst BAD officials; 3) the transformation of the Departmental Committee 
for Johannesburg from ‘watchdog’ to an effective communication platform; 4) the growth in 
secrecy around urban African administration; and 5) the growing dominance of the BAD and 
the acceleration of Separate Development. 
    
The Mixed Meetings Saga 
Towards the end of 1958, shortly after the Council’s acquiescence to the Government’s 
demand for assurances, another conflict erupted between the two levels of Government, this 
time over the BAD’s plan to ban all mixed gatherings in Johannesburg. In line with the 
                                                             
327 The Progressive Party was established in the second half of 1959 by members who had left the United 
Party. Their views on political rights for Africans (and a whole host of other policy areas) differed significantly 
from official UP policy.  
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legislation of the time, the new Minister of Native Affairs, Michiel Daniel Christiaan De Wet 
Nel, sent a letter to the Council indicating his intentions and asking the Council to state 
whether it had any objections. Attached to the letter was a list of thirteen premises where 
racially mixed parties ‘characterised by excess’ were reported to have taken place regularly. 
As the law required the Council to respond within three weeks an urgent meeting of the 
General Purposes Committee was called.328 The decision on whether or not to fight the matter 
revealed significant divisions within the Council.329 The conservative ‘Business Group’ 
pushed for cooperation arguing that the UP stood for social segregation while the liberal 
‘Political Group’ argued that any ban would set a dangerous precedent in Johannesburg. After 
heated debate the Committee resolved to fight and a registered letter outlining the decision 
was posted to the Minister.330 
 
News of the dispute soon emerged in the Press with both parties accusing the other of leaking 
confidential details. In response to the Minister’s claim that he only wanted to target a limited 
number of mixed parties The Star speculated that his real intention was to secure greater 
powers to impose a blanket ban.331 The Rand Daily Mail argued that if the Minister’s claim 
was true there would be no need for the ban as the Government could easily handle the small 
number of mixed gatherings using existing legislation: 
 
 If he wants to stop these parties then he has plenty of weapons to hand 
without seeking a blanket authority to ban all mixed gatherings. If the 
drinking is illegal he can use the Liquor Laws. If he fears undesirable 
political influence he can use the anti-communist legislation. The kindest 
interpretation of Nel’s actions is that he has been clumsy. The inference that 
most people will draw, however, is that he really would like to stop social 
meetings between the races even in private houses and if that conclusion is 
wrong then he only has himself to blame for the misconception.332 
 
                                                             
328 The General Purposes Committee had the power to act on behalf of the Council while it was in recess. 
329 See the section at the end of this chapter for more on the internal divisions within the Council. 
330 The divisions within the United Party will be discussed in a section towards the end of this chapter. 
331 University of the Witwatersrand Historical Papers (UWHP), Private Papers of PRB Lewis (PRBL), A1132, Bb, 
Vol 2, The Star, 5 January 1959 
332 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily, 6 January 1959 
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Ellen Hellmann of the SAIRR weighed in on the matter praising the City Council for fighting 
the ban and arguing that the Minister’s proposal amounted to ‘imposing a government 
monopoly on association with Africans’.333 She stated firmly that race relations in the City 
would deteriorate dramatically if the ban was imposed.334 
 
Nel was particularly angry with the Council’s conduct in the matter and held it responsible 
for the media offensive which had been mounted against him. He defended the Government’s 
decision to ban all gatherings arguing that it was the only effective way to put a stop to the 
mixed parties. He felt that the thirteen individuals in question would be able to evade a 
limited ban by meeting their African friends elsewhere.335 The following passages taken from 
a letter written by Nel and published in The Rand Daily Mail reveal the acute frustration felt 
by the new Minister:   
 
The City Council of Johannesburg has for the umpteenth time, acted in a 
characteristic manner – without a proper appreciation of its statutory 
relation to the central government and above all without a proper 
conception of events occurring in the city entrusted to its care. For a 
considerable time, a fairly large number of Europeans in Johannesburg have 
held mixed parties – characterised by excesses – in their homes in 
contravention of well known South African custom. Lately, liquor has 
flowed freely at such parties and the results can be left to the imagination.  
If the JCC knows what is happening in the area under its jurisdiction – and 
we can rightly expect that it should – it will be well aware of the gatherings 
which occur regularly on the premises indicated. If its law advisors had 
advised it correctly it would be quite clear that the prohibition of such 
gatherings on only the premises indicated would be ineffective unless the 
prohibition was applied to the whole city, because the gatherings could 
simply be held on premises not mentioned in the proposed notice. 
                                                             
333 She went on to say that ‘to stop the activities of thirteen people the Minister is placing a ban on one 
million’. 
334 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail, 6 January 1959 
335 The thirteen citizens mentioned by Nel were well known for their ‘controversial’ political beliefs. 
Throughout the saga they urged the Council to resist the ban. They even opened a case of defamation against 
the Minister. There are a few instantly recognisable names in the following ‘list of thirteen’: A. Fischer; J. Slovo; 
J. Baker; R.E. Press; S. Goldsmith; L. Bernstein; M. Harmel; E. Brown; N. Levy; B. Arenstein; P.B. Benjamin; M. 
Goldberg; and E. Weinberg. 
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In future nobody need be surprised at the steps taken by my predecessor 
when he appointed a Departmental Committee for Johannesburg. The 
appointment of the Natives Resettlement Board must be seen in the same 
light.  
 
Must I now accept that the JCC is well satisfied with the mixed drinking 
parties occurring in the city? Must I accept that it was completely unaware 
of what regularly happens on the 13 premises indicated? Must I accept that 
it does not know how to get in touch with my department or that it even 
refuses to do so? This is the council that regularly complains that the 
government trespasses on municipal terrain. A Government which does not 
– in such circumstances – protect the national interest would be neglecting 
its duty. 
 
In conclusion I must say that the discourteous behaviour of the council has 
deeply disappointed me.336  
 
Over the ensuing days Nel continued to emphasise his dissatisfaction with the Council’s 
handling of the matter but kept the door open for further negotiations: 
 
I took the initiative and asked the City Council, as my partner in this matter, 
for its cooperation, trusting that the position would be rectified. Naturally if 
the Council had any doubts in the matter I would have been gladly available 
for any discussions with a deputation. Neither from me or my department, 
which was in any case always available, was any further information asked. 
Discussions or an extension of the prescribed period were never asked for. 
All of these possibilities of which the City Council availed itself in the past 
were in this instance ignored and only a blank refusal to cooperate was 
received, with the result that my hands are tied provisionally.  
 
                                                             
336 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail, 5 January 1959 
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I wish to point out however that the City Council will now have to assume 
full responsibility for the conditions to which I referred and about which the 
public is rightly concerned. If the City Council of Johannesburg wakes up 
and realises that action in the public interest is necessary and if the council 
is anxious to clear up the matter I shall be willing even at this late stage and 
after much malicious use has been made of this urgent affair to consider 
proper joint action.337 
 
At the same time he used the strategy perfected by his predecessor and issued an ultimatum to 
the JCC: 
 
If cooperation in this matter is not given and the undesirable conditions 
continue to the annoyance of the public and the undermining of South 
African interests, I shall be obliged to consider asking Parliament to entrust 
to the State alone the responsibility with regard to such affairs and to relieve 
the local authorities who are unwilling to perform their duty towards the 
public of such responsibilities.338 
 
 
Picture 4: UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail, 6 January 1959, Bob Connolly takes a swing at Minister 
Nel’s handling of the ‘Mixed Meetings’ saga 
                                                             
337 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail, 7 January 1959 
338 Ibid 
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While the Minister was actively defending his conduct the General Purposes Committee met 
to consider the BAD’s ultimatum. After fiery deliberations and pressure from senior UP 
officials the Council decided to reject Nel’s request for cooperation.339 Following the meeting 
a council spokesperson escalated tensions by asking the Minister to make a public statement 
that he had been wrong all along.340 Despite this political posturing it was announced just a 
few days later that a Council deputation would go and see the Minister on the 15 January to 
discuss their differences. In a piece prophetically titled ‘A New Start’ a Rand Daily Mail 
columnist spoke candidly about the upcoming meeting: 
 
Mr Nel will enhance his stature if he takes another look at the matter and 
the Council for its part should see its function as that of persuasion rather 
than recrimination. If there have been misunderstandings it will be the task 
of the negotiators to eliminate them so that both sides can argue on a basis 
of hard facts. No one expects the Council and the Minister to agree – and 
certainly not to compromise – on matters of principle. It is expected from 
the Minister that if the council puts up a convincing case he should give 
their arguments careful consideration and concede what is right. And if he 
does so he should be given due credit.341 
 
The open and direct discussions at this important meeting revealed that the distance between 
the parties was not as wide as it had been represented in the media over the preceding weeks. 
Nel told the deputation that it was never his intention to prohibit certain basic freedoms and 
admitted that the legal effect of the notice was far wider than the limited purpose he wished 
to attain. After listening attentively to the representations of the deputation he agreed to 
revisit the matter and draw up a fresh draft which would result in a ban on certain specified 
mixed parties in private homes only and not on all political and social contact between black 
and white as was originally indicated.342 In reaction to this pronouncement a Councillor 
commented: 
 
                                                             
339 See the section towards the end of this chapter for further details of the internal divisions within the United 
Party. 
340 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail, 10 January 1959 
341 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail, 13 January 1959 
342 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail, 16 January 1959 
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This is good news for everyone in Johannesburg. The Government has 
asked us for many assurances in the past and at last we have one from a 
Minister in return.343 
 
Surprisingly little movement on the issue occurred in the weeks following the meeting and it 
appears as if this is where the matter ended. A senior Council official stated in early March 
1959 that ‘everyone was hoping that this embarrassing matter would be forgotten’.344  
  
While a large part of this dispute resembled the heated struggles from earlier in the decade, 
the manner in which the 15 January meeting was conducted revealed the beginning of a new 
phase in the relationship between the Council and the BAD.345 Glimpses of a spirit of 
pragmatic cooperation emerged with the Minister in particular showing that he was prepared 
to listen to Council officials and be swayed by sound logic.346 
 
 
Picture 5: UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail. Unknown Date (Approximately early January 1959). ‘You 
realise of course the Minister frowns on mixed gatherings!’ A humorous take on the ‘Mixed Meetings’ saga.  
                                                             
343 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail, 16 January 1959 
344 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail, 2 March 1959 
345 The Mentz Committee and Lewis were largely absent during the relatively short-lived yet highly intense 
‘Mixed Meetings Saga’.  
346 Minister Nel also showed his ability to listen to reason during a controversy over the banning of African 
church services in Forest Town. Four residents from the surrounding suburbs submitted noise and hygiene 
related complaints to Nationalist City Councillors who lobbied the Minister to enforce a ban. The United Party 
argued that the services should be allowed to continue in line with the feeling of the majority of residents. On 
12 December 1958 Nel acted against the advice of the Council and banned the services. Reverend J.B Webb 
organised a ‘man to man’ discussion with the Minister and the two came to an agreement. Nel would lift the 
ban as long as churchgoers were quiet at all times, dispersed as soon as the service was over and church 
services were decentralised immediately. Webb assured the Minister that the Church would be run along the 
lines of ‘garage churches’. Nel was widely praised for the manner of his conduct and for making reasonable 
concessions.        
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The Beerhalls Crisis 
Within a few weeks of this positive outcome the Council and Government were 
thrown into another crisis when a white man was murdered outside the Mai-Mai 
Beerhall to the east of the City.347 The BAD responded by ordering the JCC to close 
all central beerhalls by the 16th June and build alternative facilities in African areas 
in line with Government policy. In order to understand the differences between the 
two levels of government on this issue it is important to trace the seeds of the 
controversy. 
  
In 1937 the amendment of the Native (Urban Areas) Act made it legal for Africans to brew 
their own beer in locations or native villages where local authorities did not erect a beerhall. 
In 1938, rather than allow home brewing, many local authorities on the Witwatersrand 
including Johannesburg erected their own production and distribution infrastructure.348 Over 
the years the practice attracted  a great deal of criticism but the JCC forged ahead arguing that 
the Council monopoly had definite advantages including the following: 1) preventing the 
‘deterioration of health, morals and crime’ by minimising illicit brewing and providing a 
standard quality product; 2) preventing overindulgence by maintaining control over supply 
and demand; 3) keeping Africans off the streets during their lunch hour; and 4) easing the 
financial burden of providing  health, welfare, recreation and housing services.349 
 
Largely due to the difficulty of finding suitable land Johannesburg’s Beerhalls were located 
in industrial areas where a large number of Africans were employed. Only four were built 
leading to overcrowding and a number of dangerous incidents. The Central Beerhall was the 
largest in the city serving an estimated ten thousand patrons per day by the mid 1950s and 
drawing numerous complaints from nearby white ratepayers. Carr and other officials at the 
                                                             
347 In a draft version of his lecture ‘A City within a City – The Creation of Soweto’ Lewis provides the following 
description of events leading up to the murder: ‘Two Europeans returning from the Turffontein Race Course 
one Saturday afternoon stalled the very old motor car they were riding in near the Mai–Mai Beer Garden in 
City and Suburban just at the time when patrons were pouring out after closing time. The Europeans ordered 
the passing crowd to push their car to get it re-started, but the Bantu objected to the terms in which they were 
addressed and an argument started culminating in blows being exchanged, and finally the one European was 
so seriously assaulted that he died, but the other managed to run away.’  
348 The opinion of officials at the time was that home brewing would attract single male migrants and increase 
the chances of ‘unpleasant’ incidents. 
349 Johannesburg Public Library Archives (JPLA), Johannesburg City Council Minutes (JCCM), Report of the 
JNEAC submitted to the Council, 26 March 1957 
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JNEAD had given some thought towards improving the situation but a letter from the 
Secretary for Native Affairs on 8 November 1956 demanded action: 
 
As a result of recent disturbances at the Central Beerhall in Johannesburg 
the Department has given careful consideration to the advisability of 
locating institutions such as beerhalls, which are at the same time sources of 
potential danger, elsewhere than in central European or densely populated 
areas. 
 
As you are no doubt aware it is departmental policy that all institutions   
such as beerhalls catering for the needs of urban Natives should be situated 
in areas specially demarcated for Natives. Indeed the Department no longer 
sanctions the erection of beerhalls save where these are erected in 
accordance with policy in the location. The same remarks also apply in 
regard to Native hostels and recreational facilities. 
 
...it is considered that the time is now opportune for the City Council to 
consider the desirability of removing all such institutions to the Native 
townships. It is appreciated that this can only be a long term policy but to 
commence with the City Council should be urged to give consideration to 
the early removal of the Central Beerhall. The removal of the other 
beerhalls should receive consideration when the hostels are removed and 
the Native population in the central area is reduced by the implementation 
of the ‘Locations in the Sky’ legislation. 
 
The primary object should be eventually to establish all the beerhalls in the 
South-Western Native complex.350 
 
In response Carr presented a potential solution to the JNEAC.  He showed how planning was 
already in place for beerhalls at the new hostels at Dube and Nancefield and suggested that 
additional smaller beerhalls be constructed in the African areas to reduce overcrowding. He 
emphasised the importance of keeping the Central Beerhall open until alternative facilities 
                                                             
350 JPLA, JCCM, Letter from the Secretary of Native Affairs to the Council, 8 November 1956, NEAC report, 26 
March 1957 
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became available and speculated that the loss of profits from closing the central beerhalls 
could be made up by the establishment of beer gardens and off-sale facilities in the locations. 
A central concern highlighted in the report was the high probability that Africans living in 
‘European’ areas would turn to shebeens and dangerous concoctions if deprived of a 
convenient source of African beer. Carr argued strongly that this would create far more 
problems than those created by the beerhalls and believed that the solution was to maintain a 
presence in the ‘European’ areas of the city. At the same time he acknowledged the 
controversial nature of this suggestion: 
 
...it would appear contrary to the Government’s policy to establish Native 
beerhalls in European areas and it will be difficult, if not impossible, to find 
sites in the town where new smaller beerhalls can be established so as to 
relieve congestion in the four large ones existing, but this point is of 
sufficient importance to justify verbal representations being made on a high 
level to the Department of Native Affairs.               
 
The Council supported the Manager’s concerns and adopted the following resolution: 
 
That, in order to prevent the emergence of shebeens in the central area, the 
Manager, Non European Affairs Department, be authorised, in conjunction 
with other appropriate departments, to select and negotiate for the 
acquisition of two or three small beerhalls in predominantly industrial areas 
and that he be further authorised to make representations to the Native 
Affairs Department to obtain Government approval for this proposal, 
which, if necessary, could be on a temporary basis.351 
 
As this resolution openly opposed Government policy the Nationalist leader in Council 
proposed a motion to remove it. The UP used its large majority to push the recommendation 
through but unsurprisingly Government approval for the plan was not forthcoming.352 A year 
and a half later after sustained government pressure one of the assurances given by the JCC 
was that it would cooperate with the NAD and accept the principle that in certain cases 
                                                             
351 JPLA, JCCM, Ordinary Meeting, 26 March 1957 
352 Ibid 
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hostels, beerhalls and other institutions and amenities should be replaced with similar 
facilities in Native Areas.353  
 
During a meeting of the Departmental Committee for Johannesburg in January 1959 the 
Council presented two plans for the BAD to consider. The first involved closing the central 
beerhalls and replacing them with facilities in African areas in line with Government policy. 
The second, mirroring controversial resolution of March 1957, suggested providing well sited 
beerhalls in industrial areas to cater for employees and Africans residing in the ‘European’ 
areas.354 While these proposals were being considered media reports of the murder outside 
the Mai-Mai Beerhall began to emerge and public opinion swayed firmly in favour of the 
immediate removal of all beerhalls to the African areas.355 
 
Grasping the significance of the event and the dangers of a knee-jerk reaction from the BAD 
Lewis immediately issued a statement to the Press to reinforce the Council’s position: 
 
We are naturally gravely concerned about an incident such as that on 
Saturday. But it would be neither feasible nor sensible to uproot all the 
beerhalls in the city. Johannesburg’s natives consume 10 million gallons of 
kaffir beer a year. This proves their need for the brew, which is prepared 
under the best possible conditions and is virtually a food. Thousands of the 
beer-drinkers live and work in the city’s environs both during the week and 
on the weekend. If they were deprived of this beer just at a stroke it is 
certain that they would turn to illicit and dangerous brews.  
 
The Council thinks a sensible alternative to the large, crowded beerhalls 
would be to have smaller beerhalls in the city at strategic points. Thus big 
congregations of natives at one point would be prevented.356 
 
As mentioned above Minister Nel responded swiftly to the murder and ordered the Central, 
Mai-Mai and Wolhuter beerhalls to be closed before 16th June 1959. In addition to this he 
ordered that in the interim beerhalls in white areas should be closed on Sundays and that 
                                                             
353 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail, 25 September 1958 
354 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail, 9 January 1959 
355 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail, 2 February 1959 
356 Ibid 
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construction work on beer gardens in the African areas begin immediately. In doing so he 
rejected the Council’s plan – to maintain a decentralised presence in the ‘European’ areas - in 
line with recommendations from the Departmental Committee and overall Government 
Policy. The Star criticised Nel for ignoring the advice of the ‘men on the spot’ as well as the 
reality that tens of thousands of Africans still lived in the white areas for the convenience of 
their employers.357  
 
On 27 February 1959 the Council met to discuss the Minister’s instructions. Lewis requested 
that the contents of the meeting be kept from the Press as previous leaks had increased 
tensions between the levels of Government.358 Despite this The Rand Daily Mail was able to 
secure details of the meeting and reported that the Council had decided to approach the 
Minister to make further representations.359 Eben Cuyler argued that since the English Press 
had reported on the matter he would now reveal ‘what the United Party had up its sleeves’.360 
Die Vaderland subsequently informed its readers that the Council had decided to request that 
the Malan Commission – investigating the supply of liquor to Africans - be expanded to 
include an investigation into the sale and supply of beer. It accused the Council of employing 
delaying tactics with the aim of pressuring the Minister to pass legislation to remove 
beerhalls.361 
 
While the request for the Malan Commission to look into the matter was rejected the Council 
began construction of beer gardens in the African areas with the full support of the BAD. 
Lewis expressed his gratitude to Department officials for their assistance and cooperation but 
at the same time voiced his concern that the needs of Africans in the white areas had not been 
met.362 Lewis repeated his concerns at every opportunity including a candid speech to the 
Rotary Club of Johannesburg in April 1959: 
 
If the beerhalls are to be closed can it be expected that the present patrons 
will suddenly change their habits, go without what they regard as their 
                                                             
357UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Star, 24 February 1959 
358 The provocative role played by the media during the ‘Mixed Meetings’ saga the previous month appears to 
have contributed to this decision. 
359 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail, 28 February 1959   
360 He argued that any agreement with Lewis regarding confidentiality had lapsed due to the leak to The Rand 
Daily Mail. 
361 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, Die Vaderland, 2 March 1959 
362 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Star, 13 March 1959 
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midday meal, reserve their thirsts for when they return to the Townships in 
the evening, and if they should live in the city are they suddenly going to 
drink ginger pop? I think the answer is to be found in some famous words 
of George Bernard Shaw – “not bloody likely”. When it is considered that 
the return fare from Johannesburg to Orlando at the weekend is 1.10d. and 
that the travelling time would be a minimum of one and a half hours, I think 
it more than likely that it will be the shebeens that will get the patronage. 
 
It is my fear, and that of members of the Council, that the sudden closing of 
the central beerhalls will cause terrific resentment in the minds of the 
African people and that it will result in an increase in the patronage of 
shebeens and the illicit sale of European liquor. 
 
It is my contention that the unfortunate incidents that have occurred in the 
vicinity of the beerhalls will be nothing to that which will follow if the 
beerhalls are closed and the shebeen traffic gets under way.363  
 
Negotiations between the Council and BAD continued behind the scenes and at a watershed 
meeting on the 5th June a Council deputation, led by Lewis and Carr, made a final appeal for 
the BAD to consider the perilous implications of not catering for Africans living in the 
‘European’ areas. The Minister stood firm on his decision that the large beerhalls should go 
but in a momentous move he gave his permission for the Council to operate two to three 
small beerhalls on an experimental basis in industrial areas. The Minister received 
widespread praise for his overall conduct and for granting this concession. Lewis commended 
Nel by saying: 
 
The Minister displayed an awareness of the complexity of the problem and 
discussed the practical issues in a spirit of helpfulness. 
 
Indeed our reception by the Minister in Cape Town when we flew to see 
him on the matter was that we would not discuss the matter on political 
                                                             
363 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, Address to the Johannesburg Rotary Club given by Patrick Lewis, 28 April 
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lines but purely on the merits. We deeply appreciated his understanding of 
our problems. 
 
Things moved rapidly once agreement was reached. Mr Heald from the BAD immediately 
toured the proposed sites and gave his approval. The Council put its construction teams into 
action and miraculously after four days of flat out work three new beerhalls were ready to 
serve customers.364 Lewis described this outstanding achievement in a speech to the Council 
in 1960: 
 
I remember well the crisis we had on June 16th last year when the Central 
Beerhalls had to be closed and the Minister gave us permission to open new 
ones in the worked-out mining area. We were given the seemingly 
impossible task of constructing the new ones in three to four days. The 
officials of the Council responded magnificently and the change over went 
off without a hitch. Those who were in on it regarded it as a miracle.365  
 
The successful resolution of the crisis was largely due to the leadership and commitment of 
Patrick Lewis and his growing relationship with the Minister. The Rand Daily Mail 
commented as follows: 
 
In getting permission to establish the small city beerhalls Mr Patrick Lewis, 
Non European Affairs Committee leader, has achieved what even his 
friends said was impossible. 
 
The beerhalls crisis continued for a few months with Nationalist Councillors protesting 
loudly against the concessions granted by the Minister. Backed by the Afrikaner Press they 
launched a campaign to ‘fight to the bitter end’ and secure the removal of the new 
beerhalls.366 Cuyler even publicly appealed to Verwoerd to overrule Nel’s decision.367 In 
                                                             
364 The Council threw a party for the African workers who had built the new beerhalls. While they were 
enjoying their reward – a feast of beer and meat – over a hundred African women protested outside 
demanding schools not beerhalls.  
365 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ed13. Speech by Patrick Lewis to the Council Chamber regarding the resignation of 
Councillor Jack Cutten, 12 May 1960 
366 The JNEAD received complaints from a number of whites living near the Denver beerhall and ultimately had 
to close it within a month of opening. 
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dealing with a number of complaints emerging from white residents near the beerhalls the 
Minister revealed the extent to which he had been convinced by Lewis’s representations. 
While insisting that he would not hesitate to close the beerhalls if they were a threat to the 
peace and safety of nearby residents he added the following caveat: 
 
I must however be careful to put an end to one evil and create a greater evil 
in its place.368 
 
 
Picture 6: UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail, 25 June 1959, A Bob Connolly Cartoon commenting on 
the complaints against the new Beerhalls 
 
The Preservation of Pimville 
Another significant event demonstrating the improvement in the relationship between the 
Council and the BAD was the Minister’s decision to allow Pimville to be included within the 
boundaries of the South Western Native Township. In 1904 after the outbreak of bubonic 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
367 Ironically the relationship between Lewis and Nel was far stronger than the one between the two National 
Party members. It appears as though Cuyler’s dissent early in Nel’s term led to him being marginalised by the 
Minister. In a tribute to Lewis on his retirement, Councillor Oberholzer spoke candidly about this: ‘I think at 
times the then leader of the opposition was a little jealous of the position he [Lewis] held in the minds of those 
two gentlemen [Verwoerd and Nel]! I know on an occasion, Sir, het hy Raadslip Lewis gaan verkla by die 
Minister en die Minister het nie notisie geneem van gewese Raadslip Cuyler nie. Soveel so dat hy by 
geleentheid hier gese het in hierdie Raad, ‘Yes, I know the reason why, it is because you are the Minister’s 
blue-eyed boy’. 
368 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail, 24 June 1959 
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plague near present day Newtown the African population in the area was moved to the farm 
Klipspruit twelve miles south west of the city. This settlement became Johannesburg’s first 
municipal location and was renamed Pimville in 1934.369 In 1953 a planning committee 
chaired by FE Mentz responded to complaints from white residents in the Nancefield-
Klipriviersoog area and recommended that the Potchefstroom road and railway be the 
dividing line between black and white (see map below).370 As Pimville fell on the ‘white’ 
side of this line the committee recommended its removal – a long term project - so that 
tensions between the races could be eliminated.371 Shortly after Verwoerd had approved these 
recommendations the Council appealed for the retention of Pimville as it was then in the 
process of considering a complete relayout of the slum dominated area.372 The request was 
rejected and the Council was barred from incurring any further capital expenditure in the area 
which continued to deteriorate.373  
 
 
                                                             
369 Named after Howard Pim who had dedicated a large part of his life to the ‘upliftment’ of Africans in 
Johannesburg. 
370 This committee was commonly referred to as the Mentz Committee. It is important not to confuse it with 
the later Departmental Committee for Johannesburg which was also referred to as the Mentz Committee. 
371 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ea 16, Letter from the Secretary for Native Affairs to the Director of Native Labour 
Johannesburg, 9 August 1954 
372 Lewis argued that the Council resisted the decision regarding Pimville as it had been occupied by Africans 
for many decades. 
373 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ea 16, Letter from the Secretary for Native Affairs to the Chief Native Commissioner, 
23 December 1954 
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 The Council was reluctant to accept this as the NAD’s final policy and asked the JNEAD to 
prepare a detailed memorandum which was submitted to Government officials in 1955. The 
Department replied that nothing could be done until the Group Areas Board had made its 
recommendations to the Minister regarding the proclamation of group areas in and around 
Johannesburg.374 This was where the matter remained until July 1958 when the JNEAC 
decided to make renewed representations. As Government policy had been firm on the issue 
the Town Clerk recommended putting together the strongest possible case. It was agreed that 
the Council should not approach the BAD for the relaying of Pimville but rather for the 
resettlement of families who would have been housed on Diepkloof land that had been 
surrendered to the Resettlement Board for housing Africans removed from Alexandra.375 The 
following passages from a letter sent by the Town Clerk to Carr reflect the Council’s 
strategy: 
 
It appears to me that the only possible approach to the Department of 
Native Affairs is that, the acquisition of Diepkloof by the Natives 
Resettlement Board having deprived the Council of the opportunity to 
provide housing closer to Johannesburg proper than the remote stretches of 
Doornkop, the Council should be allowed to develop available land fairly 
close to Johannesburg. But the emphasis must be on the intention to provide 
housing on this land for people who would otherwise have to be housed at 
Doornkop so that the relayout of Pimville itself becomes a secondary 
consideration.  
 
As to the reasons given by the Mentz Committee for the original decision to 
evacuate Pimville in the distant future, the Council has already provided in 
addition to a buffer strip of the maximum width now required by the 
department (500 yards) a public road and an avenue of tall trees. The 
complaints that have been made are no more serious than those from the 
                                                             
374 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ea 16, A description of events relating to Pimville in a letter from the Town Clerk to 
the Manager of the Non European Affairs Department, 14 January 1959 
375 In 1954 the Council negotiated an option to purchase a portion of the farm Diepkloof number nine from 
Crown Mines. The Resettlement Board asked the Council to forego their rights as the Board needed the 
ground for the proposed removal of Africans from Alexandra. The Council was reluctant to give up this land as 
it would have provided over five thousand urgently needed sites in an area relatively close to the city. In July 
1958 the Council agreed to abandon its rights to acquire the land in spite of the demands of its own housing 
programme. 
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Europeans on the fringes of Doornkop and wherever we settle Natives the 
same complaints will arise. We shall have to make it clear that there will be 
no development along the present Potchefstroom Road until the new 
national road to the south has been opened.  
 
That will be the main argument but a secondary argument will be that the 
Council’s proposal will make possible the relayout of the old village and 
the consequential avoidance of the necessity to pay £100,000 or more in 
compensation to families who might otherwise be dispossessed and move 
elsewhere.376 
 
The Council was eager to get permission to use the land adjacent to Pimville as it had a 
number of advantages including: 1) it was large enough to enable the JCC to provide around 
seven thousand houses; 2) it was already owned by the Council; 3) it bordered existing 
African areas; and 4) it was well situated along transport routes. The Council raised the 
matter with the Departmental Committee for Johannesburg in August 1959 but negotiations 
were delayed due to the illness of Chairman Mentz.377 The impetus returned in 1960 when 
MC Botha replaced Mentz as Deputy Minister and in December he and Nel visited the South 
Western Areas to see what was happening on the ground. Lewis gave a rousing welcome 
speech expressing his respect and gratitude to the Minister and revealing the essence of 
pragmatic cooperation: 
 
Mr Minister I feel you are endeavouring to carry out a policy which you 
believe holds the solution. I do not agree with many of the aspects of that 
policy, but I do accept your sincerity and I do believe you have a regard for 
                                                             
376 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ea 16, Letter from the Town Clerk to the Manager of the Non European Affairs 
Department, 14 January 1959 
377 During this time a number of constraints on the activities of the Resettlement Board in the Western Areas 
provided a motivation for the BAD to come to an agreement on Pimville. The ‘cleaning up of Sophiatown’ was 
being delayed by the shortage of alternative accommodation for Coloureds. The Board therefore wanted 
Western Native Township, which had been proclaimed a Coloured Group area, to be cleared to provide the 
required temporary housing. The Council also needed to provide alternative housing for the Africans from 
Western Native Township but had no land for such a purpose. It appeared as though the deviation of the 
‘Mentz Line’ to free up land adjacent to Pimville could be the key to the whole problem. An interesting aside is 
that Eben Cuyler made a political issue out of these events. He proposed a motion at a Council meeting in May 
1960 for the JCC to hand over control of the removal of Western Native Township to the Resettlement Board. 
Lewis accused Cuyler of trying to drive a wedge between the Council and the Board. He suspected that Cuyler 
wanted the NAD to take over full control of ‘Native’ Administration in Johannesburg. Lewis went on to defend 
the Council’s record in African administration stating that it had been ‘a credit to the City’. 
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the Bantu and wish to do right by him. I hope Mr Minister that you have the 
same feeling towards us, that although you may not agree with all our 
requests you will accept that they are sincerely made and that we, as much 
as you, are endeavouring in our small way to deal with the difficult 
problems of the Urban Bantu that are our responsibility.378 
 
Nel’s personal visit and the strong case put forward by the Council resulted in the Minister 
reversing the decision of the Mentz Committee – a move that would have been unheard of a 
few years earlier. On hearing the news Lewis travelled to Pimville to inform the communities 
on the ground: 
 
This is great news that I bring you. The Minister of Bantu Development Mr 
De Wet Nel has reversed a former decision of the Government that Pimville 
should become a white area and has agreed to allow us to build you new 
homes here.379 
 
In a report of the achievements in African affairs for the year 1960/61, Carr gave the 
following summary of events:  
 
The protracted negotiations with the Government for the deviation of the 
Mentz Line further to the East to include the Pimville area within the South 
Western Native Are complex came to fruition during the Mayoral year with 
the receipt of the desired approval of the Minister of Bantu Administration 
and Development after a personal visit by himself and his deputy. The 
relayout of Pimville and the consequent rehousing of 7,000 families living 
under slum conditions in the township has, therefore, now become a matter 
of urgency and has been the subject of discussion with the Department of 
Bantu Administration and Development at a number of meeting of the 
Departmental Committee for Johannesburg. 
 
                                                             
378 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ea 13, Speech by Patrick Lewis welcoming the Minister and Deputy Minister on their 
official tour of the South Western Areas 
379 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, 21 January 1961 
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Once again Nel received wide acclaim for considering the situation on its merits and 
enhanced his reputation as a man of reason and compassion. A key theme of Nel’s term as 
Minister, reflected in this decision, was his effort to understand the conditions on the ground 
in South Africa’s richest and largest city.380 Even Carr, who was highly critical of many BAD 
officials, praised Nel: 
 
There was however, one notable exception, that of Mr De Wet Nel. His 
tenure as Minister of the Bantu Administration Department was marked by 
humanity, compassion and humour, and although he did not depart from 
National Party Policy, he did apply it with a real sense of the difficulties 
and hardships experienced by ordinary Africans.381 
 
Although the retention of Pimville can be considered a success it is important to note that 
over time the Council was stalled in its implementation of the scheme as housing loans from 
the Government dried up. This was largely due to the BAD’s focus on developing the 
homelands and reducing the attractiveness of urban areas in the hope of reversing 
urbanisation.382 The Mining Houses once again came to the rescue and in 1966 they 
organised a loan of R750 000 as a gift to Johannesburg on its 80th birthday to facilitate the 
completion of the Pimville scheme.383  
 
The ‘Locations in the Sky’ Formula and the Development of the Oriental Plaza 
With pragmatic cooperation firmly embedded in the relationship between the levels of 
Government, the BAD and JCC began negotiations on revising the formula for the continued 
                                                             
380 Nel was not the only high level government official making a contribution to rebuilding the relationship with 
the Council. Willie Maree, the Minister of ‘Bantu’ Education played a significant role in saving the Vocational 
Training Centre (VTC) setup by the JNEAD in 1942. The VTC provided artisan training for young men from the 
townships with the objective of improving their chances of finding employment. Despite the centre’s relatively 
small scale and the apparently benevolent intentions of the Council, its continued existence drew objections 
from white trade unions and the BAD. The trade unions did not want Africans being trained as artisans while 
the BAD argued that subsidising the centre was contrary to the policy that all African institutions should be self 
financing. The JNEAD, fearing that Government officials would close down the VTC, invited the Minister of 
Bantu Education to tour the facilities. It appears as if the Minister’s ultimate visit in August 1961 had a 
profound effect on him as shortly afterwards he gave his approval for the centre to remain open and for a new 
course to be added enabling the VTC expand. 
381 W. J. P. Carr, Soweto - Its creation, life and decline, South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 
1990, p. 60 
382 This process will be covered in more detail in the final chapter. 
383 W. J. P. Carr, Soweto - Its creation, life and decline, South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 
1990, p. 60 
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removal of Africans in terms of the ‘Locations in the Sky’ legislation. The BAD wanted to 
increase the pace of removals while the Council was concerned that a more stringent formula 
would upset property owners and investors. Estate agents around Johannesburg had warned 
Councillors of the potential disruption to the property market if the existing formula of one 
servant per five flats was changed.384 At a meeting of the Departmental Committee for 
Johannesburg in September 1963, the Minister outlined his plans to amend the formula to one 
servant per eight flats. Lewis highlighted the concerns of hotels, businesses and investors and 
appealed for the formula to stay the same. It appeared as if negotiations were heading for a 
stalemate which would ultimately result in the BAD pushing through its formula against the 
advice of the Council.  The Deputy Minister then highlighted a matter that he thought had 
been overlooked. He felt that any new formula should include compassionate cases placing 
the onus on property owners to decide how servants would be allocated. He intimated that he 
would be happy to agree to keep the existing formula of one servant for every five flats (plus 
a boiler attendant and a watchman) if the Council agreed that this would include all 
compassionate cases.385 The terms were acceptable to Council representatives and another 
pragmatic ‘success’ was achieved.386  
 
The BAD also wanted old buildings to be brought into line with the new formula as soon as 
possible. The Council argued that due to a lack of alternative accommodation very little could 
be done on this matter in the immediate future.387 The Minister suggested that, as a temporary 
measure, vacant housing in Alexandra be used to house female servants currently living in 
Johannesburg’s Northern Suburbs. Lewis was hesitant to agree to this line of action as the 
houses were in disrepair and had inadequate cooking and washing facilities. Botha then 
proposed that the accommodation be used for males but again Lewis was reluctant as in 
addition to the poor facilities there would be no guarantee of proper control. The Deputy 
Minister had the power to disregard the Council’s reservations but instead asked Smuts and 
Carr to carry out an inspection and prepare a report on the suitability or otherwise of the 
rooms. Although a resolution on the matter was deferred to a future meeting both parties 
continued to pursue cooperation over conflict.388  
                                                             
384 Estate Agents argued that investors would shy away from purchasing new stock knowing that they would 
struggle to find tenants because of the strict limitation of servants compared to older buildings. 
385UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ea 25, Minutes of the Departmental Committee for Johannesburg, 28 November 1962 
386 The people being removed would hardly call this a success. 
387 Carr was placed under immense pressure to expedite the removals in line with overall Apartheid policy. 
388 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ea 25, Minutes of the Departmental Committee for Johannesburg, 28 November 1962 
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An additional episode revealing a high level of cooperation between the levels of 
Government in the realm of African affairs was the idea and development of the Oriental 
Plaza. In 1963 a State committee was appointed under the chairmanship of Mr J.H. Niemand 
to ‘assist’ the Council with the planning and redevelopment of Pageview. The Council, aware 
of the flow of authority in the Country and hoping to ameliorate the harshness of the 
removals, nominated its full Management Committee to work in conjunction with the State 
Committee.389 The manner in which the resettlement of traders was to take place fell outside 
the terms of reference of this powerful body and it was initially assumed that traders would 
have to use their own resources and initiative to re-establish themselves in business in 
Fordsburg. Appreciating the difficulty of establishing a business at the best of times, Lewis 
approached Niemand and they speculated on the possibility of a massive redevelopment 
project in the form of an Indian market to assist traders in getting back on their feet.390 An 
analysis of the extent to which the Plaza succeeded in this regard falls beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. It is sufficient to say that the drive and leadership of Patrick Lewis played a 
significant role in enabling officials from all levels of government with different ideological 
backgrounds to work together and bring the mammoth project to fruition over eight years. 
Councillor Oberholzer paid tribute to Lewis’s contributions on his retirement shortly before 
the Plaza opened:   
 
Sir, some of the things he has done will be everlasting monuments to his 
‘memory’... I think of the Oriental Plaza. He is the father of the thought, of 
the displaced Indian traders, who will ultimately be removed from 
Pageview... he thought that something unique should be done to assist these 
people in their plight, and this was agreed to by the higher authorities, for 
that too, Sir, we are thankful.391 
 
Internal Division and Party Politics 
The JCC’s strategy of pragmatic cooperation, from the late 1950s until the mid 1960s, 
revealed considerable internal divisions within the UP group and triggered a number of 
                                                             
389 The Management Committee system came into existence in the early 1960s in an attempt to speed up 
decision making and improve the functioning of the Council. An extremely powerful group of five councillors 
made up the Committee. 
390 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ea 54, Speech by Mr JH Niemand at the opening of the Oriental Plaza, 6 December 
1971 
391 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ea 58, Tribute to Patrick Lewis on retiring from the Council by Councillor J.F. 
Oberholzer, 22 February 1972 
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attacks from its political rivals.392 The previous chapter highlighted a split between a 
conservative ‘Business Group’ and a more liberal ‘Political Group’ on whether or not to 
accede to the Government’s demand for assurances.393 In the aftermath of the decision to 
cooperate tensions continued to mount leading to the decision of at least five influential 
Members of Parliament, as well as other high ranking Party officials, to attempt to withdraw 
the UP from the JCC and replace it with an independent yet anti-nationalist ratepayers group. 
Senior Party members argued that it would be better for Johannesburg’s population, white 
and black, if municipal affairs were free of party political influence and anti-UP 
discrimination. They also hoped to censure a considerable number of their JCC 
representatives for not toeing the party line. These representatives were accused of promoting 
Government plans for the running of Johannesburg including Nel’s proposed banning of 
mixed gatherings.394  
 
A momentous meeting took place on the evening of the 14th January 1959 where a near 
record number of UP executives from centres across the Witwatersrand assembled to 
consider the proposal to leave municipal politics. After two and a half hours of heated debate 
the suggestion was rejected and the UP resolved to continue to ‘play its leading part in the 
City’s fight against the Nationalist Government’. A key factor in the decision was the general 
agreement that the UP had a duty to represent the people of Johannesburg at a time when 
traditional freedoms were being eroded by the Central State.395 The timing of the proposal, at 
the height of the ‘mixed meetings’ controversy, appears to have played a significant role in its 
defeat as reflected in the following political commentary from The Rand Daily Mail: 
 
While it is accepted that the principle of non-party local government is a 
good one, the UP’s decision to stay in the JCC is understandable. The idea 
of withdrawal has strong support and the likelihood is that this would have 
been agreed were it not for Mr Nel. The Government has been going out of 
its way to embarrass the UP through the council. Had the UP pulled out at 
this moment it would have looked liked running away. 
                                                             
392 Threads of pragmatic cooperation continued until the end of the municipal administration of African affairs 
in the early 1970s. 
393 It is important to note that while many primary sources describe a clear division between the groups there 
were a number of Councillors including Patrick Lewis who tried to walk a middle line judging each situation on 
its merits.  
394 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, The Rand Daily Mail, 14 January 1959 
395 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, The Rand Daily Mail, 15 January 1959 
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Both groups appear to have taken something out of the occasion. The liberals were pleased 
with the resolution to continue to fight the nationalists while the conservatives were satisfied 
that the UP remained in municipal politics and had managed to avoid a ‘liberal coup’.396 
  
 
Picture 7: UWHP, PRBL, A1132. Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail, 17 January 1959, the United Party decides to remain in 
the JCC  
 
It is important to emphasise that the divisions within the UP group in the City Council were 
closely tied to a rift in the party at a national level. The Rand Daily Mail argued that party 
members were in broad agreement on general principles but diverged significantly over their 
interpretation. The newspaper identified a ‘Liberal Group’ which wanted to take a firmer 
stand against the Government and push for more progressive race policies and a 
‘Conservative Group’ which complained bitterly that they had suffered in the general election 
when rural audiences asked them to explain some of the statements made by their liberal 
counterparts in the cities. The conservatives argued that the Party should freely admit when 
its policies were similar to those of the Nationalists and not attempt to fight every issue 
                                                             
396 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail, 23 January 1959 
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whereas the liberals believed that there were few areas of congruence between the two 
parties.397    
 
It was not long before Nationalist Councillors shrewdly played on the noticeable divisions 
within the UP group. In March 1960 Eben Cuyler suggested that a luncheon be organised to 
celebrate the Resettlement Board’s completion of the Western Areas Removal Scheme. This 
proposal placed the UP in an impossible position. If it resolved to take part in the celebrations 
it could be attacked on all sides – by internal liberals, Progressives and Nationalists - for the 
hypocrisy of the decision. If it chose to reject the idea it would open itself up to renewed 
Nationalist accusations of non-compliant behaviour and anger conservative councillors 
within the Party pushing for cooperation. Ultimately the Council decided that organising the 
luncheon was the lesser of the two evils and proceeded with arrangements. The Rand Daily 
Mail provided the following memorable description of the decision: 
 
For the Council now to join the Board at a commemorative function will be 
like rejoicing over the loot after having condemned the burglars. The less 
they have to do with it the better.1 
 
As expected the Nationalists were able to extract some political capital out of the matter 
when an official gave his smug assessment of the Council’s move: 
 
This will mark the final defeat of the Council. It put up so many scare 
stories about Sophiatown. Now it will fete the men it criticised so 
vehemently.1 
 
Despite calls for party unity on the matter, a small number of Councillors, including Jack 
Cutten, boycotted the lunch on principle and were severely criticised by the Mayor for doing 
so. A few months later Cutten was no longer able to tolerate the Council’s strategy of 
pragmatic cooperation and resigned from the Council.398 
 
                                                             
397 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Rand Daily Mail, 16 January 1959 
398 Cutten was criticised heavily by many of his United Party colleagues for his lack of consistency. He had 
remained a Councillor after the assurances saga in 1958 despite threatening to resign if the Council 
‘surrendered’ to the Government. 
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The divisions within the Council were exacerbated by Nel’s appointment of Marthinus Smuts 
as ‘Information Officer’ in late 1960. His role entailed ‘assisting’ local authorities across the 
Witwatersrand with the correct implementation of Government Policy as well as 
communicating this policy to urban Africans through the Advisory Boards. The Press 
reported that a new ‘Watchdog’ had been unleashed on Johannesburg with the power to 
attend confidential JNEAC meetings. The liberal group in Council interpreted the 
appointment as another attack on municipal autonomy and called for the UP to resist the 
move. It appears as though the conservatives considered Smuts’s appointment a relatively 
minor matter with the potential to improve communication between the two levels of 
government. Lewis had approved Smuts’ attendance at a November meeting of the JNEAC 
and was caught off-guard by the criticism directed towards him by the Press for doing so. He 
moved swiftly to walk a middle line between the conservatives and liberals stating that while 
Smuts had attended the meeting he had done so only briefly to address the Committee on 
specific items. Lewis went on to emphasise that although the Committee had nothing to hide 
from the Government it would never allow Smuts to take part in its private conversations and 
deliberations.399  
 
A key aspect of Lewis’s leadership approach was to engage in behind the scenes negotiations 
keeping many details away from reporters.400 Considering the negative aspects of media 
battles during the disputes of the 1950s this appears to have been a prudent strategy. 
Ironically Lewis’s desire stay out of the newspapers resulted in a well publicised running 
skirmish with Progressive Party Councillor Kathleen Mitchell. She criticised Lewis’s 
secretive approach arguing that the citizens of Johannesburg had a right to know what 
negotiations were taking place in their name. She also accused the Council of failing to 
protest loudly enough against unjust laws. Lewis defended his actions and those of the UP 
unequivocally: 
 
I can assure your readers that we do protest vigorously. That these protests 
don’t always appear in the press, I freely admit. If we seem to be constantly 
bickering and sniping at the Government and highlighting a particular area of 
                                                             
399 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Bb, Vol 2, The Sunday Times, 13 November 1960 
400 On his retirement from the Council The Rand Daily Mail published a farewell article titled ‘Mr No Comment 
Bows out’. 
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disagreement we thereby place the Minister concerned in a position in which if 
he alters his decision he would lose face. 
 
Is it not better in the interests of the African people for us to use reasoned 
negotiation to endeavour to change the situation and then having achieved 
success leave it at that rather than crow about the apparent victory and then 
make it impossible to conduct in the next set of negotiations in a calm 
atmosphere?401 
 
Although this response from Lewis was calm and considered, the consistent, and in his mind 
unfair, attacks from the Progressives infuriated him. He argued powerfully that they created 
various myths about the UP which were then repeated ad nauseam to voters in the hope that 
something would stick. One of these was the allegation that there was no difference between 
UP and NP policy. In the realm of African administration Lewis produced countless 
examples to debunk this myth including the UP’s stance that the Pass Laws were 
unnecessarily harsh and in need of considerable amendment, its opposition to the 
Government’s plan to remove Indians from Johannesburg in terms of the Group Areas Act; 
and its continual emphasis on the importance of freehold title for urban Africans. He 
strengthened his point by providing the following commentary on Government policy: 
 
Those who have come face to face with Nationalist policy can only regard it 
as evil – where frank discussion is regarded as Treason, where people are 
banished without trial, where a totalitarian doctrine pervades 
everything...402 
 
Another myth which Lewis was keen to expose was the claim by the Progressives that they 
were the only ones who cared. In doing this he mentioned the achievements of the UP as well 
as his own paternalist credentials: 
 
I believe that the United Party controlled Johannesburg City Council has, 
within the confining legislation of the Central Government, and within the 
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402 UWHP, PRBL, A1132. Fa, Provincial Election Speech by Patrick Lewis, 24 January 1962 
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means at its disposal, come down to earth and proved by action and not 
words that it has the welfare of the Native People at heart. 
 
I claim to be a friend of the Non-European Peoples. Over 25 years ago I 
was Chairman of an organisation called the Joint Council for Europeans and 
Africans. The South African Institute of Race Relations honoured me by 
appointing me as one of their honorary Life Members after my many years 
of association with them as Honourary Treasurer, I think the efforts I have 
made, while no doubt subject to criticism, have nevertheless been a genuine 
attempt to contribute to their well being.403 
 
Progressive Party members respected Lewis’s credentials and even approached him a number 
of times to join their ranks. In explaining his decision to stay within the UP and arguing that 
others should do so as well he used the following analogy: 
 
I am interested in forestry. If there are dead trees in my forests I don’t burn 
down the forests, I replant the affected areas.404 
 
In addition to this he had very little confidence in the ability of the Progressive Party to be a 
viable political alternative. He often repeated the Sunday Times’ clever use of Churchill’s 
famous speech to emphasise this point: 
  
Never in the field of Political Activities have so few trumpeted so loudly 
about so little.405 
 
A key trend described in this chapter has been the vast improvement in the relationship 
between the JCC and the BAD from the late 1950s to the mid 1960s.  This is reflected in the 
following key passage of a letter from Lewis to Deputy Minister Botha: 
 
During my period of office, I have tried to establish a relationship between 
our Council and your Ministry whereby a modus vivendi was preserved. In 
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a large number of matters we have not agreed on policy, but I like to 
believe that where I have been able to put up a good case, my views have 
been respected as being views sincerely held, and I would like to thank you 
for the consideration you have given to my representations. I would also 
like to state that I have at all times received the utmost consideration from 
the members of your staff with whom I have to deal.406 
 
The transformation of the Mentz Committee during this time was also highlighted by 
Lewis in the following statement to the Press: 
 
The City’s deputation has found the meetings with the Deputy Minister 
most helpful in sorting out many of the difficulties necessarily associated 
with the administration of its complex task. While at one stage the term 
Watchdog Committee might have been justified the recent meetings have 
not been conducted in this atmosphere. These days the Government comes 
to us for information and there is no tension between us. They know we 
have a difficult task and that we do it well.407 
 
Looking back on this period of the relationship between the JCC and BAD, Councillor J. F. 
Oberholzer emphasised the huge changes and significant influence of Patrick Lewis:   
  
You know, Sir, when he first entered the Council and took over the 
Chairmanship of the Non-European Affairs Committee, it was a rather 
torrid time... there were many difficulties, the late Dr Verwoerd was then 
Minister of Native Affairs and after him Mr De Wet Nel. It was Patrick 
Lewis through his personality, and also through his example, and his 
approach, was able to put the relationship between the Council and those 
two Ministers on an amiable and sound footing. It was then, Sir, that things 
began to happen in Johannesburg.408  
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Although the JCC achieved a number of notable concessions through the strategy of 
pragmatic cooperation it is important to emphasise that during this period the BAD extended 
its dominance over local authorities and ramped up the implementation of its overall policy of 
Separate Development.409 Regulations were extended and strengthened and their effects on 
the urban African population became increasingly severe. From the turn of the decade there 
was a noticeable shift from a policy of stabilisation of the urban African population in the 
name of ‘practical Apartheid’ to the Stallardist ideal of reducing the number of Africans in 
urban areas to an absolute minimum. Influx control measures were tightened, housing loans 
become increasingly difficult to obtain and any schemes that were approved had to be on a 
self financing basis. In this context a number of JCC representations to the NAD were 
rebuffed. Various Councillors and officials, including Carr and Lewis, protested forcefully 
against the removal of the Indian Community from Pageview. They pushed for changes to the 
harsh restriction on trading rights in African areas which were designed to ‘encourage’ 
Africans to move to the homelands. They put forward numerous suggestions on 
improvements to the pass laws hoping these would ameliorate some of the hardships on 
ordinary Africans. All these complaints and suggestions fell on deaf ears. The dominance of 
the Government and its attack on the permanency of urban Africans would intensify from the 
mid 1960s onward. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
409 A pragmatic two-way relationship emerged during this period. Although the Council was far from being 
reduced to the role of an ‘Agent of the State’ there was no question that the Central State was the dominant 
partner.  
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Chapter Five: The Beginning of the End 
In his memoirs Carr describes the mid 1960s as ‘the beginning of the end’ with the BAD 
adding impetus to the implementation of Apartheid.410 In this concluding chapter I will 
briefly describe the renewed tensions between the JCC and BAD over housing policy and 
influx control and trace the emergence of the Administration Board system which brought the 
era of municipal control over urban African administration to an end. 
  
As the 1960s unfolded Government policy became increasingly focused on homeland 
development and reducing the size of the urban African population to an absolute 
minimum.411 Housing schemes were still approved in urban areas but as a general rule, local 
authorities were expected to solve their housing problems via homelands as a first step.412 
JNEAD officials argued that this approach was not the answer to the genuine waiting lists for 
family housing in urban areas.413 The output of the JCC’s Housing Division declined 
dramatically from the early 1960s, largely as a result of the reduction in housing loan 
approvals (see graph below). In 1966, despite the housing backlog approaching eighteen 
thousand units (including Pimville), the Division continued to be starved of work and the 
JCC contemplated shutting it down. The Management Committee vetoed the move but the 
episode reflected the growing housing crisis in Soweto at the time. 
 
In a description of the challenges related to the redevelopment of Pimville, Lewis reveals the 
frustrations of the Council and the ideology of the BAD during this period: 
  
The Johannesburg Council, for a long period, were frustrated in the 
implementation of this scheme by the delays in obtaining approval – 
constant requests for ‘motivation’ were used by the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development, even though the removal scheme had 
been approved by the Minister. The list of houses built portrays the slow-
down in catering for the growing backlog in housing. One realises that 
                                                             
410 W. J. P. Carr, Soweto - Its creation, life and decline, South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 
1990, p. 183 
411 A number of sources point to the late 1950s for this shift. 
412 The JNEAD, for example, was encouraged to build family homes in Ladysmith. The BAD’s plan was for 
workers to commute over three hundred kilometres to work in Johannesburg. Carr believed this suggestion 
was absurd and refused to play any part in its implementation. In his memoirs he argues that this sealed the 
fate of the JNEAD.  
413 University of the Witwatersrand Historical Papers (UWHP), Private Papers of PRB Lewis (PRBL), A1132, 
Ea63, Presidential Address at the Fourth Biennial Meeting of Officials, 13 November 1972 
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unlimited funds were not available414, but at the same time that these funds 
were wanted for housing in Soweto, the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development were endeavouring to induce the 
Johannesburg City Council to embark on housing schemes in Ladysmith in 
Natal, the idea being that families could be housed there while their 
menfolk commuted to Johannesburg.415 
 
 
   
Figure 2: Output of the JCC’s Housing Division 1954-1971. Core figures taken from UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ed28, Evidence 
submitted by Lewis to the Riekert Commission in the late 1970s 
 
In March 1967 Carr and the City Engineer co-authored Forward Planning Report No 4 - an 
investigation into the growth of the urban African population in Johannesburg and its housing 
requirements. The report argued that the character of Johannesburg’s African population had 
changed dramatically since the 1940s. The majority of residents were now part of a settled 
population whose children knew no other home other than Johannesburg. The report 
estimated that the population of the African areas under the control of the JCC would 
increase by over one hundred and fifty five thousand people by 1980 requiring an additional 
                                                             
414 An interesting meeting occurred in December 1966 between JCC and BAD officials. The BAD was looking for 
support for its homeland development projects and asked the Council for money from its accumulated beer 
profits fund. The Department had been finding it difficult to subsidise homeland services and amenities with 
existing funds - this position was exacerbated by a severe drought that year. The BAD felt that as the Council 
had ‘completed’ most of its housing projects this would not be too much to ask. Lewis quickly pointed out that 
this was not the case and the JCC was waiting for approval from the BAD to continue its housing programme. 
Government officials continued to emphasise that the Council should not spend all its money in the urban 
areas as this would make it difficult to attract Africans to the homelands. Whether the Council contributed or 
not is unclear but it is nevertheless interesting to observe the inverted power relations in this brief example.   
415 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ed 28, Evidence submitted by Patrick Lewis to the Riekert Commission, Unknown date 
(approximately 1978-1979)  
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six square miles of land for housing.416 The authors argued that Johannesburg faced an urgent 
and immediate housing problem and recommended that additional Group Areas be created as 
Soweto was virtually circumscribed. It also highlighted that rental subsidisation would be 
necessary for higher density housing schemes and that improved transport infrastructure was 
urgently required to cater for the growing population.417 
 
A copy of the Forward Planning Report was sent to the BAD where its predictions and 
recommendations were not warmly received. Deputy Minister Blaar Coetzee, who had staked 
his political career on halting the movement of Africans to the cities, described it as the 
biggest load of nonsense he had ever read.418 The Afrikaner Press heaped criticism on the 
report and its authors while the English newspapers humorously highlighted the foolishness 
of Johannesburg’s officials for pointing out a reality that was contrary to Government 
policy.419 
 
 
Picture 8: AUFS, WJPC, PV423, 1/5/2/4, Vol 2, Die Transvaler, 4 April 1967, A cartoon representing the Nationalist feeling 
towards the Forward Planning Report and the JCC. 
 
                                                             
416 The predictions of the report would have been amplified if the areas under the control of the Resettlement 
Board were included. 
417 Archives of the University of the Free State (AUFS), Private Papers of WJP Carr (WJPC), PV423, 1/5/2/4, Vol 
2, Forward Planning Report No 4, 10 March 1967. 
418 Carr, Soweto, p. 174 
419 The English Press took a similar line when describing the Border Industry Policy designed to ‘reverse the 
tide of African labour’. The Rand Daily Mail stated that ‘officials can argue all they like but they will always be 
defeated by the basic arithmetic of the exercise’. 
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The BAD immediately set up a committee under the Chairmanship of I.P. van Onselen to 
investigate the report’s findings. Apart from being asked to take a busload of officials around 
Soweto, the Committee did not consult the JCC in any way and its findings were never 
released to JCC officials. The effects were, however, immediately apparent as housing loan 
applications were frozen.420 In a memorandum to the BAD Carr candidly described the 
potentially volatile housing situation in Soweto: 
 
The position today is one with which the Council is concerned. Non-
consideration of all housing loan applications, until the Committee 
appointed by the Minister to consider the long term effect of a projected 
increase in the Bantu population, can have serious effects. [It is one] that 
will leave the lawful population of Soweto not only unhoused but 
disgruntled, disruptive and potentially explosive.421 
 
The housing schemes proposed in the Forward Planning Report were never carried out 
(approximately twenty three thousand houses) and the housing backlog continued to rise.422 
 
In the midst of the fallout from the Forward Planning Report Carr decided that it was finally 
time to bow out of the JNEAD. At the beginning of 1968 he informed the Council of his 
intention to take early retirement on his sixtieth birthday in February 1969.423 Despite 
surprising overtures from a few members of the BAD asking him to reconsider, he decided to 
let his early retirement stand and to push forward with as many projects as possible in his 
final year.424 His rationale was that the policies of the BAD during this time were so 
repugnant that he had to get out as soon as he could.  There appears to be slightly more to this 
                                                             
420 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ed 28, Evidence submitted by Patrick Lewis to the Riekert Commission, Unknown date 
(approximately 1978-1979) 
421 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ea40, Memorandum compiled by Carr and submitted to the Bantu Administration and 
Development Department regarding housing and related problems in Johannesburg, 5 August 1968 
422 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ed 28, Evidence submitted by Patrick Lewis to the Riekert Commission, Unknown date 
(approximately 1978-1979) 
423 Lewis delivered a moving tribute to Carr as the curtain fell on his almost four decade career with the JNEAD. 
He emphasised the courage it must have taken to have accepted the role of Manager in 1952 in the midst of a 
housing crisis, extreme poverty and high unemployment. He highlighted the many crises Carr overcame from 
the Dube Riots and the implementation of the ‘Locations in the Sky Legislation’ to the Appointment of the 
‘Watchdog’ Committee and the onslaught from Verwoerd. Lewis could not explain how Carr had managed to 
retain the confidence of the people of Soweto despite overseeing constantly changing laws that were of often 
harsh and unjust.  Lewis finished by saying ‘His monument is Soweto, that ‘City’ within a City which, without 
his painstaking endeavour, could not have been created’ 
424 Carr. Soweto. p. 184 
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decision as Carr had long regarded many Nationalist policies as ‘repugnant’. His vocal and 
persistent opposition to ethnic grouping in the 1950s is a prime example. In a letter to the 
Town Clerk, at the height of the NAD’s offensive against the Council in 1958, Carr not only 
highlighted the difficulty of his position but revealed concern over losing his livelihood:  
 
The threat which is implied in the final paragraph of the Secretary’s letter is 
disturbing because it means in effect that an official holding a very difficult 
position, where often strongly conflicting views are held by members of the 
two opposing political parties, quite apart from the views of the Native 
Population whom he is expected to keep in order and contented, can be 
deprived of his livelihood for trying to do his duty honestly.425  
 
It is conceivable that by 1968 Carr had achieved a level of financial security after 
almost forty years with the Council - seventeen as Manager of the JNEAD.  Perhaps 
this enabled him to make a decision he had been contemplating for many years. 
 
Carr’s strong relationship with Patrick Lewis, their shared paternalist convictions 
and the period of pragmatic cooperation in the early 1960s may also have delayed 
Carr’s decision. As emphasised in chapter four, Lewis played a significant role in 
improving the relationship between the JCC and BAD after the assurances saga. He 
not only reduced the amount of political wrangling compared to the 1950s but 
attempted to cushion Carr and other top officials from Government criticism.  From 
1958-1969 Lewis and Carr worked closely together to try and achieve the ‘best’ 
possible results for Johannesburg and its urban African population within the legal 
framework of the time. A final scenario that may shed light on Carr’s decision was 
that he saw the writing on the wall for municipal urban African administration. He 
would no doubt have digested the findings of the Van Rensburg report (see below) 
and seen the legislative machinery preparing to relieve municipalities of their 
responsibilities. The most likely explanation for the timing of Carr’s decision to take 
early retirement is a coalescence of the factors described above. 
   
                                                             
425 UWHP, PRBL, A1132,  EC1, Letter from WJP Carr to the Town Clerk, Undated (Approximately mid-May 1958)  
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In August 1968 a high level JCC deputation, including Carr and Lewis, met with the Deputy 
Minister to discuss the deteriorating housing situation in Soweto. Carr prepared a detailed 
memorandum highlighting the major issues concerning the Council. He politely stated that 
the intention of the memorandum was not to challenge the intent of Government policy but to 
indicate to senior officials what was happening on the ground as a result of ‘circulars which 
appear to be issued without always realising the possible consequences’. The Council urged 
the BAD to reconsider the directive that proclaimed that all dwellings should be made 
available on a lettings only basis. The JCC was being asked not to grant any further thirty 
year leases although the promulgated regulations of Johannesburg, approved by the Minister, 
allowed this. Carr argued that thousands of homeowners were proud of their possessions, felt 
they had a stake in the community in which they had lived for many years and were, in 
general, responsible citizens. In the following passage Carr not only emphasised his strong 
ideological position but issued a subtle prediction for the future of Soweto: 
 
To deny teachers, professional men, shopkeepers, Urban Bantu Councillors 
and other important Bantu, the right to continue to possess buildings in the 
area in which they have lived for many years and are likely to live for many 
more years and who have no direct connection with the Bantu Homelands, 
is to run the risk of creating frustration, fear and all its consequent evils for 
the future. There is class distinction amongst the Bantu people and they 
should be allowed to put up dwellings which they themselves may own, if 
not on a freehold basis then certainly on a 30 year lease in terms of the 
existing Bantu Village Regulations.  
 
Carr also made a general comment an overall housing policy. While acknowledging that 
hostel accommodation would become increasingly important as a result of tighter influx 
control, he urged BAD officials to recognise that family accommodation was equally 
important due to the natural increase of the population. A survey conducted a few years later 
by the JNEAD, on behalf of the BAD, regarding the origins of workers in Johannesburg 
confirmed Carr’s position by revealing that Johannesburg had become its own biggest 
supplier of labour.426 
 
                                                             
426 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ea63, Presidential Address at the Fourth Biennial Meeting of Officials, 13 November 
1972 
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At the end of 1968 in reaction to the renewed tensions between the JCC and the BAD over 
the Forward Planning Report, general housing policy and the report of the Van Rensburg 
Committee (see below), Lewis, now Mayor of Johannesburg, decided once again to try and 
improve relations between the levels of Government. The idea was a big one: to invite over 
two hundred MPs, Senators, Cabinet Ministers and Heads of Government Departments to 
visit Johannesburg and Soweto to observe conditions on the ground in South Africa’s 
economic hub.427 He believed the event would be an excellent networking and public 
relations exercise to bring lawmakers, high level government officials and local councillors 
and administrators closer together. The Sunday Times fully supported the idea: 
 
What a wonderful opportunity it would give our legislators to study the 
complexities of this great city first hand – to observe its achievements, to 
acquaint themselves with its problems and to note its weaknesses.428  
 
Lewis hoped that a comprehensive tour of the African areas would not only highlight the 
Council’s achievements but draw attention to the urgent housing problems emerging as a 
result of Government policy. Councillor Francois Oberholzer, Chairman of the Management 
committee agreed: 
 
We believe that as a result of the shortage of funds for housing we are 
reaching a critical stage in Soweto. People are becoming restive. We want 
the Government to see that additional funds are urgently needed. Soweto is 
becoming increasingly overcrowded. Families are sharing houses and 
doubling up all over the township. We have a waiting list of more than 
10 000. We believe there are thousands of others who are living with other 
families and have not reported it.429 
 
                                                             
427 The idea emerged from a discussion between Lewis and Speaker of the House of Assembly J.H. Klopper. 
Klopper mentioned that the mining industry had extended an invitation to Parliamentarians to visit various 
industry sites to get an idea of conditions on the ground. Lewis believed this would be a fantastic method to 
improve local-central relations.  
428 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ea44, The Sunday Times, 10 August 1969 
429 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ea44, The Star, 5 August 1969 
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Prime Minister B.J. Vorster liked the idea but made his support conditional on the acceptance 
of the proposal by all political parties in Johannesburg.430 Eben Cuyler was kept in the picture 
throughout the process and City officials fully expected the NP in Johannesburg to support 
the scheme. As momentum behind the idea grew, Cuyler made the dramatic announcement 
that the NP in Johannesburg would not endorse the event. This effectively wrecked any 
chance of moving forward. He justified his decision by arguing that it was important for 
relations between the levels of government to improve before a visit of this nature could be 
successful. This reasoning appears highly dubious as the overall purpose of the visit was to 
build relationships. A second line of argument used by Cuyler to defend his decision was that 
there was already too much contact between the JCC and BAD resulting in the Provincial 
Council being ignored. While this claim was broadly accurate, The Star rightly pointed out 
that this was a procedural matter that could receive attention through existing channels 
without derailing the visit.431    
  
Councillor Oberholzer spoke out strongly against Cuyler’s political intervention: 
  
I think Mr Cuyler has done [Johannesburg] a disservice with his bigoted, small 
minded attitude.432  
 
I think he is afraid to show people that the city is not the Sodom and Gomorrah he 
has always made it out to be. He was afraid the visitors would see for themselves 
and would naturally question the accuracy of the statements he had made in the past.  
 
In many ways I consider it a calamity for the City that Mr Cuyler exercised what 
amounted to a veto, otherwise a great step forward would have been taken in forging 
a real understanding of our difficulties and problems and hopes in the minds of the 
Government.433 
 
The entire scheme ultimately succumbed to party political intrigue despite Lewis’s intention 
to make the proposed visit a non-political event in the interests of the City. It appears unlikely 
                                                             
430 UWHP, PBRL, A1132, Ea44, The Sunday Times, 10 August 1969 
431 UWHP, PBRL, A1132, Ea44, The Star, 7 August 1969 
432 UWHP, PBRL, A1132, Ea44, The Star, 5 August 1969 
433 UWHP, PBRL, A1132, Ea44, The Sunday Times, 10 August 1969 
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that the BAD would have granted significant concessions to the JCC in any event as, during 
this time, it was moving steadily towards the creation of the Administration Board system. 
 
Bekker and Humphries argue that the shift to this new system – which ended municipal 
jurisdiction over urban African administration - was largely a result of the perception within 
the BAD that various municipalities were not implementing Government policy as efficiently 
as desired. The BAD made numerous attempts to expedite policy implementation in 
Johannesburg during the early stages of Apartheid but remained frustrated with the overall 
rate of progress.434 The Department was particularly concerned about halting the flow of 
Africans to the urban areas and in 1965 the Minister appointed an Inter-departmental 
Committee, chaired by P.S.F.J. Van Rensburg, to review influx control policy. The 
Committee’s report, released in 1967, condemned the existing system and revealed a number 
of flaws and inadequacies in legislation and various administrative procedures.  It severely 
criticised Section 10 of the Native Laws Amendment Act for undermining influx control and 
argued that the effectiveness of the labour bureau system was being diluted by the inability of 
local authorities to police the employment of illegal residents.435 The report highlighted that 
spot checks on large employers in Johannesburg revealed that approximately sixteen percent 
of the workforce was illegally employed.436  
 
The Van Rensburg report reinforced the idea that local authorities harbouring an opposing 
ideological outlook could not be trusted to implement policy as effectively as required.437 The 
publication of the Forward Planning Report placed renewed focus on the ideology and 
conduct of the JCC. In a debate in the House of Assembly in early February 1968, Mr 
Coetzee made his feelings towards the Council abundantly clear.438 After conceding that the 
JCC was cooperating more effectively with the BAD in a number of areas he swung onto the 
attack criticising the Council on three major issues. Firstly, he condemned the JCC for 
operating its ‘Bantu’ Revenue Account at a loss. He believed that a large portion of Council 
spending was unnecessary and was annoyed by the city’s refusal to collect economic rentals: 
                                                             
434 The issuing of threats and ultimatums during the disputes of the 1950s; the appointment of the Mentz 
Committee and the demand for assurances during the showdown of 1958; the appointment of Marthinus 
Smuts as ‘Information Officer’ on the Rand; and the numerous requests for progress updates.  
435 The Committee argued that Section 10 was in opposition to Government policy as it allowed many 
‘unproductive’ Africans to enter and remain in urban areas.  
436 S. Bekker and R. Humphries, From Control to Confusion: The Changing Role of Administration Boards in 
South Africa, 1971-1983, Shuter & Shooter, Pietermaritzburg, 1985, p. 7 
437 Ibid 
438 Mr Coetzee publicly staked his political career on halting the flow of Africans to the cities. 
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I want to give the Johannesburg City Council a light warning today. They 
must please pay attention to our instructions regarding the collection of 
economic rents because all they are doing now is to subsidise this account 
from the White revenue account because they cannot do their own work 
properly.439 
 
Secondly he denounced the Council’s attitude towards the BAD’s directive that local 
authorities should not grant any further 30 year leases and lastly, he severely criticised the 
findings of the Forward Planning Report warning that ‘the Government in the further 
execution of its policy will not tolerate that any City Council thwarts it.440 
 
Two months after this attack Mr Coetzee formally opened the Urban Bantu Council in 
Soweto and further berated the JCC.441  Carr provides the following description of Coetzee’s 
attitude during the ceremony: 
 
He was not pleased with the standard of the building because it conflicted 
with his department’s policy of not creating anything in the urban area 
which would serve as a magnet for Africans to remain instead of returning 
to the homelands. 
 
Following the publication of the Van Rensburg Committee’s findings, the BAD announced 
its intention to form Labour Boards which would relieve local authorities of jurisdiction over 
influx control and labour regulation. The Star commented that the move was seen as an all 
out effort by the Government to halt the increasing flow of Africans to the urban areas.442 A 
                                                             
439 AUFS, WJPC, PV423, 1/5/2/4, Vol 2, The Star,  28 February 1968 
440 Ibid 
441 The Soweto UBC replaced the various Advisory Boards in 1965. The UBC system supposedly gave African 
communities more autonomy and power over their own affairs.  
442 The all encompassing effects of this policy were revealed in a tragic event that occurred at the Registration 
Branch of the JNEAD. In mid-1968 a JNEAD staff member – in great distress – reported to Carr that an African 
man had hanged himself in the lock-up attached to the labour bureau at 80 Albert Street. Following an 
investigation into the tragedy it came to light that the man was desperate for employment but as his papers 
did not entitle him to be in Johannesburg he was put into the lock-up until he could be handed over to the 
Native Commissioner for ‘repatriation’. Carr was deeply troubled by this incident and addressed all the senior 
staff at the JNEAD on the need for compassion and understanding. He asked them to put themselves in the 
shoes of the applicant on the other side of the counter before coming to a final decision. Shortly after this 
incident Carr was summoned to the Mayor’s office and informed that a serious complaint had been lodged 
131 
 
draft bill aimed at decreasing labour turnover, increasing the ability of authorities to remove 
superfluous labour to the homelands and ensuring that employees and employers complied 
with regulations was circulated for comment. It was withdrawn later in the year after 
receiving widespread criticism for placing labour controls and housing under the jurisdiction 
of two different bodies. BAD officials accepted the criticism and in 1969 the first draft of the 
Bantu Affairs Administration Board Bill was circulated. It combined housing and labour 
under one body effectively ending municipal jurisdiction over urban African administration. 
After a number of redrafts the Act was passed in 1971.443 
 
A number of individuals and organisations spoke out firmly against this centralisation of 
urban African administration. The SAIRR released a statement outlining its suspicions that a 
new authoritarian style of administration would replace the JCC’s humane approach and lead 
to a deterioration in race relations in the City. Soweto’s Urban Bantu Council voiced its fears 
that the new Boards would focus more on removals than providing housing for legally 
entitled families. These fears were confirmed when Kallie van der Merwe, Chairman of the 
East Rand Administration Board, stated that one of the greatest aims of the Boards was to 
ensure that economically inactive Africans would gradually disappear from ‘white’ South 
Africa.444 The principle that the Boards would be financially self supporting also stirred up 
significant concerns. The SAIRR argued that this would adversely affect the provision of 
medical, welfare and recreational services and drive up rentals. It heaped praise on the JCC 
for having the foresight to subsidise its native revenue account for many years despite 
Government pressure.445 The response from the BAD was that the new system could not be 
worse than the old one and that critics should wait until the Boards were operational before 
evaluating them.446  
 
A common argument in favour of the new system was that it would increase labour mobility 
and make life easier for employers and employees. Carr exposed weaknesses in this 
reasoning in an interview with the Financial Mail in June 1973 by pointing out that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
against him regarding his ‘instructions to staff to disregard government regulations and let people into 
Johannesburg who did not qualify’. According to Carr, an NP aligned member of his staff reported his actions 
to a leading NP Councillor who took up the matter officially with the BAD. 
443 Bekker and Humphries, From Control to Confusion, p. 10 
444 UAFS, WJPC, PV423, 1/1/2/1, Vol 2, Financial Mail, 29 June 1973 
445 The SAIRR argued that the JCC’s humane approach to urban African administration had played a significant 
role in improving race relations in the city.  
446 UAFS, WJPC, PV423, 1/1/2/1 Vol 3, Natal Mercury, 28 June 1973 
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largest movement of labour on the Witwatersrand was between Johannesburg and the East 
Rand where two different Boards were in operation.447 If a business owner based in 
Johannesburg and employing workers from Soweto wanted to relocate to Kempton Park he 
would be unable to take his employees with him in terms of the legislation. This reality 
diluted the strength of the labour mobility argument. 
  
Looking back on the transition to the West Rand Administration Board, Lewis argued that no 
proper planning was undertaken to enable the establishment of a viable administration.448 He 
maintained that if it was not for the JCC, the disarray at the time would have been much 
worse. He also accused WRAB officials of having very little experience in the administration 
of urban African affairs. In his opinion, Board members were chosen more for their 
Nationalist credentials than their ability to do a proper job. Lewis believed that African 
communities were acutely aware of the different standards of service delivery between the 
JCC controlled areas and the Resettlement Board areas and did not support the change. The 
almost immediate hike in rentals and deterioration in services confirmed their reservations.449   
 
Bekker and Humphries were surprised that the Government took so long to remove the 
responsibility for urban African administration from the municipalities.450 Carr was equally 
surprised: 
  
The removal of African urban administration from local authorities was, 
however, a logical step, and it was not unreasonable for the government to 
exclude a hostile local authority such as Johannesburg which was a constant 
irritant with its endless querying of government policy. In fact I was 
surprised that this had not been done earlier.451 
 
He believed that the seeds for the abolition of municipal African administration were 
sown in the mid 1950s when the Resettlement Board was formed to clear the 
                                                             
447 Carr supported the idea of declaring the entire Witwatersrand region a single labour area. 
448 WRAB took over in July 1973  
449 UWHP, PRBL, A1132, Ed 28, Evidence submitted by Patrick Lewis to the Riekert Commission. Unknown date 
(approximately 1978-1979) 
450 Bekker and Humphries, From Control to Confusion, p. 10 
451 Carr, Soweto, p. 183 
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Western Areas.452 The Council had always assumed that the Board would be a 
temporary body and requested clarification on its future from the NAD on numerous 
occasions. Eben Cuyler was one of the most vocal supporters of centralisation and 
used every opportunity he could to suggest that the Resettlement Board should 
become a permanent body with expanded powers and ultimately replace the 
‘defiant’ JCC.  
 
In 1956 Verwoerd argued that that there was no reason for the Government to take 
control of urban African affairs if all parties were aware of their statutory duties and 
respected the flow of authority in the country. He used the UP controlled Benoni 
Council as an example of what could be achieved if local authorities rigorously 
implemented Government policy.453 It is conceivable that the assurances given by 
the JCC in 1958 and the period of pragmatic cooperation that followed delayed the 
Government’s ultimate decision to remove local authorities from the realm of urban 
African administration.454 It would be interesting to know whether or not other large 
UP dominated councils experienced a similar period and pattern of pragmatic 
cooperation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
452 Carr, Soweto, p. 183 
453University of the Witwatersrand Historical Papers (UWHP), Conferences of the Institute of Administrators of 
Non European Affairs (CIANEA), AG2703, Box 1, Opening Address by Dr Verwoerd to the 1956 IANEA 
Conference 
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